Yes, they are: For they think that the central goals of human life are of a sort that can be achieved by natural powers alone.
No, they aren't: For they think that intimate union with God cannot be achieved by natural powers alone.
OK, so what's the right answer? In a sense, both yes and no. If we define Pelagianism by the natural achievability of the central goals of human life, then yes. If we defined it by the natural achievability of intimate union with God, then no. On Christian doctrine, the two definitions will come to the same thing. But on naturalism, they don't.
This might, however, yield a question-begging (but perhaps still useful) argument against naturalism. According to naturalism, the central goals of human life can be achieved by natural powers alone. But union with God cannot be. And union of God is a central goal of human life.
I'll need a clearer definition of God. Does naturalistic pantheism count? If not, then the central goals of human life cannot include union with God. In fact, I cannot see how on naturalism any sort of normative facts could exist whatsoever.
ReplyDeleteOn naturalistic pantheism, then maybe union with God is possible. I'm not sure.
I guess that'll depend on the particular claims of the naturalistic pantheism.
ReplyDeleteI would assume that most philosophers who are naturaists believe in normative facts, e.g., that one should not conclude p from "if p, then q" and q.
Yeah. I would hope that all philosophers would conclude that normative facts exist, lest they undermine reason itself. I fail to see any sort of justification for such a belief on naturalism.
ReplyDeleteAlso, I just don't understand how on naturalism, these objective goals of human life could even exist. I understand how subjective goals could exist. I even understand how pragmatic goals can exist. But what about these objective goals that exist independently of our beliefs in them?
I wonder if there's a related argument around here somewhere--something like:
ReplyDelete1. On naturalistic moral realism, we have a duty to be morally perfect. (Otherwise, we can commit wrongs and claim we haven't fallen short of any moral obligation).
2. It's either possible or impossible to be morally perfect.
3. But no one is in fact morally perfect.
4. If moral perfection is impossible, then having a duty to be morally perfect seems incoherent.
5. If moral perfection is possible, then the reason we all fall short of moral perfection either has to do with our free choices or 'outside' factors.
6. If the reason we fall short of moral perfection has to do with outside (deterministic) features, then having a duty to be morally perfect again seems incoherent (on naturalism at least).
7. If the reason we fall short of moral perfection has to do with our own free will, then something doesn't quite ring true, for why would this be the case given that most of us have a deep desire to be better people and consider moral issues to be of huge importance? (And free will seems quite difficult on naturalism in any case).
Can't the naturalist say: It is possible to do the right thing every time, but it is extremely unlikely? It's like tossing a coin a hundred times and getting heads each time.
ReplyDeleteI suppose so. Though likeliness seems a strange thing to appeal to once acts of volition have entered the picture. That is, it seems odd to say something like: 'I was trying to do the right thing, but I got unlucky and succumbed to temptation'.
ReplyDelete