tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post6954848397126825355..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: 48 arguments against naturalismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger18125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-71344271783378406212011-11-14T16:58:44.124-06:002011-11-14T16:58:44.124-06:00Does committing to that notion of 'normal'...Does committing to that notion of 'normal' affect the argument?some kanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12312599784024098652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-9066034593808550532011-11-14T13:17:40.154-06:002011-11-14T13:17:40.154-06:00Fair enough.Fair enough.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-16796476804213918092011-11-14T09:22:41.948-06:002011-11-14T09:22:41.948-06:00"No, I don't think of the normal output o...<i>"No, I don't think of the normal output of a computational system in the brain in terms of intention."</i><br /><br />Well, hang on. I very specifically referred to Dennett's "as-if intentionality". Evolution, for example, doesn't <i>intend</i> a particular function, it just winds up preserving structures that wind up carrying out functions. (Indeed, I'm not sure there's any structure in nature that serves only <i>one</i> function...)Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-17267850939491014312011-11-11T10:52:03.722-06:002011-11-11T10:52:03.722-06:00What if strict, 100% naturalism is not true, but &...What if strict, 100% naturalism is not true, but "moral perfection" in humans is also not true (or unachievable, or meaningless)? What if exceptions to naturalism are necessary to create humanity, but no exceptions to naturalism are required in humanity's day-to-day, year-to-year, century-to-century operation?<br /><br />Sometimes I think the dichotomous culture war is too influential.Darel Rex Finleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02497837565842454125noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-84107727826532112492011-11-11T09:50:32.112-06:002011-11-11T09:50:32.112-06:00No, I don't think of the normal output of a co...No, I don't think of the normal output of a computational system in the brain in terms of intention. And the naturalist certainly had better not do so if proper function is needed for a naturalistic account of mind, since then we would have vicious circularity.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-2646240237191005832011-11-11T09:31:14.727-06:002011-11-11T09:31:14.727-06:00"And a number of naturalists think they can m...<i>"And a number of naturalists think they can make sense of notions of proper function in evolutionary terms. I think they are wrong about that, and maybe you agree, but this is a controversial point."</i><br /><br />Hmmm. I don't actually see a problem with that - when it comes to biological functions, evolutionary accounts seem to do well. Such accounts <i>feed into</i> higher-level 'functions' (understood as 'intents of an agent') but don't completely determine them.<br /><br /><i>"the only way to make sense of the notion of computational error is to have a notion of the normal output of a computational subsystem."</i><br /><br />In that sentence, don't you mean 'normal' in the sense of 'intended'? (Note Dennett's distinction about 'as-if intentionality', too.)Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-36238435378432681522011-11-11T07:37:57.507-06:002011-11-11T07:37:57.507-06:00Let me also add that if the naturalist can't m...Let me also add that if the naturalist can't make sense of the notion of the normal and proper function, then the naturalist is unlikely to make sense of ethical truth. See my post for today. :-)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-80157179926115276942011-11-11T07:36:20.679-06:002011-11-11T07:36:20.679-06:00Oops, my formalization has nasty typos. It should...Oops, my formalization has nasty typos. It should be:<br /><br />1. RD(x,<x is morally perfect>)<br />2. (p)(~Mp → ~RD(x,p))<br />3. N → ~M<x is morally perfect><br />4. Therefore, ~N.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-24802996035949633042011-11-11T07:28:15.919-06:002011-11-11T07:28:15.919-06:00Well, it fits with Aristotelian naturalism. :-) A...Well, it fits with Aristotelian naturalism. :-) And a number of naturalists think they can make sense of notions of proper function in evolutionary terms. I think they are wrong about that, and maybe you agree, but this is a controversial point.<br /><br />I think a naturalist needs the notion of proper function, because I think the only at all promising naturalist account of mind is given by functionalism. And functionalism needs proper function. Rob Koons and I have a paper on this, but one way to see the basic issue is that functionalism needs to take account of the possibility of computational error, and the only way to make sense of the notion of computational error is to have a notion of the normal output of a computational subsystem.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-35653314108411099682011-11-11T07:11:48.272-06:002011-11-11T07:11:48.272-06:00I respectfully submit that quite possibly your und...I respectfully submit that quite possibly your understanding of 'normal' may <i>presuppose</i> the invalidity of naturalism. <br /><br />For example, I have a hard time processing this statement in any other way: "If a desire cannot be fulfilled for humans, it is not [normal] for humans."Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-90683342431270960242011-11-10T18:29:57.273-06:002011-11-10T18:29:57.273-06:00Mr. Schnapps:
