tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post5829823105575726763..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: The certainty of faithAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-39129112778837846202016-03-21T14:34:06.029-05:002016-03-21T14:34:06.029-05:00Jakub:
I've been feeling dizzy all day. I may...Jakub:<br /><br />I've been feeling dizzy all day. I may be coming down with something minor. So perhaps my thinking is dizzy, too. :-)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1408368768914775022016-03-21T13:19:16.835-05:002016-03-21T13:19:16.835-05:00I don't count something not available to consc...I don't count something not available to consciousness as evidence; otherwise I could say that the evidence that my views are true, is the objective fact that they are true. But I agree that if you are speaking of objective properties of faith (as opposed to subjective perceptions), it is reasonable to say that "faith as a supernatural entity has a 100% chance of being related to something true." And in fact I think this is what is meant by the tradition that faith is certain. I just don't think it's very reasonable to identify that with a credence, especially since you don't know whether you have such a supernatural entity or not.<br /><br />I am pretty sure that people do in fact, in many or most cases, even apart from akrasia, act as though the probability of Christianity is less than one. I may not know how I would behave before it happens, but there are many cases where I am sure that the probability of something is less than one, but where I hope I would be willing to die for the claim. But for a more typical example of what I am talking about, I think that Pope Francis is more interested in benefiting the world and less interested in benefiting Catholicism, compared to Pope Benedict, because he is subjectively less certain of his faith than Pope Benedict. I think something similar was true of Pope John Paul II -- he wanted to be sure he was doing good overall, even if Christianity turned out to be false.<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-46569330551851009362016-03-21T12:56:19.029-05:002016-03-21T12:56:19.029-05:00"If you understand credence in this way, it i..."If you understand credence in this way, it is evident that you cannot have a probability of one for Christianity": It depends on what counts as evidence, and in particular whether the evidence needs to be available to consciousness. For in 100% of the cases where a person holds a belief infused by the Holy Spirit, the thing is true. :-)<br /><br />I am not sure that, except for (very common) cases which they themselves would admit to be cases of akrasia, typical Christians act as if the probability of Christianity were less than one. People are in fact willing to die for Christianity, etc. <br /><br />Nor does certainty prevent changing one's mind. At most, it prevents *rationally* changing one's mind. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-10043393636816882302016-03-21T12:45:22.361-05:002016-03-21T12:45:22.361-05:00My objection here was to the utility of the view, ...My objection here was to the utility of the view, not to the idea that your account could be true in some sense.<br /><br />Personally I think that credence is an idealization related to the evidence we have for something, and this is why people assume that their credence is proportionate to the evidence they have for it: because in the end saying that something has a probability of 90% means, "In 90% of cases, given evidence this strong, the thing would turn out to be true." If you understand credence in this way, it is evident that you cannot have a probability of one for Christianity.<br /><br />So you must be understanding it in some other sense. Given some other sense, it is possible that your view could be true. But I was objecting that it is not a useful view: it will not prevent some of your actions from looking like "acting like the probability of Christianity is less than one," nor should it prevent your actions from being that way. Nor can it or should it prevent you from changing your mind about Christianity based on evidence against it, supposing you come to see sufficiently strong evidence to that effect.<br /><br />The probability that I have faith is relevant to this kind of objection because if I had a probability of one that I had faith, a probability of one about the contents of faith, and a probability of one that faith cannot be false, that situation should indeed prevent my actions from betraying any kind of uncertainty, ever, and likewise it should prevent my changing my mind even about the content of faith, no matter how much evidence is brought against my idea of the contents (this last fact itself shows the falsehood of this particular view.)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-66484309771963439502016-03-21T12:43:37.376-05:002016-03-21T12:43:37.376-05:00I am sorry but this is maybe the weakest text I´ve...I am sorry but this is maybe the weakest text I´ve read in this blog so far ...Jakub Moravčíkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543628674375672591noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64704580547997144872016-03-21T12:34:38.913-05:002016-03-21T12:34:38.913-05:00I was thinking of something closer to (b), except ...I was thinking of something closer to (b), except that it's not so much a feeling or something introspectible.<br /><br />My crude picture is that our mind has a list of propositions, and besides each one there is a probability written. This list functions in our reasoning, but it's not directly visible to us.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-37258001974803199792016-03-21T11:47:42.153-05:002016-03-21T11:47:42.153-05:00I think you are ambiguous between "certainty&...I think you are ambiguous between "certainty" as (a) objective probability one, complete justification, the proposition is entailed by my grounds for believing it; and (b) subjective probability one, complete psychological confidence.<br /><br />Your first objection about justification is an objection to (a) and is ably rebutted by appealing to externalism. I'm not sure (genuinely) that this does what the "certainty" doctrine is supposed to do, though. <br /><br />Your second objection, about how Christians actually feel, is an objection to (b). It seems to me that we know people are not 100% confident by both introspection and behavior, and there is no reason to doubt this.<br /><br />Note that if you were an internalist about justification, you would be in a position to say that the fact of (a) gives one rational grounds for (b), although for various irrational reasons Christians may not achieve (b). This might be the traditional position. Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-28765378449941358262016-03-21T11:25:58.809-05:002016-03-21T11:25:58.809-05:00I agree one doesn't need to assign probability...I agree one doesn't need to assign probability one to the proposition that one has faith. I don't see how that's an objection to the view.<br /><br />As for historical contingencies, it may be that in central cases, one also receives the supernatural grace of being certain of the doctrine when one believes by trusting the Church. In other words, I could have been given a certainty that the Son is one substance with the Father that goes beyond the evidence for historical claims about Ecumenical Councils.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-92118359212578981942016-03-21T11:17:11.201-05:002016-03-21T11:17:11.201-05:00I have many criticisms of this, but the most basic...I have many criticisms of this, but the most basic are that you cannot assign a probability of one to the proposition that you have faith (since this very thing is not part of the faith; you could be e.g. a formal heretic), nor to the proposition that "particular doctrine x is a doctrine of Christianity," since your knowledge of the latter depends on the knowledge of various contingents which do not have a probability of one.<br /><br />The result is that even if you could have a credence of one in some sense, your effective credence after reflection will be less than one. And although that doesn't mean that all of your actions will be "as if this had a probability less than one," some of them will be.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com