Assume a Thomistic metaphysics, including the primary/secondary causation model from Aquinas. Thus, whenever a created cause has an effect, it has the effect it does only because God, through primary causation, cooperates with the created cause. If God did not cooperate with the created cause, the creature’s secondary causal power would be impotent to produce the effect. On the other hand, God can directly cause something by primary causation without the secondary causes doing anything.
Suppose that I strike a match, but God doesn’t cooperate in the frictional causing of fire. Then the match is struck, and does everything a struck match does, except that no fire results. Now imagine these two scenarios:
I strike a match which, in the ordinary way and with God’s cooperation, causes fire.
I strike a match, but God does not cooperate with me; however, God miraculously causes a fire just like the one in (1).
These two scenarios are different. So they must differ in something. They cannot differ in God, since that would violate divine simplicity, a core commitment of Thomistic metaphysics. So they must differ on the side of creatures. If so, they differ in the match striking or in the fire (or, more precisely, in the match and in that which is on fire, given a substance-accident ontology), God’s cooperation or lack thereof making the match-striking or the fire different.
Suppose God’s cooperation makes the match-striking different. Then in scenario (1), created reality includes the event of divinely-cooperated-match-striking. This event surely doesn’t need any further divine cooperation, or else we’d have a regress. But no item in created reality is sufficient on its own to produce an effect witout God’s cooperation being added to it on the primary/secondary causation model.
So, it is the fire that must be made different by God’s cooperation. In scenario (1), the fire is caused by the match and God while in (2), it is caused by God alone, and that makes the fire different between the scenarios. I would like to say that the esse of the fire is different in the two cases: in the ordinary case its esse is at least in part being caused by the match with God’s cooperation while in the other case the match doesn’t enter into its esse. But the details don’t matter for this post: what matters is that the fire is different between scenarios (1) and (2).
But this has an unfortunate consequence: If the fire must be different in some metaphysical way in cases (1) and (2), it follows that God cannot directly and independently of creation cause the same effect as the match caused. And this violates the Thomistic principle that whatever a finite cause suffices for can be produced by God directly. God cannot directly produce a fire-caused-by-the-match; that would be a contradiction.
So we have a conflict between a number of Thomistic principles:
Divine simplicity
Divine omnipotence
The primary/secondary causation model
God can directly cause anything he can cause in cooperation with a creature.
It seems to me that 3-5 are more central to Thomism than 6. So, I am inclined to reject 6, perhaps replacing it with the weaker principle that for any item x that God can cause in cooperation with a creature, God can cause an item x* which is qualitatively just like x.
Perhaps I was too quick when I said that (1) and (2) must differ in the match or the fire. Perhaps they differ in something “in between” the match and the fire, a token causal relation. I think this is a problematic solution for two reasons. First, it is central to Aristotelianism that all that exists are substances and their accidents. The token causal relation, if it’s not “in” any creature, would violate this. Second, it seems that the match strike plus this “in between” thingy are now sufficient to produce the fire, or else we can run the above argument with the match strike and the “in between” thingy in place of the match strike. But no mere creature is sufficient to produce an effect without God’s cooperation.
Alex
ReplyDelete"God can cause an item x* which is qualitatively just like x." The question then becomes how exactly x* is different from x. Qualitatively they are the same, so there must be another difference. But, as you say, it cannot be a metaphysical difference. So, how does it make sense to say that there is an item x* and an item x?
I think you are on the verge of becoming aware of the incoherence of Thomistic causation.
Can't there be a relational difference? Sort of what people call "Cambridge properties", meaning, there's a difference in the relation of the thing caused in respect to God, precisely because it was caused directly by Him.
ReplyDeleteSupose that, instead of using a process of evolution through secondary causes, God had created all at once. Even if that world was exactly like ours, wouldn't it differ in relation to God, since he caused everything through primary causes only?
Well, the Aristotelian view holds that reality is determined by the substances and what is in them (forms, accidents and maybe acts of being). So the relation would seem to have to be in a substance, and hence some substance would be different in the world directly created by God from how it actually is.
ReplyDeleteOne can indeed escape the issue by allowing for merely relational differences not grounded in any difference in substances.
Igor
ReplyDeleteI think Alex's post reveals a big problem in dealing with the nature of secondary causes and how exactly they contribute to effects.
Hence my comments that Alex's post may very well show a fundamental incoherence in the very notion of secondary and primary causes and perhaps this whole idea should be rethought.
