tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post8571934885437352096..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: The vagueness argument against restricted compositionalityAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger16125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-52659056959662582072013-11-01T08:44:21.976-05:002013-11-01T08:44:21.976-05:00"I can say that there are n objects with a se..."I can say that there are n objects with a sentence whose only predicate is identity."<br /><br />Hmmm. True. In that case I guess the thing to say is that the domain may be vague, that is, it may be vague whether we have an object here (e.g. a heap) or not. So quantification is vague, in effect.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-5324661495090529162013-10-31T23:53:22.025-05:002013-10-31T23:53:22.025-05:00The "n" in your sentence would be vague ...The "n" in your sentence would be vague between, say, 7,121,543,290 and 7,121,543,312, where n is world population and the number changes as the sentence is read :).Williamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12533263841520213358noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-86239365130614397822013-10-31T14:17:20.960-05:002013-10-31T14:17:20.960-05:00"all such sentences will incorporate a predic..."all such sentences will incorporate a predicate"<br /><br />Which predicate?<br /><br />I can say that there are n objects with a sentence whose only predicate is identity.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-67818283086835197072013-10-31T12:53:11.628-05:002013-10-31T12:53:11.628-05:00As I understand it, the Lewis-Sider argument is
I...As I understand it, the Lewis-Sider argument is<br /><br />If unrestricted compositionality is false, the number of objects is vague<br />The number of objects is not vague<br />So, unrestricted compositionality is true.<br /><br />I think the second premise is false, so we cannot draw any conclusions about un/restricted compositionality. The reason I think the second premise is false is that the number of objects depends on which sentences using the existential quantifier are true (here they are correct). But all such sentences will incorporate a predicate, and if the predicate is vague then the sentences will have vague truth values. That is just what a vague number of objects would be. <br />Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64238533204327423292013-10-31T09:07:19.428-05:002013-10-31T09:07:19.428-05:00Heath:
Lewis and Sider, on the other hand, will j...Heath:<br /><br />Lewis and Sider, on the other hand, will just say that your argument is just a version of their argument for unrestricted compositionality, except that it's based on more controversial entities, viz., heaps.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1624968469894948972013-10-31T06:44:46.165-05:002013-10-31T06:44:46.165-05:00*throws up hands*
:-)*throws up hands*<br /><br /><br />:-)Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-74304508378188699092013-10-30T16:22:20.052-05:002013-10-30T16:22:20.052-05:00A nice argument against the existence of heaps. :-...A nice argument against the existence of heaps. :-)Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-64099699878599264272013-10-30T16:19:22.941-05:002013-10-30T16:19:22.941-05:00Fine, leave people out of it.
Suppose the univers...Fine, leave people out of it.<br /><br />Suppose the universe consists of air particles and sand particles. There are a definite number of each. The wind (air particles in motion) blows the sand around and they gradually form heaps. At some point they become definite heaps. But along the way they will be vague heaps. So the number of contingent entities will be the number of air particles plus the number of sand particles plus the number of heaps. As the latter is vague, the sum will be vague. <br /><br />But this story isn't any more controversial than the existence (and instantiation) of vague predicates.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-54966420430854138542013-10-30T14:49:12.930-05:002013-10-30T14:49:12.930-05:00Regarding the last paragraph: Couldn't we say ...Regarding the last paragraph: Couldn't we say something similar without introducing forms? You suggest two possibilities: (a) There are sharp laws of nature specifying when a form comes into existence. (b) God decides on a case by case basis whether to create a form. But we could adopt similar positions without introducing forms, i.e.: (a*) There are sharp laws of nature specifying when a new material object comes into existence. (So, instead of having the form: "Whenever some xs are related thusly, there comes to be a form F such that F informs the xs," we just have laws of the form "whenever some xs are related thusly, there comes to be an object y such that the xs compose y.") Or: (b*) God decides on a case by case basis when to create a new material object. So, instead of God's deciding to create a form F and put it in the "informing" relation to the xs, he just creates a new thing y, and puts the xs in the proper parthood relation to it.<br /><br />Is there any reason to prefer (a) or (b) over their starred counterparts?Brian Cutterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17059155559949747916noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-1538280934508315422013-10-30T14:38:07.498-05:002013-10-30T14:38:07.498-05:00I take it that it's part of your story that it...I take it that it's part of your story that it's definite that the only objects are going to be particles and any bald philosophers there might be. <br /><br />But then the number of objects will equal the number of particles plus the number of people. For it's definite that all bald philosophers are people, and no people are particles.<br /><br />So any vagueness in your story has to do not so much with bald philosophers but with people. But one can't have vagueness about whether particles compose a person. They do so iff they have a personal soul.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-17915232818424404162013-10-30T14:27:36.983-05:002013-10-30T14:27:36.983-05:00Suppose the universe begins as an amorphous mass o...Suppose the universe begins as an amorphous mass of contingent particles. Gradually these particles begin to coalesce, at different rates, into bald philosophers. At any time before the endstage there will be a precise number of particles and a vague number of bald philosophers. So the total number of contingent objects will be vague. But I'm not seeing the difficulty in such a description.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-71738947287317693532013-10-30T13:50:02.389-05:002013-10-30T13:50:02.389-05:00What's your view on Merricks' strategy reg...What's your view on Merricks' strategy regarding vague composition? What I have in mind is the idea that the emergence of new causal powers is a sign of composition. Merricks has this example about straws breaking a camel's back, but I think that particular example is pretty weak. Nevertheless, this can be developed into a more plausible argument. <br /><br />If I'm allowed a self-reference, I suggested in a 2009 paper (http://philpapers.org/rec/TAHATV) that the case of a heap provides a good example: four grains of sand is plausible the least number required to compose a heap because of the new causal powers that emerge, e.g., the rise in potential energy that the pyramid shape allows.Tuomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08673467659602413154noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-84133112808268070322013-10-30T13:17:33.478-05:002013-10-30T13:17:33.478-05:00Yeah, it's not a problem that it's vague h...Yeah, it's not a problem that it's vague how many objects of kind K there are, where K is a kind with vague boundary conditions. BUt it's a problem that it's vague how many Ks there are where K is a non-vague kind, e.g., contingent.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-66024877046534785482013-10-30T12:34:27.615-05:002013-10-30T12:34:27.615-05:00Right. My point was this: that bald philosophers...Right. My point was this: that bald philosophers are objects, and how many of them there are is vague, and this doesn't seem to be a problem.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-3708697491739693582013-10-30T12:30:11.049-05:002013-10-30T12:30:11.049-05:00That's a statement that includes other terms w...That's a statement that includes other terms with vague application: "bald", "philosopher", "having" and "this discussion". The vagueness does not seem to be rooted in the quantifiers.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-14444740662086058332013-10-30T12:00:34.140-05:002013-10-30T12:00:34.140-05:00The reply which immediately occurs to me is that t...The reply which immediately occurs to me is that the truth values of quantified statements certainly are vague. E.g. "there are exactly two bald philosophers having this discussion."Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.com