Is being dependent an intrinsic property of an entity?
Suppose we say that it is intrinsic. Then we have the following interesting consequence. Assuming there are dependent entities, it is possible to have an intrinsic property, D, whose possession entails the obtaining of a genuine relation (a dependence relation) to another entity, but where D is, nonetheless, not relational. This would force us to deny strong recombination principles in accounts of modality. And that would be a good thing from my point of view. For one, it would force a humility in the move from apparent conceivability to possibility. (The modal problem of evil is one place where this matters.)
Could we say that being dependent is not an intrinsic property? That, I think, would be odd. If being dependent is not an intrinsic property, or at least is not entailed by the intrinsic properties of the entity (all I need for the arguments of the previous paragraph is that being dependent is entailed by the intrinsic properties of a thing), then being dependent is not a matter of some kind of inner need or lack in the entity. If George could survive without water, and without any substitute (natural or supernatural) for water, and without without any intrinsic difference in him, then he is not really dependent on water for his existence. My intuition is that the notion of a dependence that does not supervene on the intrinsic properties of a thing and that (therefore) is merely accidental is a sham dependence. I don't yet have a very good argument here, beyond just restatements of the intuition.
If I am right, then Hume has no conceptual resources to affirm that any entity is genuinely causally dependent. For on his view, "causal dependence" would have to be an extrinsic property of an entity, and hence, if I am right, would at best be just a sham dependence.
by being dependent do you mean causally dependent? Does this differ from the view that causal relations are internal to their terms? Does this lead to monism? An interesting (not necessarily bad) consequence.
ReplyDeleteI think the point is more general than just about causal dependence.
ReplyDeleteI think what I said is compatible with two views:
- causal relations are internal to their terms
- causal relations are internal to the effect
By monism, do you mean the doctrine that there is only one thing or the doctrine that there is only kind of thing? I don't think we're led to either.
I was thinking of what I take to be Spinoza's view and also that of the British Idealists. So, in a sense yes, there is only one thing.
ReplyDeleteIf causal relations are internal, then to understand a thing, x, you need to know its relations. But of course the relations themselves are related. and so on. So it follows that a complete understanding of any particular thing would include everything. This contrasts with logical atomism, according to which relations are external to their terms.
Maybe there is something wrong with the argument, but it is historiclly significant, and Russell and Moore rejected it by rejecting the claim that all relations are internal (I know your claim is more limited, to dependency relations)
All that follows is that the complete understanding of any thing requires a complete understanding of all of its causal antecedents. I think this is true. But it does not follow either that a complete understanding of any thing requires a complete understanding of everything, nor does it follow that there is only one thing.
ReplyDeleteOne gets a little more if one thinks the causal relations are internal in the cause. Then maybe one gets determinism, and maybe gets an understanding-holism like in Leibniz. But holism is not monism.