tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post7283948289409224836..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Induction and the A-theoryAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-72954154395791916562008-02-24T21:57:00.000-06:002008-02-24T21:57:00.000-06:00Nice question. On the B-theory, the difference be...Nice question. On the B-theory, the difference between a past and a future time is a merely numerical difference, and the same kind of numerical difference is already found between different past times. Merely numerical difference is always an issue with regard to any induction, so I think that's already taken into account.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-28326212775611904322008-02-24T21:43:00.000-06:002008-02-24T21:43:00.000-06:00If you are right that there is a problem for the A...If you are right that there is a problem for the A-theorist, isn't there also a parallel problem for the B-theorist who reasons from past to future? Future events, for him, have a different property from past events: they occupy a different part of the B series. You might respond that this isn't an ontological difference; but this shows only that the problem isn't as severe for the B-theorist, not that there isn't a problem at all.Davidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15048385218047191192noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4610817087829531842008-02-24T14:59:00.000-06:002008-02-24T14:59:00.000-06:00Alex,Since it could be confusing, the above commen...Alex,<BR/><BR/>Since it could be confusing, the above comment wasn't my own. Responding to your earlier point, though, the extra bit of descriptivity doesn't make the theory purely indexical. I agree. There may be some other interesting issues here too. Some respond to the problem of induction by restricting projectable predicates to non-temporally relativized ones. Such predicates wouldn't express properties that figure in laws. So, if the A-theorists accepts that her predicates are so relativized, she may have another way to sidestep the objection.<BR/><BR/>-christianAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-77782898477292832222008-02-24T10:27:00.000-06:002008-02-24T10:27:00.000-06:00We make inductive predictions about the future. L...We make inductive predictions about the future. Let's say we have good reason to think that tomorrow you will strike a match. I conclude that it will probably catch on fire.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-59224766896222087712008-02-23T11:29:00.000-06:002008-02-23T11:29:00.000-06:00The problem seems a false one. We don't observe a...The problem seems a false one. We don't observe anything in the future, only what has already happened. So all induction is from past to past.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-49681133006662898352008-02-22T21:46:00.000-06:002008-02-22T21:46:00.000-06:00It doesn't, then, sound indexical, because of that...It doesn't, then, sound indexical, because of that extra bit of descriptivity...Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-22919832459308379072008-02-22T18:59:00.000-06:002008-02-22T18:59:00.000-06:00I know this is a bit afield, but I have a view in ...I know this is a bit afield, but I have a view in mind like E.J. Lowe's (with a modification).<BR/><BR/>Roughly, one accepts primitive tensed predication and accepts that 'now' is both referential and descriptive. It refers to the time of utterance (varying from context to context) "and" describes the property had at that time as present. We then analyze the past and future in terms of it. <BR/><BR/>We capture B-theorists intuitions of analyzablility and the A-theorists intuitions of primitive presentness, and we do this allowing the variability that appears to accompany 'now'. And we avoid McTaggart's argument and awful 'at t' locutions.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-13284684945915348812008-02-22T18:45:00.000-06:002008-02-22T18:45:00.000-06:00Christian:If presentness is indexical, then I don'...Christian:<BR/><BR/>If presentness is indexical, then I don't see how what you have is an A-theory. Do you think there is an observer independent fact about the world what time is present?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-67152605203769454272008-02-22T17:27:00.000-06:002008-02-22T17:27:00.000-06:00As for the B-theorist, she might escape the argume...<EM>As for the B-theorist, she might escape the argument because the difference between past, present and future events is just a difference in how the events are related to the observer or, alternately, are merely indexical. But merely indexical differences, or differences in relation to the observer are already accounted for in inductive reasoning.</EM><BR/><BR/>I see now. The A-theory I'm suggesting is one according to which presentness is indexical. So the A-theory, like the B-theory your describing, will also have accounted for the differences in inductive reasoning. But like I said, this is idiosyncratic. The standard A-theory accepts primitve future and past tense properties, I don't think an A-theorist should accept this.