tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post665422125930862645..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Change without a plurality of timesAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-30996110222771163942021-01-18T12:49:07.253-06:002021-01-18T12:49:07.253-06:00So, if an object -- say, a huge Arrakis sandworm -...So, if an object -- say, a huge Arrakis sandworm -- extends from San Antonio to Houston, and it has the power to vibrate at any point along its body, but only does so in the parts that are in Houston, are we supposed to think that the potentialities (the unactualized powers) in San Antonio are being actualized in Houston? Is this a case of the potentiality co-existing with its actualization? I wouldn't think so. It seems to me that the potentialities of the segments <i>in Houston</i> were actualized in Houston and so are no longer potential, but actual. The potentiality in San Antonio (and in the area between there and Houston) remains unactualized.<br /><br />Am I incorrect (or using the terms in an inappropriate way)? Even if so, do you at least see what I'm getting at? It doesn't seem right to think that powers of San Antonio segments are what are getting exercised or actualized in the Houston segments....Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-39487173646274454822021-01-15T23:24:13.341-06:002021-01-15T23:24:13.341-06:00Act is limited by potency but pure act is perfecti...Act is limited by potency but pure act is perfection or subsistent, God is as you said devoided of potentiality but in finite beings this isn’t the case. Your ontology does not include potentiality but powers, are finite being composed because they have multiple powers? I guess I just don’t see why an “ontology of powers” Perhaps it is just a problem of words but I don’t understand why do you prefer the word “power” and “actuation” instead of an ontology of act limited by potency.<br />Mauriciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03120520307440018389noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23669199306658533132021-01-15T10:37:01.684-06:002021-01-15T10:37:01.684-06:00God has powers (indeed one power, identical with h...God has powers (indeed one power, identical with himself) but God has no potencies of any kind. <br /><br />But if you want to *call* a power an "active potency", that's fine with me.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61235290538992443422021-01-14T21:31:53.968-06:002021-01-14T21:31:53.968-06:00How does your understanding of powers differ, Isnt...How does your understanding of powers differ, Isnt a power an active potency? Mauriciohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03120520307440018389noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-27843080547786151052021-01-14T12:07:50.137-06:002021-01-14T12:07:50.137-06:00Potentiality as such is not in my ontology. My ont...Potentiality as such is not in my ontology. My ontology is an ontology of powers. Some powers are actuated and some powers are not actuated.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-32924783012793435772021-01-14T10:30:23.235-06:002021-01-14T10:30:23.235-06:00Not to beat a dead horse, but this has really got ...Not to beat a dead horse, but this has really got me thinking about the prospects for a proper conception of "change" or "time" on non-presentist, Aristotelian views. Surely we have to say that every moment of time is actual (otherwise, we are presentists), and therefore there are no potentialities and change doesn't exist (and, if we're Aristotelians about it, neither does time). <br /><br />Am I missing something?Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-21707141661706116912021-01-13T09:57:48.385-06:002021-01-13T09:57:48.385-06:00A couple of things, since I am (most days) both a ...A couple of things, since I am (most days) both a presentist and an Aristotelian:<br /><br />1) On a non-presentist view (any view in which past states of affairs are actual), in what sense is anything a "potentiality"? Is it not just an actuality "over there"?<br /><br />2) I applaud and heartily agree with your tensing of the definition as "<i>was</i> a potentiality", and would add that that is manifestly what <b>must</b> be meant! After all, it surely can't be that Aristotle or his successors think there must <i>continue to be</i> a potentiality (which is the only other option).<br /><br />3) It intuitively seems to me that Aristotle would think the following about non-presentism: The whole 4D world exists changelessly and therefore timelessly. That it is unchangingly different "over there" than "over here" (along whichever coordinates of extension you like) has nothing to do with change, becoming, or time.Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.com