tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post524262117958144631..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: A reliabilist moral argument for the truth of some religious beliefAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-67823620082946813752011-08-09T16:28:34.315-05:002011-08-09T16:28:34.315-05:00Clifton:
I am thinking here of something in betwe...Clifton:<br /><br />I am thinking here of something in between the very general and the very specific as the relevant process, something like "producing a non-empirical belief as a way of discouraging defection in prisoner's dilemmas."<br /><br />But I feel the force of your worry.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-68621264732366609202011-08-09T16:11:40.714-05:002011-08-09T16:11:40.714-05:00It seems that whether or not the naturalist is com...It seems that whether or not the naturalist is committed to (1) depends on how broadly or narrowly we construe evolutionary processes. On a narrow construal (one on which an evolutionary process is a specific adaptation in response to specific selective pressures) I don't see what's stopping the naturalist from saying that our moral beliefs are the result of one evolutionary process and our religious beliefs are the result of another.<br /><br />Surely there's some story to told on which our moral beliefs are the result of pressures that selected for *true* moral beliefs, while our religious beliefs are the result of pressures that merely selected for religious belief, true or not. Whether there would be any reason to believe such a story is another matter.<br /><br />But if the argument is trading on a broader construal of an evolutionary process (the entire evolutionary history of an organism, perhaps) why is that the construal that should be of interest to a reliabilist?Cliftonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15734613275995240974noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64868356105954323542011-08-09T15:29:38.999-05:002011-08-09T15:29:38.999-05:00Professor Pruss: Thanks so much for the added info...Professor Pruss: Thanks so much for the added information and I really enjoyed the article: “God, evolutionary psychology and moral realism” as well as the related post:<br /> “EAAN in the case of moral knowledge;” especially what you stated: “I think one can use EAAN-type arguments for a more limited conclusion, namely that if naturalism and evolution are true, then certain important kinds of knowledge are seriously threatened, specifically moral (and maybe more generally normative) knowledge (I think certain kinds of modal and metaphysical knowledge are also threatened, and it may be that metaphysical naturalism falls within the class of threatened knowledge).” <br />I want to re-read and study that article and the related posts (Gene’s criticism and your responses).<br /><br />A bit off topic, Dr. Pruss would it be plausibly defensible for me to maintain:<br />“If it is possible that there is a moral absolute in one possible world, since it is an absolute, the moral absolute would be true in all possible worlds or necessary.”<br />If you have time to respond, I don’t presume a long answer. I am already so grateful for your posts and answers you have already provided.proof for godhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16804021329824674064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-33078517094747748402011-08-09T14:57:49.137-05:002011-08-09T14:57:49.137-05:00Mike:
Another move is Gene Witmer's here.Mike:<br /><br />Another move is Gene Witmer's <a href="http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2011/08/god-evolutionar.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-92022334117405748412011-08-08T20:24:59.866-05:002011-08-08T20:24:59.866-05:00Mike:
Well, the anti-reliabilist in epistemology ...Mike:<br /><br />Well, the anti-reliabilist in epistemology will deny 4. <br /><br />I am a bit sceptical of 4 myself, but I am inclined to accept some version of the principle that if we know our beliefs come from an unreliable process, then the beliefs aren't knowledge. This won't support the full argument, but some version may yet survive.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-28424575450548375502011-08-08T20:22:17.887-05:002011-08-08T20:22:17.887-05:00The one hope I see for an empirically observable m...The one hope I see for an empirically observable morality is if we have a moral sense, whereby we directly perceive moral truths. But such a sense would not be any of our physical senses, since our physical senses are sensitive to purely physical states of affairs, and moral states of affairs aren't purely physical. Thus, such a view could only be held by a non-naturalist.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86053271072092225972011-08-08T19:59:12.557-05:002011-08-08T19:59:12.557-05:00Dr. Pruss, Some naturalists might say that while r...Dr. Pruss, Some naturalists might say that while religious beliefs are non-empirically derived from <i>P</i>, moral beliefs should be only be based on a process that is empirical. So, if something like Sam Harris' theory of morality were to prove correct, an alternate process to <i>P</i> could be proposed without being objectionably <i>ad hoc</i>.<br /><br />At the same time, the arguments that objective morality is empirical have so far proved to be rather flimsy (IMHO).Danielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03100665960985978420noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-906134459629451732011-08-08T18:30:41.573-05:002011-08-08T18:30:41.573-05:00Professor I really enjoyed this post. I’m really t...Professor I really enjoyed this post. I’m really trying, without success, to find ways around your argument. What other groups, along with the nihilist who denies moral realism, might assert that this argument lacks persuasive power? Are many naturalists in academia moral anti-realists?proof for godhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16804021329824674064noreply@blogger.com