Rondo Keele has explored a debate between Ockham and Chatton on this very fascinating question here: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/218279/pdf
ReplyDeleteWalter
ReplyDeleteI just don't get the incoherence part. Where would the contradiction lie? Alex' argument, in my view, at most seem to sugest we'd have no epistemic grounds for asserting the existence of secondary causes. If you compare to my evolution example, the end result would be the same (in a way that, even if there weren't a process of evolution, there would seem to be one). In that sense, evolution could have happened or everything could have been created directly by God, and we wouldn't be able to tell the difference, which does not entail that there must not be one.
That's the point I was trying to raise, and I'm not sure if Alex conceded that much, which was: there must not be a metaphysical difference in the end result for there to be a difference at all, because there could be a relational difference (which would be a real difference, we just wouldn't be able to know about it).
Dr. Feser gives an example in Five Proofs which I find a good illustration of the principle. Suppose you are writing in a board with a blue piece of chalk. It is true that, ultimately, it is you that are causing the chalk to move, but were it of a different color, for example, the writing would have come out different (which would sugest that the chalk too plays a part in causing what is ultimately being written on the board).
Now, supose that, instead of you writing on the board with a chalk, God produced an impression on the board that would be indistinguishible from your writing. There would be a difference in relation, but not metaphysical or qualitative. Of course we wouldn't be able to tell one from the other, but it doesn't mean there's something incoherent or contradictory about it happening one way or the other.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't it circular to say, for example: A. That God can cause exactly the same thing to happen with primary causes that would happen through secondary ones. B. Assume that there must be some metaphysical difference if God were to make something directly as opposed through secondary causes? I mean, given those two presupositions, no wonder they are contradictory, but there just don't seem to be any good grounds for affirming both of them (particularly B, since I wouldn't know why there must be a metaphysical difference in the structure of the thing unless you assume it).
Of course, but then, why should anyone hold to concurrentism as opposed to, say, ocasionalism or mere conservationism? And I think that's where concurrentism shines, because it proves itself as a better way to account for the data in comparison to the opposing views.
Igor
ReplyDeleteI am not saying there cannot be any secondary causes, but it does raise the question as to how the secondary causes really contribute to the effect.
Say I draw a circle on a board and you draw another circle. Let's suppose the circles are identical. You produced a circle that would be indistinguishable from mine. Let's forget for a moment that the circles do have a metaphysical difference because they are not in the same place. in that case there would only be a difference in relation.
The difference with secondary causes is that they cannot, all by themselves, produce any effect, while the primary cause can, apparently, produce every possible effect.
So, it's difficult to see how there can merely be a relational difference in that case.
moreover, Alex does seems to hold that in the Aristotelian view differences are always in substances. And that poses big problems for secondary causation, I think, because there isn't any difference between the substance of a statue made by me (as a secondary cause) and god (as a primary one) and a statue made by God alone.
Walter
ReplyDeleteIs that what Alex think? But wouldn't that entail that two substances separated in space (say) wouldn't be different? Because, if they are, then there would seem to be some kinds of differences that aren't merely substantial ones.
If A causes B which in turn causes C, it is true to say that B really causes C to happen. I think that's what behind the concept of secondary causation. You could also say that A causes C without the participation of B, but in that case, where really is the difficulty? Is it that B is not needed, at least necessarrily, to produce the desired effect? But isn't that exactly what I'm arguing for?
I'd say that, since the sequence of causation is hierarquical, God would act like an engine which make a certain gear move, and that gear makes another gear move, and so on and so forth. Every gear is dependent on it's predecessor in orther to move, but none of them have a power of it's own. The power is transmitted by the engine to the whole chain of causes.
Igor:
ReplyDeleteA central Aristotelian assumption is that the truth is grounded (metaphysically, not necessarily epistemically) in being. If two possible worlds are different, then there must *be* something in one world that isn't in the other.
So, now take the worlds w1 where the fire is caused by the secondary cause (with God) and w2 where the fire is caused by God alone. If these worlds are different, there must *be* something in one world that isn't in the other. What is it? If it's the very same fire in both worlds, and it has the very same properties, and the very same match, with the very same properties, what is it that exists in one world but not the other?
I take it that your suggestion is that it's a relation: there is a causal relation R between the match and the fire in w1 but not in w2. OK, let's think about R. It must be some sort of a being. On Thomism, every being is either God or a creature. R is not God. So, R is a creature. By the principle I am arguing against, God can directly create every creature without secondary causes. So, if that principle is correct, there will be a world w3 where God not only directly causes the fire but also directly causes R. This world w3 will be no different from w1: the one being from w1 that was missing in w2, namely R, has been put back into w3. So, by the principle I started this comment with, w3 must be the same as w1. Which can't be right, since in w1 the fire is caused by the match and in w3 it's not.
