tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post7385699363436776355..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Righting wrongsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger46125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-17190759056018067542009-04-20T14:06:00.000-05:002009-04-20T14:06:00.000-05:00Don't comment on my last comment. I will make it ...Don't comment on my last comment. I will make it an independent post. This thread is long enough.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-32754387683398083542009-04-20T14:04:00.000-05:002009-04-20T14:04:00.000-05:00Observe that we do not think it is unjust to impos...Observe that we do not think it is unjust to impose a financial penalty on a parent even if that has an adverse effect on the parent's children.<br /><br />I think in your (1), there is an ambiguity in "impose". There is a difference between imposing F something on x, and allowing F to happen to y as a result of imposing F on x. <br /><br />Anyway, my considered opinion now is that God does nothing wrong in W2. Consider this sequence of worlds:<br /><br />A. God kills Adam and Eve, and that's that for the human race.<br />B. God kicks Adam and Eve out of paradise, and as a punishment for their sins, sends them infertility. And that's that for the human race.<br />C. God kicks Adam and Eve out of paradise, but lets them have children, who also live where Adam and Eve do.<br /><br />I think that God wouldn't be acting unjustly either in A or in B. But the only difference between B and C is that in B, God sends infertility on Adam and Eve. If B is a world where God is just, and C is a world where God is unjust, then it follows that by not sterilizing Adam and Eve, God has acted unjustly towards us. But that seems deeply implausible. Moreover, I suspect that any argument that God was obliged by justice to sterilize Adam and Eve would also show that it is wrong for us to reproduce, which is absurd.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23746613079881754702009-04-20T13:08:00.000-05:002009-04-20T13:08:00.000-05:001. It is unjust for a moral agent to impose the sa...1. It is unjust for a moral agent to impose the same kind of harsh consequences on x, as he did on y, for the mere fact that y committed a crime/wrong doing. <br />2. God imposed the same kind of harsh consequences on the descendants of Adam and Eve, as he did on Adam and Eve, for the mere fact that the latter committed a crime/wrong doing.<br />3. God acted unjustly. <br /><br />Assuming the Incarnation did not happen, do you dispute the argument?Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-60590670936175392232009-04-20T12:43:00.000-05:002009-04-20T12:43:00.000-05:00Then to be fair, we should compare: the world wher...Then to be fair, we should compare: the world where the descendants are not *automatically* kicked out of paradise as result of Adam and Eve's actions (W1), and the world where they are *automatically* kicked out (W2). Let's assume in both worlds that the Incarnation doesn't happen.<br /><br />In W2, God imposes the same (kind of) consequences on the descendants as he did on Adam and Eve for mere fact that the latter sinned, but not in W1 (God actually waits for people to sin first before imposing unpleasant consequences). <br /><br />Two questions: <br /><br />1. Does God act unjustly to those in W2 (assuming the Incarnation doesn't occur). If so, how is this any different from imposing imprisonment on x for the mere fact that y committed a crime the required imprisonment?<br /><br />2. If God DOES act unjustly to those in W2, how would the Incarnation make it so that God's action here is not unjust?Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-89737589336605382882009-04-20T12:30:00.000-05:002009-04-20T12:30:00.000-05:00Actually, I can say that. For God was not under a...Actually, I can say that. For God was not under an obligation of justice to become incarnate. So we may suppose that that's a world where he doesn't become incarnate.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-78866999249350615712009-04-20T12:28:00.001-05:002009-04-20T12:28:00.001-05:00And you can't say: well maybe some of the descenda...And you can't say: well maybe some of the descendants in the other world sinned and got kicked out. Because if they did, then they would have needed Christ to save them, and so that world would no longer be relevantly different from ours (for in both worlds, the Incarnation would have occurred).Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-31188646312612608882009-04-20T12:28:00.000-05:002009-04-20T12:28:00.000-05:00I guess I meant that they weren't kicked out en ma...I guess I meant that they weren't kicked out <EM>en masse</EM>. Individually, each got the same deal as Adam and Eve did: don't sin and stay in paradise, or sin and leave. <br /><br />Here's another thought. God wouldn't have wronged anybody if he had just killed Adam and Eve right after they sinned (they were warned). But God instead kicked them out of paradise, and gave them some span of life after that. This wasn't unjust in itself--we've admitted, for the sake of the argument at least, that Adam and Eve deserved it. So now the question is: Does God wrong Adam and Eve's descendants by allowing Adam and Eve to have descendants outside of paradise? <br /><br />God could have made Adam and Eve sterile, I guess, after kicking them out of paradise. But we wouldn't be the better off for that. :-) And God could have miraculously transported the descendants to paradise, one by one. But I don't see why he would have a duty of justice to do that.