It seems to me that the best way to...Mr. Schnapps:<br /><br />It seems to me that the best way to symbolize it is in terms of a pair of modal operators, say Rp for "It is normal / morally required / not abnormal that p" and ~Mp for "It is not possible that p", a predicate D(x,p) iff x desires that p, and N says that naturalism is true.<br /><br />Then we do something like, where x is a particular human, say Socrates:<br />1. RD(x,<x is morally perfect&rt;)<br />2. (p)(~Lp → ~RD(x,p))<br />3. N → ~L<x is morally perfect&rt;<br />4. Therefore, ~N.<br /><br />"is it possible that a good number of traits that we see as normal now are actually defects, created by the elimination of non-mutated/non-defective entities over time?"<br /><br />It's possible that something is a defect in one species and normal in a descendant species.<br /><br />Mr. Ingles:<br /><br />Fundamental concepts cannot be defined, on pain of vicious circularity or regress. "Normal" or "abnormal" might be a fundamental concept. <br /><br />It may, on the other hand, be that we can define the normal in terms of proper function, perhaps by saying that a system is normal provided it is properly functioning. Can proper function be defined? Maybe it can be defined in terms of teleology, and maybe not. But pretty soon we'll come to something that can't be defined. <br /><br />In any case, there are very few non-stipulative terms that can be given a non-trivial definition. At present, I only know of two ("adultery" and "bachelor").<br /><br />In particular, I think the normal cannot be given a reductive definition to (a) facts about natural selection, (b) facts about anybody's (including God's) intentions, (c) facts about our preferences, or (d) statistical facts about the distribution of a property in a population.<br /><br />Whether one can define normalcy in terms of a niche may depend on whether one understands a niche in a sufficiently normative manner.<br /><br />Absent definition what can we do? Well, we can acquire a concept not by definition, but by having a bunch of examples and logical relations pointed out. Here are some:<br /> - It's normal for adult dog eyes to send visual information to the brain.<br /> - It is the proper task of the physician to restore the body to a normal state.<br /> - It is not normal to eat one's ears for fun.<br /> - It is not normal to believe something that one takes oneself to have no reason to believe.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-60273268923544111822011-11-10T17:44:01.947-06:002011-11-10T17:44:01.947-06:00It would still be normal, in the beefier sense, fo...<i>It would still be normal, in the beefier sense, for sheep to have four legs</i><br /><br />So 'normal' means 'fitting a particular ecological niche'?<br /><br />Seriously, can we have a definition of 'beefy normal'?Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-42072491697809291222011-11-10T17:02:03.507-06:002011-11-10T17:02:03.507-06:00I'm wondering: How would you symbolize the arg...I'm wondering: How would you symbolize the argument? <br /><br />Also, is it possible that a good number of traits that we see as normal now are actually defects, created by the elimination of non-mutated/non-defective entities over time?Mr. Schnappshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04950900266422489204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61064340858319655112011-11-10T14:24:53.224-06:002011-11-10T14:24:53.224-06:00I don't think so. It would still be normal, i...I don't think so. It would still be normal, in the beefier sense, for sheep to have four legs if a genetic disease that caused three-leggedness were to overtake the majority of the world's sheep population.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-74216417162154258972011-11-10T14:20:23.374-06:002011-11-10T14:20:23.374-06:00But I want a beefier sort of normalcy here.
Which...<i>But I want a beefier sort of normalcy here.</i><br /><br />Which would just devolve back to 'morally required', though, right?Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-17184680233760461022011-11-10T11:44:52.050-06:002011-11-10T11:44:52.050-06:00Only if by "normal" you mean something l...Only if by "normal" you mean something like "statistically normal". But I want a beefier sort of normalcy here.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-8570416476107004372011-11-10T11:41:13.035-06:002011-11-10T11:41:13.035-06:00One can replace "morally required" by su...<i>One can replace "morally required" by such terms as "normal", "non-abnormal"</i><br /><br />Of course, if you do the argument kinda falls apart. We have plenty of examples of 'poor design' in nature, so unattainable goals wouldn't be a big stretch.Ray Ingleshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16290483120987779339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-88509012551921498702011-11-09T20:10:03.887-06:002011-11-09T20:10:03.887-06:00Hi Dr. Pruss, I was wondering where you might get ...Hi Dr. Pruss, I was wondering where you might get arguments for (1)-- does that derive from the pursuit of truth that all humans find themselves obligated to? Forgive my ignorance!Evan G.https://www.blogger.com/profile/02869771323426128506noreply@blogger.com