Tuesday, October 2, 2018

When God doesn't act for some reason

Here’s an argument for a thesis that pushes one closer to omnirationality.

  1. God is responsible for all contingent facts about his will.

  2. No one is responsible for anything that isn’t an action (perhaps internal) done for a reason or the result of such an action.

  3. If God doesn’t act on a reason R that he could have acted on, that’s a contingent fact about his will.

  4. So, if God doesn’t act on a reason R, then either (a) God couldn’t have acted on R, or (b) God’s not acting on R itself has a reason S behind it.

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7 comments:

  1. Walter Van den AckerOctober 2, 2018 at 12:39 PM

    Alex

    If God is simply and immutable, as Classical Theists believe, then it doesn't make sense to say that God could have acted on reason Rbut didn't do so.
    If reason R is a good reason, then God acts on it, if it's not a good reason, then God doesn't act on it. That all "the reason S" really means, but the important thing here, I think, is that reason S cannot be contingent.



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  2. Alexander R PrussOctober 3, 2018 at 2:46 PM

    Well, sometimes reasons conflict. There is a good reason R to do A and a good reason S not to. If God chooses to do A, he does so for reason R, and does not act on S.

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  3. Walter Van den AckerOctober 4, 2018 at 12:13 AM

    Alex

    But then you get into an infinite regress, because if the choice to act is to be a rational
    choice, there has to be a reason T why God doesn't act on reason S but does act on reason R.
    Or the "choice" between reason R and reason S is random, of course, but then by your own reaoning, God is not responsible for acting since the action is not done for a reason.

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  4. Alexander R PrussOctober 4, 2018 at 7:54 PM

    The reason why God doesn't act on S but acts on R can be just R.

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  5. Walter Van den AckerOctober 5, 2018 at 1:08 AM

    Alex

    No, the reason T God acts on R is that God prefers reason R over reason S.
    But, since God is necessary and immutable and simple, T is necessary, so God cannot not act act on reason T, hence He cannot act on reason S.

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  6. Alexander R PrussOctober 5, 2018 at 6:48 AM

    In my view of free choice, preferences play little role. Persons choose between reasons, on the basis of precisely these reasons.

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  7. Walter Van den AckerOctober 5, 2018 at 8:05 AM

    Alex

    If reason R and reason S are both equally good, it makes little sense to say He chooses between R and S on the basis of R, unless He prefers R over S.
    A person only chooses "on the basis" of reason R if that reason if better than another reason.

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