Now, Feser himself doesn't believe what I called the central Aristotelian principle that truth supervenes on being. (This is clear from Ed's presentism.) So, he can consistently say that w1 and w2 have the same beings but are nonetheless different worlds, because the fire is differently related to other things in w2, without there being any being in one of the worlds but not in the other.
I think Aristotelian theories typically take relations to be accidents of the related substances. Thus, when two substances A and B are a meter apart, then perhaps A has the accident of being-a-meter-from-B and B has the accident of being-a-meter-from-A. But this won't help with the problem in my post. For any accident can presumably be directly caused by God. Thus, if the fire has the accident of being-caused-by-the-match in w1, then God could directly cause that accident--without the match doing anything. And then we would have the absurdity that the fire has the accident of being-caused-by-the-match without being caused by the match.
Igor
ReplyDeleteI see that Alex has replied to you, so I can be brief. I think it's safe to say that the notion of secondary causes is highly problematic and, to be honest, I have always found Feser's account of this deeply confused. I do not see any way to distinguish what Feser calls concurrentism from occasionalism. And your gear example looks like conservationism to me. Once the first gear moves, the others move too. The first gear needs to be powered, but that's all.This seems to be compatible with deism.
It doesn't strike me as something a Thomist would argue.
Alex
ReplyDeleteI get what you mean now, thanks for the reply (very good food for thought indeed!) Sou you would say that it's better to abandon one of the principles you mentioned than to say truth is not grounded in being?
Walter
I think Ed argues that occasionalism in the end entails idealism, so concurrentism would be a way to avoid this result.
I'd say it's not compatible with deism, at least in the Enlightment ideal, because they think God is no longer necessary once he caused the first cause, and is not continuing to cause the world to exist. The engine example serves to illustrate that the power of the gears is ultimately always derived from the engine, which has a power of it's own.
Surely occasionalism does not *entail* idealism. It might be that if occasionalism is true, we have less reason to reject idealism.
ReplyDeleteNote that every theist should admit that occasionalism, while perhaps not actually true, is at least logically possible. God could create beings with no causal powers of their own and then move them around. (But it is not clear whether such beings could be conscious.)
Alex
ReplyDeleteWhat do you think is Wrong with this argument?
"Consider first why occasionalism cannot be correct. Since agere sequitur esse—what a thing does necessarily reflects what it is—if something could not truly do anything, if it had no causal efficacy at all, then it would not truly exist. Occasionalism would thus entail that God alone truly exists, since only he truly does anything. And this cannot be right. For one thing, we know that things other than God do exist—tables, chairs, rocks, trees, and so on. Even if you were seriously to entertain the possibility that those things do not really exist after all but were somehow mere hallucinations you were having, you would still know that you exist. And you are not identical to God. After all, the very fact that you are thinking through these various possibilities entails that you are changeable—you move from one thought to the next to the next—whereas God is immutable. The fact that you would not be certain whether tables, chairs, and so forth exist would show that you are not omniscient, whereas God is omniscient. The fact that you lack power in various ways—for example, you could not make yourself stop experiencing tables, chairs, and so forth, even if you convinced yourself that they are not real—shows that you are not omnipotent, whereas God is omnipotent. And so forth. So, you know that at least one thing other than God exists, which would not be true if occasionalism were true. For another thing, even if you could coherently deny the existence of yourself along with everything else, occasionalism would still leave us with an incoherent position in another way. For we arrived at the idea of God as First Cause only because we reasoned from the existence of things other than God which require him as a cause. For example, we started with the idea that certain things change, inferred that they must be mixtures of actuality and potentiality, and deduced in turn that there must be a purely actual cause which sustains them in existence. We started with the idea that certain things are composite, inferred that there must be something that causes their component parts to be combined, and deduced in turn that the ultimate cause must be simple or noncomposite. And so on. If we now say that God alone exists, we would be abandoning the very grounds that led us to affirm the existence of God as First Cause in the first place. It would be like someone who slowly and carefully climbs a ladder, then pulls out a ray gun and blasts it out from under him—he would fall to the ground, making his cautious ascent entirely pointless."
Feser, Edward. Five Proofs of the Existence of God (pp. 235-236). Ignatius Press.
Igor
ReplyDeleteYes, I know Feser argues this. But he doesn't seem to realize that his notion of concurrentism has the very same problems. The "causal powers" of a created being are not really causal at all, because nothing in the created being can remain in existence for even an instant without God actively creating and sustaining it. And that, if consistently applied, would hold for a creature's alleged causal powers too. So, they are both created and sustained by God, just like in Alex's example of God moving around his creatures.