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-6122321914789332122008-02-22T16:38:00.000-06:002008-02-22T16:38:00.000-06:00It seems that just as details of spatial arrangeme...It seems that just as details of spatial arrangement are causally relevant (a source of heat can only cause water to boil when the source of heat is physically near the water), so are details of temporal arrangement. For instance, some causes have effects precisely a certain amount of time later (setting an alarm for 10 hours ahead causes a noise in 10 hours). I suppose you could argue that what is causally relevant are B-relations like "being 10 hours earlier than", but A-determinations are causally irrelevant. But that would seem to me to be <I>ad hoc</I>, unless you have an argument. Maybe you do, given your theory. But I can't follow the account, given your brevity.<BR/><BR/>I don't think my argument requires the A-determinations to be actual properties. It works fine on the modal rendering I offer at the end, for instance.<BR/><BR/>As for the B-theorist, she might escape the argument because the difference between past, present and future events is just a difference in how the events are related to the observer or, alternately, are merely indexical. But merely indexical differences, or differences in relation to the observer are already accounted for in inductive reasoning.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-13393130469236502192008-02-22T16:26:00.000-06:002008-02-22T16:26:00.000-06:00I'd say a priori. Right theory of causation + righ...I'd say a priori. Right theory of causation + right theory of time = presentness is causally irrelevant. The former are a priori (don't ask me for the derivation, please).<BR/><BR/>So I deny the seeming in 2. I'd say that present things cause, not because they are present, but because they have other properties. Perhaps things are earlier than other because of causation via causal theories of time's direction. But I'm not sure. <BR/><BR/>I also think all events have presentness tenselessly, but are in time by now having presentness, by having properties in a certain way, not by having certain properties. They are past in virtue of being earlier than events that now have properties. I realize this is idiosyncratic, but I think it's right, right now.<BR/><BR/>I agree there is an objective difference between the observed and unobserved cases. What I don't see is why being earlier than the present is relevantly different from being later than the present. It's true that induction into the past, like you say, is induction to objects that share the property of being earlier than the present, induction into the future is to objects that lack it. I'm not yet feeling the intuition that this makes a difference, that is, any more of a difference than that induction is from observed to unobserved, or from things close to me to things far away.<BR/><BR/>Maybe I could get you to tell me why you think the B-theorists does not have the same problem?<BR/><BR/>-cAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-40303804732645637832008-02-22T15:37:00.000-06:002008-02-22T15:37:00.000-06:00Christian:1. How do you know presentness is causal...Christian:<BR/><BR/>1. How do you know presentness is causally irrelevant to properties? <EM>A priori</EM> or <EM>a posteriori</EM>?<BR/><BR/>2. It seems that presentness is causally relevant. For while a present blackness can't be caused by a future blackness, a present blackness can be caused by a present or past blackness (say).<BR/><BR/>3. I don't think the view you mention escapes the criticism. All the observed events are earlier than the present, and hence lack presentness. The unobserved case is present. This seems to be an objective difference between the observed and unobserved cases.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-30622431877540238792008-02-22T15:01:00.000-06:002008-02-22T15:01:00.000-06:00Alex,Unless P were the property of being unobserve...Alex,<BR/><BR/><EM>Unless P were the property of being unobserved or something like it (the strength of inductive inference in general already takes this difference into account), or unless we had evidence that the possession of P is irrelevant to properties like blackness, this would weaken the inference. </EM><BR/><BR/>I think I would say that presentness (pastness, futurity) is irrelevant to blackness as it is causally irrelevant to any property. Naturalness requires causal relevance.<BR/><BR/>An A-theory I like will also analyze pastness and futurity. It won't face your objection. To say x is past is to say it is earlier than the present, it's future iff it's later than the present. Presentness is primitive and intrinsic. Anyway, it's not clear to me how the problem is a problem on this view.<BR/><BR/>-ChristianAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com