tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post9163731353160234798..comments2024-03-27T20:37:09.185-05:00Comments on Alexander Pruss's Blog: Randomness and compatibilismAlexander R Prusshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-33984591193782220142015-09-17T10:53:18.940-05:002015-09-17T10:53:18.940-05:00I think that in domination cases, my reasons do de...I think that in domination cases, my reasons do deprive me of the power of choice. If A rationally dominates B, then every reason I have for B is also a reason for A, and so there is no reason that favors B over A. So I have no reasons for B over A. But only things for which I have contrastive reasons are options in a choice. So if A dominates B, then B isn't an option in a choice. But a choice requires at least two options.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-83832883270472906712015-09-17T10:40:53.889-05:002015-09-17T10:40:53.889-05:00when you have overwhelming reasons in favor of one...<i>when you have overwhelming reasons in favor of one option, you don't choose. That's what "overwhelming" means.</i><br /><br />I don't think that's what "overwhelming" means in this context. It just means the choice is very obvious and unproblematic. It would be pretty odd if my reasons could deprive me of the power of choice.Heath Whitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13535886546816778688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23629175065458174172015-09-17T10:12:34.828-05:002015-09-17T10:12:34.828-05:00That's a nice alternative.
That said, when y...That's a nice alternative. <br /><br />That said, when you have overwhelming reasons in favor of one option, you don't choose. That's what "overwhelming" means. And it's freedom in *choice* that I am interested in here.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3891434218564545511.post-23966086798789073352015-09-17T09:35:04.465-05:002015-09-17T09:35:04.465-05:00There's a weaker (quasi-)Humean position one c...There's a weaker (quasi-)Humean position one can adopt if one thinks freedom comes in degrees. One might say that the insertion of indeterminism into the process of choice can't make us any <i>more</i> free than in the (good) deterministic case, and, indeed, in ordinary background conditions makes us <i>less</i> free. For instance, you might think (with Descartes) that the highest grade of freedom is when you have overwhelming reasons in favor of one option and you act on these reasons. Then you might think that the less decisive your reasons are, or the less determined by reasons your choices are (i.e., the more chance there is that you will act against your reasons), the less free you are. Then you would say: sure, we imperfectly free humans (unlike God) have an element of indeterminism in our choices, and we're free, but the indeterminism isn't helping us be <i>more</i> free than we otherwise would be - in fact, we'd be more free if we were determined.<br /><br />On this kind of view, all three of your characters are free when they have a strongest desire, and Blaise and Carl are equally (un)free in cases of conflicting desire (since Carl is not determined by his reasons, but by some other process). This seems like a good result.Kenny Pearcehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05561248709234656660noreply@blogger.com