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-32817946530794541942009-04-20T12:20:00.000-05:002009-04-20T12:20:00.000-05:00No, you're right. Let's compare the world where th...No, you're right. Let's compare the world where the descendants of Adam and Eve weren't kicked out of paradise to the world where they are. <br /><br />In the former, none of the descendants go to hell because none of them are kicked out. In this world, at least some of the descendants go to hell. Hence there are more descendants in this world that go to hell than the descendants in the other world.Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-37082366734882401202009-04-20T12:16:00.000-05:002009-04-20T12:16:00.000-05:00Ad 3: Actually, I thought your worry was that it w...Ad 3: Actually, I thought your worry was that it was unfair of God to let Adam and Eve's descendants suffer as a result of Adam and Eve's actions. So I was imagining a scenario where Adam and Eve still sin, and are themselves punished for it, but their descendants stay in paradise, each individually having the option to sin, just as Adam and Eve did.<br /><br />If Adam and Eve didn't sin, maybe some of their descendants would have, anyway?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-61982094540173731682009-04-20T12:14:00.000-05:002009-04-20T12:14:00.000-05:001. With my example, I'm simply trying to conform i...1. With my example, I'm simply trying to conform it to your principle: If acting so that A happens to x is not treating x unjustly, and B is better than A, then the presumption is that acting so that B happens to x is not treating x unjustly.<br /><br />In case one, the government acts so that it takes away 1,000 dollars from x, and in case two, the government acts so that it takes away 800 dollars away from x. The second "taking away" is clearly better than the first "taking away" FOR x, even though the former - and not the latter - is just. <br /><br />Moreover, I can avoid your counter by stipulating that x ceases to exist 30 seconds after both "taking aways", and so he benefits in neither case. <br /><br />2. If God has a tendency towards equality, then this should hold true in the other world as well. Wouldn't the descendants in the other world also have some special, deep union with God? <br /><br />3. I thought we're comparing the world where the Fall occurred to the world where the Fall didn't occur. In the latter, no one sinned.Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-20627525306553738382009-04-20T11:57:00.000-05:002009-04-20T11:57:00.000-05:00Ad 1: Are the two actions done in the same circums...Ad 1: Are the two actions done in the same circumstances? Moreover, in the first case, x is benefited by participating in the work of justice.<br /><br />Ad 2: Well, there is something to the idea that God shares a nature with us. Love has a tendency towards equality. Moreover, God offers us, after death (though some people may get glimpses in this life, perhaps?), the beatific vision, an intuitive vision of God, where God joins himself to us. Adam and Eve were not offered the beatific vision.<br /><br />Ad 3: Adam and Eve still sinned, despite being in paradise. So even if their descendants stayed in paradise, they might have sinned.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-37009307205412671002009-04-20T11:53:00.000-05:002009-04-20T11:53:00.000-05:001. I can make the same agent do the "stealing" in ...1. I can make the same agent do the "stealing" in both cases--the government. In case one, the government takes away 1,000 dollars from x to pay for y's imprisonment. In case two, the government simply takes away 800 dollars from x. <br /><br />2. Can you flesh out the metaphysical component of the union? Why would this make our fellowship with God deeper or better? <br /><br />3. I don't see how there can be any uncertainty in knowing which of the two worlds has more people going to in hell. In the world where no one is kicked out of paradise, no one goes to hell. In our world, "many" go to hell.Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-32154311150061405092009-04-20T11:36:00.000-05:002009-04-20T11:36:00.000-05:00Ad 1: I am comparing a world w1 where God does not...Ad 1: I am comparing a world w1 where God does not become incarnate, and where we're not kicked out of paradise, to our world. World w1 is a possible world, and God is not unjust in w1. That's all I need.<br /><br />Ad 2: There is a metaphysical component to the union, which goes over and beyond mere knowledge of God and personal righteousness.