Internalism about non-derivative responsibility holds that whether one is non-derivatively responsible for a decision depends only on facts about the agent during the time of the decision.
Only an incompatibilist can be an internalist. For suppose that compatibilism is true. Then there will be possible cases of non-derivative responsibility where what the agent decides will be determined by factors just prior to the decision. But of course those factors could have been aberrantly produced in order to determine the particular decision by some super-powerful, super-smart being, and then the agent would not have been responsible for the decision. So whether there is responsibility on compatibilism depends on factors outside the time of the decision.
Speaking for myself, I have a strong direct intuition that internalism about non-derivative responsibility is true. But it would be interesting whether arguments can be constructed for or against such internalism. If so, that might give another way forward in the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate.
Alex
ReplyDeleteHow can anything depend only on facts about the agent during the time of the decision?
I'd think the agent during the time of the decision clearly depends on the agent prior to the decision. At least, I hope that tomorrow I will still depend on what I am today. And I sincerely hope that my decisions tomorrow will be determined at least in part by facts about me today. Otherwise, what I am going to decide tomorrow could turn out to be a big surprise even to myself.
Of course, facts prior to the decision affect the decision. What I meant is that the responsibility facts supervene on the facts about the agent during the decision.
ReplyDeleteCheck out this paper:
ReplyDeleteCiurria, Michelle (2015). Moral Responsibility Ain’t Just in the Head. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):601--616.
Thanks, Andrew. It seems to me that Ciurria is lumping derivative and non-derivative responsibility together, whereas I think they are very different. Historical facts do affect derivative responsibility. But ultimately (say, in terms of the Last Judgment!), only non-derivative responsibility matters, and it's what I am an internalist about.
ReplyDeleteFor instance, she thinks that Harris2, who got to the same state of lack of moral sanity and reasons-responsiveness as the actual Harris who was mistreated as a child but did so via culpable neglect of his moral development, is responsible for his actions while Harris is not. I agree, but that's only derivative responsibility, and so not what I am talking about.
In fact, I think derivative responsibility is not really agential responsibility for doing. Here's what I mean. Consider two people:
Alice pays a neuroscientist to remove all her moral reasons-responsiveness and replace it with an oversimplified hedonistic calculation. As a result of this, Alice does horrible things because they immediately please her.
Bob pays a neuroscientist to remove of all of Carl's moral reasons-responsiveness and replace it with an oversimplified hedonistic calculation. As a result of this, Carl does horrible things because they immediately please him.
Suppose Alice and Carl end up with the same mental states and do the same horrible thing H at time t for the same oversimplified hedonistic reason, in such a way that Carl is in no way responsible. Now, Alice's responsibility for Alice doing H is exactly the same in kind as Bob's responsibility for *Carl* doing H. Both at least recklessly (or maybe even intentionally) cause H, etc.
But Bob's responsibility for Carl doing H is not agential responsibility for doing. A necessary condition for one to have agential responsibility for doing is that the doing is one's own doing! But here the doing is Carl's. So, Alice's responsibility, though it is a responsibility for her own doing, is no more an agential responsibility for doing than Carl's is, as Alice has the same responsibility as Bob.
We should characterize Bob's responsibility not as an agential responsibility for doing, but as a derivative responsibility for the *effects* of doing--namely, the effects of hiring the neuroscientist. By the same token, Alice's responsibility is a derivative responsibility for the effects of one's doing--namely, the effects of hiring the neuroscientist. But effect-responsibility is not morally that important, except for considerations of restitution and tort.