Imagine a custody battle between Alice and Bob over their child Carl. Suppose the court finds that Alice loves Carl much more than Bob does, that Alice is much wiser than Bob, and that Alice knows Carl and his needs much better than Bob does. Moreover, it is discovered that Bob has knowingly unjustifiedly harmed Carl, while Alice has never done that. In the light of these, it is obvious that Alice is a more fitting candidate to have authority over Carl than Bob is.
But now, suppose x is some individual. Then God loves x much more than I love x, God is much wiser than I, God knows x and his needs much better than I do. Moreover, suppose that I have knowingly unjustifiedly harmed x, while God has never done that. In light of these, it should be plausible that God is a more fitting candidate to have authority over x than I am.
Suppose, however, that I am x. The above is still true. God loves me much more than I love myself; God is much wiser than I; God knows me and my needs much better than I do. And I have on a number of occasions knowingly unjustifiedly harmed myself—indeed, in typical cases when I sin, that’s what has happened—while God has never knowingly unjustifiedly harmed me. So, it seems that God is a more fitting candidate to have authority over me than I am.
I am not endorsing a general principle that if someone loves me more than I love myself, etc., then they are more fit to have authority over me. For the someone might be someone that has little intuitive standing to have authority over me—a complete stranger who inexplicably enormously cares about me might not have much authority over me. But it is prima facie plausible that God has significant authority over me, for the same sorts of reasons that my parents had authority over me when I was a child. And the above considerations suggest that God’s authority over me is likely to be greater than my own authority over myself.
If it is correct that God, if he existed, would have greater authority over me than I have over myself, then that would have significant repercussions for the problem of evil. For a part of the problem involves the question of whether it is permissible for God to allow a person to suffer horrendously even for the sake of greater (or incommensurable but proportionate) goods to them or (especially) another. But it would be permissible for me to allow myself to suffer horrendously for the sake of greater (or incommensurable but proportionate) goods for me or another. If God has greater authority over me than I have over myself, then it would likewise be permissible for God.
This does not of course solve the problem of evil. There is still the question whether allowing the sufferings people undergo has the right connection with greater (or incommensurable but proportionate) goods, and much of the literature on the problem of evil has focused on that. But it does help significantly with the deontic component of the question. (Though even with respect to the deontic aspects, there is still the question of divine intentions—it would I think be wrong even for God to intend an evil for the sake of a good. So care is still needed in theodicy to ensure that the theodicy doesn’t make God out to be intending evils for the sake of goods.)
Alex
ReplyDeleteSo care is still needed in theodicy to ensure that the theodicy doesn’t make God out to be intending evils for the sake of goods.)
I don't see any way around that. If evil E is necessary for Good G and God wants G, then God intends E, for good reasons. The God you believe in is, as far as I can tell, the active creator and sustainer of everything that exist apart from Himself. That means that E would not exist, even for an instant, if God did not actively sustain E.
So, you might be able to find a theodicy that somehow "excuses" God because He did what he did for good reasons. But you cannot claim that God didn't do what He did.
Re moral evils as opposed to non-moral evils - don't human beings quite often tolerate moral evils in consideration of goods down the line but without positively intending the bad moral choice occur? I am holding a child in my lap who is culpably prone to pull the cat's tail (currently in reach only because the child is on my lap). Yes, I am 'sustaining' that child, and yes, I could prevent the tail-pulling if I push the child off my lap - but that will not provide a better outcome than leaving her where she is, following which she will no doubt grab, get scratched and see the error of her ways. A 'defeater-defeater': preventing the action will not improve things overall.
ReplyDeleteThe situation is different I think with non-moral evils which surely both we and God can in principle intend in some cases at least - as when I intend to catch/give someone else the common cold as part of a clinical trial.
Of course, there are any number of far more challenging examples, but can't we accept the possibility at least of God intending some non-moral evils, and God failing to prevent some moral evils not because God intends they occur, but because intervening will not improve things overall?
Helen
ReplyDelete"Can't we accept the possibility at least of God intending some non-moral evils, and God failing to prevent some moral evils not because God intends they occur, but because intervening will not improve things overall?"
It's not a matter of intervening. God may have good reasons "overall" to actively bring about moral evils. That's not the point. But an evil for good reasosn is still an evil.
On classical theism, nothing happens that God doesn't intend. So, if, as Alex says, it would be wrong even for God to intend an evil for the sake of a good, then the occurence of any evil means God was wrong.