<br /><br />Ad 3: The principle is a presumptive one. Note that on the natural reading of your counterexample, too, we are comparing actions with different agents. <br /><br />Ad 4: Suppose Adam and Eve's descendants weren't kicked out of paradise. Would fewer people have ended up in hell? Who knows. After all, we don't know how many are going to end up in hell. One? Two? Ten? A hundred billion? Scripture does say "many", so that suggests more than one or two (but doesn't prove it conclusively, because in the case of something as horrendous as hell, one might think even one or two are "many").Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-9666983462253061552009-04-20T11:28:00.000-05:002009-04-20T11:28:00.000-05:00There are several reasons why I don't think your a...There are several reasons why I don't think your argument works.<br /><br />1. Because God could have become "one of us" in the other world, you cannot rely on the assumption that the descendants in this world are really better off. You could rely on this assumption only if you can show that God would not have become one of us in the other world, and I don't think you can show this.<br /><br />2. In the other world, Christ wouldn't have needed to BECOME "one of us," because the descendants in that world--who are without sin--would have already been more like him from the outset. So I don't see how the descendants in this world have it better, and thus I don't see how premise (3) is true.<br /><br />3. Premise (1) is subject to numerous counter-examples. In case one, suppose x has to give up 1,000 dollars to pay for y's imprisonment, and this is not unjust. In case two, suppose someone steals 800 dollars off of x. Clearly, it is better that x loses 800 dollars than 1,000 dollars, but we wouldn't say that x in the second case was not treated unjustly. He was.<br /><br />4. The descendants in this world who end up in hell are obviously not better off!Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-10378822921166699972009-04-20T07:20:00.001-05:002009-04-20T07:20:00.001-05:00Deeper, through the Incarnation. There is a unity...Deeper, through the Incarnation. There is a unity of human nature that we now have with God, in that God is literally one of us--a human being.<br /><br />Of course, he could have done this even if we did not sin. But he did not owe that to us. So we can run the following "suggestive" argument.<br /><br />1. If acting so that A happens to x is not treating x unjustly, and B is better than A, then the presumption is that acting so that B happens to x is not treating x unjustly.<br /><br />2. Having the descendants of Adam and Eve live naturally in paradise without the deeper kind of union through the Incarnation is not unjust.<br /><br />3. A life of death, illness, suffering and pain, together with the virtues made possible by death, illness, suffering and pain (e.g., courage, sacrificial love), as well as the possibility of the deeper union with God through the the Incarnation is better for the descendants of Adam and Eve than living in paradise without the deeper kind of union through the Incarnation.<br /><br />4. Therefore, the presumption is that expelling Adam and Eve was not unjust.<br /><br />There is also some additional work on the argument that would be needed to consider the case of the damned. If God has middle knowledge or compatibilism holds, this is problematic.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-70407163841415287072009-04-19T20:48:00.000-05:002009-04-19T20:48:00.000-05:00Deeper in what way? Adam and Eve communicated wit...Deeper in what way? Adam and Eve communicated with God in a direct, unmistakable way that left no room for doubt. Christians still need faith. <br /><br />Moreover, if God *prefers* the supernatural fellowship to humanity, then why couldn't he have *also* offered the same fellowship to Adam and Eve and their descendants? The fact that our supernatural fellowship is "deeper" than Adam and Eve's natural fellowship doesn't mean their descendants in the other world couldn't have an *upgraded* relationship at a later time.Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-73802531336204027352009-04-19T20:28:00.000-05:002009-04-19T20:28:00.000-05:00The supernatural fellowship we are offered in Chri...The supernatural fellowship we are offered in Christ seems to be deeper than the natural fellowship with God that Adam and Eve had.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-22063214393991432652009-04-19T20:09:00.000-05:002009-04-19T20:09:00.000-05:001. We can substitute "penalty" for "consequences."...1. We can substitute "penalty" for "consequences." The descendants of Adam and Eve suffered the same (kind of) consequences they did--old age, sickness, death, and in many cases, all three. Is this not so?<br /><br />If this is right, then there's a clear, unmistakable difference between punishing x with imprisonment in a way that causes y to suffer monetary damages, and punishing x with imprisonment in a way that causes y to suffer the same (kind of) imprisonment. The situation with the descendants of Adam and Eve is more analogous to the latter scenario, which is clearly unjust.