A pattern of argument against determinism that is worth exploring is not to argue that free will is incompatible with a variety of determinism, but instead to argue that some other feature of our moral life is incompatible that variety of determinism. For instance, the following argument is valid:
- If theistic determinism holds, then all our character features, histories and choices are entirely determined by God. (Premise)
- If x's character features, history and the choice to promise p to y, are entirely determined by y, then x's promise of p to y is invalid (and hence non-binding). (Premise)
- One only validly promises something if one chose to promise it. (Premise)
- Therefore, if theistic determinism holds, no promises to God are valid (by 1-3).
- Some promises to God are valid. (Premise)
- Therefore, theistic determinism is false. (By 4 and 5)
I think one can use (2) in an argument for incompatibilism. You start with (2) and add the premises:
- If x freely promises to y something permissible, then x's promise is valid.
- If some free choice can have an ultimate cause outside one, then a freely made promise of something permissible to any person whatsoever can have an ultimate cause outside one.
- Whether an action is free does not depend on conditions a hundred years before one's conception.
Why would the theistic determinist accept premise (2)? It just seems a special case of the claim that determination is incompatible with responsibility -- but the theistic determinist already denies that.
ReplyDeleteDan said what I wanted to say better than I could. Determinism is not incompatible with responsibility. We are not responsible because we are free; we are responsible by Divine fiat. "But that's not fair," is the usual response. And therein lies the fundamental problem of mankind -- we think our notion of good and evil is right, when it is just as fallen as every other part of us.
ReplyDeleteI think the claim that being determined by the person to whom you make a promise is incompatible with the promise's validity may be more plausible than the claim the determinism is incompatible with responsibility. For, more is required for promise validity than responsibility. (E.g. I am responsible for what I do at gunpoint--but promises made at gunpoint are invalid.)
ReplyDeleteBut I was only claiming the argument was valid.
I actually find the argument, including premise 2, to be a sound one.
ReplyDeleteBut I fail to see how it has any impact on the ultimate reality of a relationship with a higher being (or simply the existence of a human being.)
I suppose I'm missing the implied steps, but a promise's validity seems to speak more to how we perceive the world, more to the illusion of free will than anything else.
I do like the concept of looking to sections of ethical life, but there must be a tighter connection between ethics and metaphysics for this to hold true. Basically, my argument is that with the two possibilities before us - one being that promises are valid and the other being that promises are invalid (based on your argument) - one precludes the existence of theistic determinism while the other allows for it while diminishing the meaning of a believer's relationship. However, both are still valid options for how reality looks.
One could just as easily say that theistic determinism exists at the cost of the genuineness of a believer's promises and ethical structures.