tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post6132817860467070377..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Relativity theory, promises and promulgation of lawsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-84590739943237668292008-10-24T08:25:00.000-05:002008-10-24T08:25:00.000-05:00I hope this isn't to far off track, but do you hav...I hope this isn't to far off track, but do you have or know of nay replies to Adolf Grunbaums "Poverty of Theistic Cosmology"?<BR/><BR/>Graham Veale<BR/>ArmaghMr Vealehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12931446615905211560noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-81630892471780205892008-10-23T13:20:00.000-05:002008-10-23T13:20:00.000-05:00So it is not clear to me what non-complicating pos...<I>So it is not clear to me what non-complicating positive theoretical work the relativity theory business does, which hasn't already been done through common sense. This isn't to say that the analysis is uninteresting or somehow incorrect, just that it does not help with moral knowledge.</I><BR/><BR/>I suppose the question is, could one then take relativity theory, given that it gives the same answers as common sense in the more simple questions, then be applied to more difficult situations when common sense would itself be more difficult to apply?Sardonicushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09614057543947120116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-63503752650803140852008-10-21T15:05:00.000-05:002008-10-21T15:05:00.000-05:00I think it's pretty cool that one can get such fai...<I>I think it's pretty cool that one can get such fairly specific answers to difficult normative questions simply out of relativity theory.</I><BR/><BR/>But how do you distinguish your concept of "invariance" from some collection of more basic common sense moral intuitions, e.g. that you are held (morally) accountable by your own knowledge rather than by someone else's (in the case of making a promise to someone far away)? Or that acting on assumptions of immorality (e.g. when you don't know someone far away has released you from a promise) is still immoral? <BR/><BR/>So I think that common sense reductions can be plausibly given in each instance, and that these reductions are known by us before we know relativity theory. So it is not clear to me what non-complicating positive theoretical work the relativity theory business does, which hasn't already been done through common sense. This isn't to say that the analysis is uninteresting or somehow incorrect, just that it does not help with moral knowledge.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-65819653261960073702008-10-21T09:19:00.000-05:002008-10-21T09:19:00.000-05:00I don't think the difference has to do with positi...I don't think the difference has to do with positive/negative. Simply by making a promise, I do not automatically generate for myself permission to do something I don't otherwise have permission to do. But if I promise you something I don't need your permission to do, such as to say good things about you behind your back (I can permissibly do that if you forbid it, though it might be ill-mannered depending on the circumstances), then I don't need to wait for your permission or acceptance. And, as it happens, typically negative actions do not require permission. But sometimes they do, and in that case I need the permission. So it's not a qusetion of positive vs. negative.<BR/><BR/>Maybe the way to understand the promise to cut your hair is as a conditional promise: I will cut your hair if you agree. In this case, agreement is needed (though not acceptance? can you not accept and not reject the promise, but agree to have your hair cut, just to please me?)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-44998225669206140292008-10-21T08:32:00.000-05:002008-10-21T08:32:00.000-05:00Yes, you're right: the contract case is different....<I>Yes, you're right: the contract case is different. One difference is that a promise can be entirely unilateral, and it does not require acceptance. (If I promise not to do something, I need to stop doing it right away, not when you accept it.) It does require non-release, though.</I><BR/><BR/>Is there a difference here between a postive-act promise and a negative-act promise? <BR/><BR/>I promise to cut someone's hair, and they later refuse - I cannot act on the promise without force. Therefore, the promise has been refused. <BR/><BR/>I promise that I will avoid cutting someone's hair, and they refuse, the promise is still in play, and they cannot change that. <BR/><BR/>Is this a different concept entirely? An oath, or somesuch?Sardonicushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09614057543947120116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86412407405455003612008-10-21T08:23:00.000-05:002008-10-21T08:23:00.000-05:00Yes, you're right: the contract case is different....Yes, you're right: the contract case is different. One difference is that a promise can be entirely unilateral, and it does not require acceptance. (If I promise not to do something, I need to stop doing it right away, not when you accept it.) It does require non-release, though.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-89592466422878167352008-10-21T08:10:00.000-05:002008-10-21T08:10:00.000-05:00My understanding is that in law, contracts done at...<I>My understanding is that in law, contracts done at a distance are binding as soon as the last signer puts a signed contract in the mail. This is pretty close to what I get from the relativistic considerations.</I><BR/><BR/>One is dealing with several questions in terms of legal contracts. One has the offer, and the terms of the offer,the acceptance and the terms of the acceptance, which may or may not include the mode of acceptance. This thinking is what stimulated my question on receipt. If a promise is not accepted after a certain period of time, should it be considered rejected, and how much should that depend on the mode and terms of the promise?<BR/><BR/>I am not sure, however, how far any of this reasoning carries into promise theory, for in contracts, the additional element of consideration, a benefit to one party or detriment to the other, is present (however attenuated the idea is in modern contract theory).Sardonicushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09614057543947120116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5139143711234516372008-10-21T07:44:00.000-05:002008-10-21T07:44:00.000-05:00The non-receipt is a good question.My understandin...The non-receipt is a good question.<BR/><BR/>My understanding is that in law, contracts done at a distance are binding as soon as the last signer puts a signed contract in the mail. This is pretty close to what I get from the relativistic considerations.<BR/><BR/>While it would be a violation of invariance for a promise to come to be binding only when received, one could have the following messy invariant view of non-receipt: The promise is binding on the promiser until such time as the definitive information gets back to the promiser that the promisee will not receive the promise. I am not sure about this, though.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-88318935568867263232008-10-21T07:24:00.000-05:002008-10-21T07:24:00.000-05:00So we have a pretty good argument, based on invari...<I>So we have a pretty good argument, based on invariance, for when promises come to bind and when we are released from them. The obligations, as it were, exist at the site of the promiser, and hence come to exist when the promiser speaks, and cease to exist when the promisee's release arrives at the promiser.</I><BR/><BR/>What if, however, the intended recipient never receives the promise, and thus it is never accepted? You say, over the neighbors noisy lawnmower, "I'll never sit on your wife's bench" and he hears, "Come to lunch" and he smiles and nods. He comes to lunch, eats with you, never mentioning the invitation. You, on the other hand, never do sit on the bench again, holding yourself bound. Are you actually bound by a promise to another? It would seem not, but you have limited your own behavior and have held yourself bound.<BR/><BR/>In the case of promulgation of the law, there is the idea, which you have hinted at, that one becomes bound by the usual law in more than one situation:<BR/><BR/>1. When one is aware of it AND is aware that one's behavior is in violation of it.<BR/><BR/>2. When one ought to have been aware that one is bound by it. (Questions of notice )<BR/><BR/>3. When the behavior in which one is engaged is so bad that there ought to be a positive law against it, even if there isn't. (<I>malum in se</I> vs. <I>malum prohibitum</I>).<BR/><BR/>-JonathanSardonicushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09614057543947120116noreply@blogger.com