<br /><br />2. Your last comment is interesting. In what way do the descendants of Adam and Eve in this world--the world in which the Fall occurred--benefit MORE than the descendants in the world where the Fall did not occur? The ultimate happy ending in both cases is paradise and intimate fellowship with God, is it not?Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-53208967297710647782009-04-19T18:36:00.000-05:002009-04-19T18:36:00.000-05:00In 1, there is a false dichotomy, in that the firs...In 1, there is a false dichotomy, in that the first option presupposes without argument that what the happens to the descendants of Adam and Eve is a penalty. A couple of things that could be said here:<br /><br />1. We can look at God as having given Adam and Eve great freedom to choose the future of the human race.<br /><br />2. It is not intrinsically unjust to punish x in a way that causes y to suffer. Often, punishment does make others suffer. We put someone in jail--and honest citizens need to pay taxes to keep the person in jail. This is not unjust.<br /><br />3. I think a relevant consideration is that when criticizing the Christian view, one needs to take the view as a whole, not just a part of it. For instance, it would be silly to argue that the Old Testament God was unjust to the Israelites by forcing them to leave Egypt. It would be silly, because when considering the justice or injustice of this divine command, one needs to consider (a) that God had a better place for the Israelites, and (b) they were slaves in Egypt.<br /><br />In the case at hand, one needs to consider the fact that while we suffer the bad effects of Adam and Eve's sin, according to Christianity, through the Incarnation God offers us a greater good than Adam and Eve themselves had, and so we sing of Adam's sin: "O felix culpa" (O happy fault). God perhaps wouldn't have been unjust if he left Adam and Eve's descendants in paradise, simply punishing Adam and Eve. But what he has done for us is better than that, or so Christianity says. This does not settle the justice question--one might think that sometimes a better action is less just--but it does shift the burden of proof at least.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-58702345141669379112009-04-19T14:16:00.000-05:002009-04-19T14:16:00.000-05:001. The claim that we were all "in" Adam needs fles...1. The claim that we were all "in" Adam needs fleshing out--what does it mean? And how is it relevant? The fact that we received our (sinful) nature BECAUSE of what Adam did is simply to repeat the antecedent of premise (1). <br /><br />Moreover, to say that the antecedent of premise (1) is false is to deny either: that God caused the descendants of Adam and Eve to suffer the penalty imposed on the latter, or if he did cause this, that the descendants of Adam were not involved in committing the crime/wrong doing being punished. Which do you deny?<br /><br />It is false that God caused the descendants of Adam and Eve to suffer their penalty.<br /><br />Or, <br /><br />It is false that they were not involved (i.e. they WERE involved) in committing the crime/wrong doing. <br /><br /><br /><br />2. Since God is perfectly just, he cannot act unjustly. This follows. I don't know what more needs to be said. <br /><br /><br /><br />3. By "established" I simply mean "show to be probably true." Can you show that Christianity is probably true? My argument demonstrates that you cannot.Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-58059981233756103652009-04-19T13:02:00.000-05:002009-04-19T13:02:00.000-05:00In the end, focusing on the argument, (1) is false...In the end, focusing on the argument, (1) is false because the antecedent in the conditional is false. We were all in Adam because we all received our human nature from Adam. There is a solidarity to man. <br /><br />And, as we have noted, there are many possible options aside from that being the case, i.e., God is not to be treated as a moral agent like we treat human moral agents, there is more to the story, the story is being interpreted wrongly, etc. You say one claim is more plausible than another (regarding the list I offered) but also suggest that you are influenced by a 'pre-test' probability or a prior conclusion, i.e., that Christianity is false or that it cannot be 'established' to be true because certain claims within it cannot be 'established' to be true. What do we mean by 'establish' here. We are not doing geometry when we assent to God acting in history as Christ. Someone can always say that we are not proving or establishing this or that in some stricter sense or with respect to some other method of reasoning. That is fine. <br /><br />There are two sides to keep in mind, however, both resting on a different evidentiary base, *one* having to do with arguments for the existence of a necessary, incomposite, intrinsically underivative, purely actual being known by reason, and *another* having to do with special revelation- that being acting in history in this or that way and history unfolding in this or that way as told by and through special revelation.Eric Telferhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10747957049183341114noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86177712016570334482009-04-17T19:28:00.000-05:002009-04-17T19:28:00.000-05:00Since there is no good reason to think that Christ...Since there is no good reason to think that Christianity is true, as I maintain, then (2) is much more plausible than (3), (4), and (5).Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-68553337442922657572009-04-17T19:25:00.000-05:002009-04-17T19:25:00.000-05:00Much could be said regarding the specifics of the ...Much could be said regarding the specifics of the argument, but it does seem to go either of two or three ways for you; <br /><br />(1) either God does not exist, or <br />(2) the historical account offered by Christians is false, not consistent with what they say about God otherwise, as you might want to say, or, <br />(3) a particular interpretation of that account is false. <br /><br />Or, <br /><br />(4) God was acting justly, for reasons which we have yet to consider, or,<br />(5) God is above and beyond being treated as a a moral agent in the way that human beings are, which means that the entire line of reasoning commits a category mistake, acting as though God is a moral agent like human beings.Eric Telferhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10747957049183341114noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-36515801150296934772009-04-17T18:34:00.000-05:002009-04-17T18:34:00.000-05:001. If God caused the descendants of Adam and Eve t...1. If God caused the descendants of Adam and Eve to suffer the penalty imposed on the latter for the mere fact that they committed a crime/wrong doing, when the former group was not involved in anyway in committing or allowing the crime/wrong doing of the latter group, then God would have acted unjustly<br />2. God cannot act unjustly.<br />3. Therefore, God did not cause the descendants of Adam and Eve to suffer the penalty imposed on the latter for the mere fact that they committed a crime/wrong doing, when the former group was not involved in anyway in committing or allowing the crime/wrong doing of the latter group.Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01066089293772059329noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-48296928049997185072009-04-17T18:28:00.000-05:002009-04-17T18:28:00.000-05:00(1) One can speak of whether life is worthwhile or...(1) One can speak of whether life is worthwhile or whether it has been or whether it will be, and in light of a variety of considerations, frames of reference, etc.. There is no doubt about that. Some of us mean that it will all be worthwhile, when all things are considered. We speak with faith and hope, but not without reason. For we have reason to think that God exists and that the beatific vision will be so much greater than anything we experience here that we will truly be able to say that it was worth it. <br /><br />(2) At most your argument would only show that God did not act in history in the way Christians claim or that there is something wrong in their account of history. At most, it questions special revelation or how that revelation is interpreted. It does not seem to call into question the existence of God, which we can know (or have good reason to believe) apart from special revelation. Within the domains of natural religion or natural theology, without special revelation and without ecclesial authority, we can reason to the existence of God. That God is the God of Christians and the God of Christianity. That is the conception of God that classical Christianity asserts as true, in general outline. Based on those general outlines, known by reason apart from revelation, we can know that God cannot act unjustly. We are still within the realm of natural theology or natural religion here. We then have to turn our attention to revealed religion and special revelation, which is what you are challenging with your argument. But your argument does not challenge the notion of a necessary, independent, self-sufficient, purely actual, supreme, intrinsically underivative, first, uncaused being known by reason. It only challenges whether that being acted in such and such a way or whether history, in light of the possibility of such a being, could have unfolded the way special revelation claims. <br /><br />Showing that God exists by reason and offering reasons for believing claims made within special revelation are two different projects. Christians do not have to prove that the claims made in special revelation are true before they have good reason to think that God exists. That is because we can know that God exists apart from special revelation and revealed religion, by the use of reason. Whether a person has good reason to believe that an independent, self sufficient, purely actual, first, uncaused being exists is one thing. Another is whether we have good reason to believe claims made in the realm of special revelation. Christianity, of course, adds up to both of these, but the first part does not depend on special revelation.Eric Telferhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10747957049183341114noreply@blogger.com