tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post8172695932717863419..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Substances do not have substantial proper partsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-59842556326035423932016-04-20T08:17:16.937-05:002016-04-20T08:17:16.937-05:00Cruz:
Another motivator for the maxim is this: If...Cruz:<br /><br />Another motivator for the maxim is this: If a material substance is made of substances, then they have some matter in common. But the form of a substance is what gives form to the matter. So there would be a bit of matter with two forms. And that seems problematic.<br /><br />Christopher:<br /><br />It seems to me that both kinds of parts are kinds of parts. And parthood is itself transitive, not just substantial parthood or integral parthood.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-12739758911896843332016-04-16T18:16:33.166-05:002016-04-16T18:16:33.166-05:00You are relying on the transitivity of parthood to...You are relying on the transitivity of parthood to get that <i>G</i> is a part of <i>A</i> and therefore a part of <i>A</i>'s matter, <i>M</i>, or its form, <i>F</i>. But you are equivocating on "part" when you use transitivity of parthood: you infer from the fact that <i>B</i> is an <i>integral</i> part (that is, a part in the sense that contemporary analytic philosophy conceives uses the word "part") of <i>A</i> and the fact that <i>G</i> is a <i>substantial</i> part (that is, form or matter) of <i>B</i>, that <i>G</i> is a substantial part of <i>A</i>, and therefore must be a part of <i>M</i> or <i>F</i>. But that doesn't follow due to the equivocation on "part". So the argument fails.<br /><br />More on the relevant distinction: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology-medieval/#3.1Christopher Michaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02003454986381351202noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-18020688362076752572016-04-15T20:29:02.722-05:002016-04-15T20:29:02.722-05:00Alex: Right. That's a cool result.
So I gues...Alex: Right. That's a cool result. <br /><br />So I guess I was curious if this was what originally motivated the Aristotelean maxim. And if not, then do the other motivations undermine a hylomorphic conception of substances?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06614262547509875440noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-11583034817345856492016-04-15T19:34:12.628-05:002016-04-15T19:34:12.628-05:00Cruz: this argument answers that question. It only...Cruz: this argument answers that question. It only works for substantial parts.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4194477919526748782016-04-15T18:33:37.061-05:002016-04-15T18:33:37.061-05:00Curious question: Why the restriction to substanti...Curious question: Why the restriction to substantial proper parts as opposed to any old proper parts (like the form and the matter)?<br /><br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06614262547509875440noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-34871550635438254082016-04-15T14:26:15.291-05:002016-04-15T14:26:15.291-05:001. Isn't the human soul supposed to be a "...1. Isn't the human soul supposed to be a "substantial form"? I.e. a substance for all practical purposes, and yet part of another substance (the person)? And if not, what is the definition of "substance" such that the human soul is not one?<br /><br />2. If hearts are parts of bodies, but not essential parts of bodies, maybe forms-of-hearts could be parts of forms-of-persons but not essential parts. Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com