tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post9069602610228022843..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Consequentialism and counterfactualsAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-16565067753995058232008-01-21T14:38:00.000-06:002008-01-21T14:38:00.000-06:00Heath:I think your final sentence says it well. T...Heath:<BR/><BR/>I think your final sentence says it well. The reasons we have for doubting the determinacy of outcomes are reasons for doubting the determinacy of the values of outcomes. Moreover, some of them also seem to be reasons for doubting the determinacy of the relative values of outcomes.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-40420972771304767392008-01-21T13:01:00.000-06:002008-01-21T13:01:00.000-06:00The consequentialist doesn’t need to affirm that p...The consequentialist doesn’t need to affirm that particular choices will lead to particular definite outcomes, i.e. counterfactuals of the form, “If I were to do A, Z would happen” for definite Z. What she needs is a relation, something like “for all actions in my power, there is some action A such that the outcome of A is better than the outcome of the other actions.” That is, the outcomes can be indeterministic or unknowable, but their relative values need to be deterministic or knowable. One might very well wonder, however, how the relative values of outcomes can be deterministic when the outcomes themselves are not deterministic.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com