It is hard to know that something is permissible, because an action is permissible provided that no moral consideration is decisive against it. Thus, it seems, to know that an action is permissible requires surveying the infinite set of all possible moral considerations and checking that none of them rules out the action.
But natural law ethics provides a handy shortcut:
- Actions characteristic of a kind of being are permissible in relevantly normal circumstances.
Principle (1), for instance, makes it difficult to defend strong versions of antinatalism or of ethical vegetarianism by conferring a default permission status on reproduction and the eating of meat, since we are organisms (and hence characteristically reproduce in appropriate circumstances) and omnivores (and hence have a characteristic diet that includes meat).
The natural permission principle shifts the discussion from the question whether a given action type, characteristic of us humans, is generally permissible, to the question whether the circumstances at hand are relevantly normal. Thus, (1) still leaves open the possibility of an antinatalism that holds that things are so abnormally bad that it’s wrong to reproduce, or an ethical vegetarianism on which global conditions require us to forego meat.
Subscribing to principle (1) also explains the incredulous stare I see on students’ faces when I explain Andrea Dworkin’s view that heterosexual intercourse is always wrong.
Alex
ReplyDeleteI can conceive of a kind of being for which torturing innocent children is characteristic of that kind of being. For such a being, torturing innocent beings would be permissible.
The problem is that it appears that there are moral considerations decisive againt torturing innocent children.
IIRC, Andrea Dworkin did not really think heterosexual intercourse is always wrong. She thought (male) domination was wrong. However, is male domination characteristic of our kind?
I am not sure it isn't. It is quite common in other mammals after all. But I happen to believe male domination is not permissible.
I would like to say that such a being may be impossible. Sure, we can still ask whether torturing the innocent would be permissible for such a being if _per impossibile_ that being existed. But one can ask such _per impossibile_ questions about every moral theory. https://www.pdcnet.org/faithphil/content/faithphil_2009_0026_0004_0432_0439
ReplyDeleteBy the way, in _Intercourse_, Dworkin is clear that she thinks heterosexual intercourse involves male domination in two ways: (a) due to social factors and (b) due to the innate geometric features of the biology.
Alex
ReplyDeleteI think we can conceive of such a thing without any apparent contradiction, so I see no reason to think it wouldn't be possible.
Now, if all heterosexual intercourse involved male domination it would indeed follow that heterosexual intercourse is always wrong. But then we have a case of an action characteristic of a kind of being (heterosexual intercourse) that is not permissible because it involves another action (male domination) that is also characteristic of the same kind of being.
Theism is committed to some things that can be described without apparent contradiction being impossible. For instance, theism is committed the impossibility of a universe where there are lots of people, all the people are morally perfect and all of them are horrendously suffering for eternity.
ReplyDeleteProbably every theorist at some point has to deny the possibility of something that can be described without apparent contradiction. This is a burden for a theory, but a burden that can be borne given other advantages of a theory.
Alex
ReplyDeleteBut given certain brands of theism, a universe where there are lots of people, all the people are morally perfect and all of them are horrendously suffering for eternity is contradictory if God is necessarily good and goodness entails that morally perfect beings do not suffer for eternity.
The scenario I was describing is not contradictory unless God's goodness necessarily entails that torturing innocent children is wrong for any kind of beings, not just for human beings. Hurting and killing a gazelle (or even a child) is characteristic for a lion, although the gazelle (or the child) is innocent.