tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post90518248015827475..comments2024-03-28T19:56:42.305-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Trolleys, breathing, killing and letting dieAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-28456239366597397442015-11-10T13:39:40.885-06:002015-11-10T13:39:40.885-06:00Thanks, and good replies too.
1. We might do som...Thanks, and good replies too. <br /><br />1. We might do some things like that in our lives, and I think that 1-1 redirection is sometimes permissible. But what I was trying to get at is that the reasoning in the OP seems to commit one to the assessment that 1-1 redirection is permissible in the original trolley problem (at least, by tossing a coin if one has a coin, but without a coin if one does not have it). <br />2. Fair enough. So, the doctor is killing the patient by taking action he foresees will result in death. But now, let's say a doctor gives a patient a huge dose of morphine, foreseeing death, but with the intention of removing suffering. That would also look like a non-intentional killing by the same standards. <br />3. In case a third party grabs the patient's hand in order to stop him from pressing the button, that looks like killing...unless the patient has no intention of pressing it in the first place. Even if the third party holds the patient's hand with intent to kill, if the patient has no intention of pressing the button, that looks to me like attempted killing on the part of the third party, rather than killing. But if they do not intend to kill, it seems to me it's not killing or attempted killing. <br />The case seems tentatively analogous to me to an original trolley case in which a third party holds your hand in order to prevent you from flipping the lever. If they do that, are they killing the five innocents? <br />If you intended to flip the lever, it seems to me they kill them by preventing you from doing so, though maybe that's not a deliberate killing. <br />If you don't, it seems to me they're not killing them (depending on their intentions, they might engage in attempted killing, though).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-87844006306759958502015-11-10T12:07:56.284-06:002015-11-10T12:07:56.284-06:00These are really good cases.
Ad 1: The 1-1 case i...These are really good cases.<br /><br />Ad 1: The 1-1 case is intuitively (to me!) a borderline case, so the judgment could depend on fine details of the situation, including questions about what is and what is not ingrained.<br /><br />I think we probably unknowingly do things similar to 1-1 redirecting quite a bit in our ordinary lives. You change lines while driving. This slightly delays traffic in one lane but not in another. It follows that when a driver miles back changes lanes without checking his blind spot, he kills the occupants of a different car than he would have had you not changed lanes. <br /><br />Ad 2-3: Yes, these are cases of killing. But whether they are cases of intentional killing depends on further details. In 2, is the doctor making an effort to stop saving in order that the patient should die? If so, then it's an intentional killing. But maybe the doctor's goal is simply to avoid imposing medical procedures that the patient has refused to consent to. In that case, there is no intention to kill, though the doctor foresees that death will result. In 3, if he fights the survival instinct in order to die, he's intentionally killing himself and thus committing suicide. But if he fights the survival instinct not in order to die but in order to avoid painful procedures (crucial point: to avoid painful procedures rather than to avoid painful life; if the latter, then he's intending to die), then he is not intending his death, and hence he's not committing suicide.<br /><br />Let me see if I can soften up up. In 3, suppose a third party grabs the patient's hand to keep him from pressing the button. This seems to be a case of killing. (Whether it's intentional killing or not depends on what the third party intends.) But why wouldn't it equally be a case of killing to grab one's own hand, tuck it in behind one's back, to keep oneself from pressing the button?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-443333005799057792015-11-10T09:17:46.519-06:002015-11-10T09:17:46.519-06:00After further consideration, I don't think it&...After further consideration, I don't think it's correct to classify every situation in which one makes an effort to refrain from letting die as a killing. But the argument seems to assume that it is, so further consequences of the argument are: <br /><br />1. Let's consider the "utilitarian" case, but now there is only one innocent on each track. It's killing vs. killing, and killing one person rather than the other does not demean anyone's death, so it seems that tossing a coin and redirect or not depending on the coin's results is permissible. Furthermore, if one does not have a coin or similar means and there is no time to get one, then it seems redirecting is permissible. But since whether a behavior is permissible does not depend (as the argument holds) on what sort of behavior is ingrained in the agent, then even in OTC(1,1), tossing a coin is permissible, and redirecting if there is no coin is