tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post8805324828504692950..comments2024-03-28T13:23:50.623-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: A thought about MolinismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-76985012421596429402013-02-04T20:51:38.619-06:002013-02-04T20:51:38.619-06:00I am not sure what to make of backtracking conditi...I am not sure what to make of backtracking conditionals. Maybe that's just a simple way of saying: "If I was going to take ..."?<br /><br />You're certainly right that some entailment-based conditionals don't involve dependence. But they're just as damaging to freedom, presumably.<br /><br />All that said, you've helped to convince me that I don't want to stand by what I said in this post, at least not in its present form.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-15910733574317215802013-02-04T19:01:45.550-06:002013-02-04T19:01:45.550-06:00Interesting post. A couple thoughts: (i) It's ...Interesting post. A couple thoughts: (i) It's widely held that not *all* subjunctive conditionals tell us how the consequent depends on the antecedent-- e.g. "backtracking" conditionals: "I didn't take the MCAT last month. But if I had, I would have studied for it in advance." Also, subjunctive conditionals of the form "If it were the case that A, it would have been the case that A" seem to be true, yet do not entail the relevant kind of dependence (assuming that irreflexivity holds of the kind of dependence in question). (ii) Incompatibilism is consistent with holding that my actions' depend on the immediately prior state of the world, so long as the dependence in question is weaker than full-on "deterministic" dependence. Brian Cutterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17059155559949747916noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-28036754170372956612013-02-04T16:24:45.604-06:002013-02-04T16:24:45.604-06:00I was thinking that the counterfactual is a fact r...I was thinking that the counterfactual is a fact rather like the Lewis "dependency hypotheses" from my other post.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-69068613272370671452013-02-04T13:15:42.429-06:002013-02-04T13:15:42.429-06:00Dr. Pruss:
Could you elaborate on the dependence ...Dr. Pruss:<br /><br />Could you elaborate on the dependence relation between <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> you identified? What exactly is problematic (for the Molinist) about <i>B</i>'s depending on <i>A</i>?Marc Belcastrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03442654158696515036noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-20433605255844961532013-02-04T11:44:27.945-06:002013-02-04T11:44:27.945-06:00I fully agree. I have never liked the Molinist ide...I fully agree. I have never liked the Molinist idea, since it seems to me that, if there is such a thing as "what I would definitely do given X" then I don't actually have free will. My decisions are more of a program or function of "if X then Y".Michael Gonzalezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05279261871735286117noreply@blogger.com