permissible. But that's against moral intuitions. <br /><br />2. A pacient is dying, is suffering, and no longer wants doctors to keep using extraordinary means to keep him alive. But the doctor has an impulse to save lives - because of her training. So, when his heart stops, she makes an effort to refrain from saving him. By the argument's characterization of killing, she killed him, so she engaged in euthanasia (I think euthanasia is sometimes permissible by the way). <br /><br />3. As before, the patient is dying, and after careful consideration, decides to tell doctors not to use extraordinary means to save him. He can still change his mind: if he goes into any sort of shock but is still conscious and presses a button, an alarm will sound, and the doctors will save him. So, something goes wrong, and he realizes it. He's dying. But he - like pretty much everyone else - has a survival instinct. Yet, he's considered the matter, and knows he will soon die anyway, but will suffer a lot more in the process if they save him. So, he refrains from pushing the button. By the characterization of killing in the argument, it seems the patient just committed suicide (I do think suicide is sometimes permissible).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-17314943127375572482015-11-09T22:36:01.703-06:002015-11-09T22:36:01.703-06:00I agree there are cases in which we have good reas...I agree there are cases in which we have good reason to think so, but I'm in doubt as to whether this one is among them. <br /><br />Still, if it is permissible iff it's obligatory, that seems to give intuitive support to the view that it's impermissible, in my assessment - at least, I have no clear intuition about permissibility, but I do seem to have a strong intuition that it's not obligatory to redirect the trolley. (I don't know what the intuitions of most people would say, when it comes to the issue of whether it's obligatory).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-4422438419538477322015-11-09T22:10:30.380-06:002015-11-09T22:10:30.380-06:00I think this is one of those cases where we have g...I think this is one of those cases where we have good reason to think something is permissible iff it is obligatory, but we have a controversy about whether it is permissible. I think there are other cases like that. Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-17079818615978746432015-11-09T22:05:10.918-06:002015-11-09T22:05:10.918-06:00Here's another consequence of the argument:
...Here's another consequence of the argument: <br /><br />In the "utilitarian" case, the matter is between killing 1 or killing 5, according to the interpretation of what it is to kill that's implicit in the OP. <br />Also, while not all instances of killings are morally equivalent, the argument appears committed to holding that the ones under consideration are (else, one might say that the argument only replaces killing vs. letting die with morally different sorts of killings, and the conclusion is blocked). So, given it's between killing 1 and killing 5, the conclusion of the argument is that one <i>should</i> redirect. But that entails redirecting is not only morally permissible, but morally obligatory in the "utilitarian" case. <br />The argument also holds that whether you should redirect or not doesn't depend on which action is more ingrained in you.<br />Based on that, the conclusion is that in the original scenario, redirecting is morally obligatory. That seems particularly counterintuitive to me. <br /><br />What do you think?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-30732371793388629342015-11-09T20:53:24.004-06:002015-11-09T20:53:24.004-06:00Ad 1: That seems to be an upshot of the argument. ...Ad 1: That seems to be an upshot of the argument. I am not comfortable with the conclusion, but that seems to be where it leads.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-77134251756509956122015-11-09T20:08:22.657-06:002015-11-09T20:08:22.657-06:00Alex:
That's an interesting argument. I'...Alex: <br /><br />That's an interesting argument. I'll have to give it more thought, but for now, I have some brief comments: <br /><br />1. Given how you characterize killing, it seems to me that by this argument, <i>any</i> instance of letting die can be said to be morally equivalent to an instance of killing: you just have to modify the agent and give her a propensity to save, so that refraining from doing it would be an instance of killing. Do you agree with that assessment?<br />2. A person who holds that redirecting is impermissible may hold that the reason is that the risk of dying the person on the side track goes from 0 to 1. That alternative seems impervious to your argument. <br />3. A person who holds that redirecting is impermissible may simply say they don't know why, as it's often the case in hypothetical scenarios, but it's intuitively clear. <br />4. Combining 2. and 3, she might say that <i>perhaps</i> the matter is due to the increased probability, but if not, it's still intuitively clear. <br /><br />Side note: I don't actually claim it's impermissible. I'm undecided on the matter, especially if it's two people rather than five (if it's 10000000, I think it's permissible).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com