The causal power of a creature is, if we accept Feser's notion, an illusion. hence, there is no real difference between Feser's concurrentism and occasionalism.
As for deism, there are many varieties of deism. I guess you mean that God must be constantly operating the first gear in order for the others to work. I don't see why this would not work if God simply provided an energy source. The first gear needs to be powered, but that is something every deist would acknowledge.
Walter
ReplyDeleteI don't think that follows. Take another example: the Moon has light only insofar as it reflects the light of the Sun. However, it's correct to say that the Moon truly participates in emitting light in the sense that, had its surface a different color, the lightwave emitted would be different.
Occasionalism, on the contrary, would say that essences don't ultimately matter. It's not that there are dispositions that things have in virtue of their essence, there is no essence at all. In that sense, every cause and effect relation would be "lose and sepparate", and we could say that causation would be, in our sense of the term, a miracle.
If a certain effet B follows from a certain cause A, it's not that A has a *power* to cause B by virtue of its essence. It only happens to be the case that God causes B regularly when A is present. In that sense, God ultimately choses the effect, and there's no connection to the cause. If God could produce a buquet of flowers every time a match is stroke, there would be nothing impeding him (it wouldn't even be considered a miracle, since there are no laws to be suspended in the first place!)
My example on deism maybe isn't helping a lot. Take for example a linear series of causes, like, my grandfather begot my mother who begot me. If my grandfather dies, that does nothing to my existence, in the sense that I don't depend on him any longer to exist. The Enlighment deism seems to put God as a cause for that sort of series.
The series that has God as first member, in Classical Theism, is one that ultimately derives power from him, and could not exist even for an instant without him sustaining it. It's like a mirror which is facing another mirror, with an object placed in between the two of them. In order to explain the object being reflect, it would do nothing to refer to the other mirror, since you'd have to reference something outside the two mirrors to explain the reflection. Once you take the object away, there's nothing there to be reflected!
Igor
ReplyDeleteIf nothing could exist even for an instant without God sustaining it, then the colour of the light reflecting from the moon cannot exist even for an instant without God actively sustaining it. It is still a mystery to me what role the moon really plays in this whole story. To me, Feser's concurrentism is in fact a kind of occasionalism, except that the number of "occasions" is much higher (perhaps even infinite).
In order for the moon to play a real role, there has got to be some sort of conservationism in play.
As to deism, I agree that the mirror example would not be compatible with classical deism, but it seems to me that it is also an instance of occasionalism.
Igor:
ReplyDeleteThat what a thing does reflects what it is can be understood in many ways. Understood in a weak way, the action and power of a thing is grounded in what it is. Understood in a strong way, the causal powers of a thing completely determine what the thing is. The strong way does not seem so plausible. If the causal powers of a thing determine what the thing is, we have a kind of vicious circularity or regress. The causal powers are defined by what they are powers for. For instance, a match has the power to cause fire. Thus, the match is defined in terms of fire (and all the other things the match can produce). But then fire will be defined in terms of what it can produce. And so on ad infinitum.
So I do not think we have a good argument that existence requires causal powers. It seems that God could create beings without causal powers.
Alex
ReplyDeleteI understand what you mean. But suppose we have a match that is exactly the same as a match in this world, except for the fact it doesn't have the pontential to cause fire. In what sense can we say it has the same essence as a match? I get that this would make occasionalism *possible*, which is your point, but I think it also pressuposes Walter is wrong insofar as it presents occasionalism as an *alternative*, not something that is entailed by concurrentism.
Alex
ReplyDeletebut the question, I think would be, what is "existence without causal powers"? Being seen, heard, felt, etc also seem causal powers to me. How does a "thing" that cannot be seen, heard, felt, smelled... and that doesn't do anything at all, be called a thing?
Well, suppose Jim can be seen and heard. Then Jim can cease to visible and still exist. And he can cease to be audible and still exist. So why can't he cease to be both and still exist? It's obviously a very low and boring order of existence.
ReplyDeleteI think one might make a case that an object in space and time cannot lack causal powers, though, by arguing that spatiality and temporality have innate ties to causation.
Alex
ReplyDeleteIf you take away all causal powers of a thing, what is left?
Alex
ReplyDelete"I think one might make a case that an object in space and time cannot lack causal powers, though, by arguing that spatiality and temporality have innate ties to causation."
Isn't that simply saying that there's a real distinction between a thing's essence and existence?
Doesn't the fact that it's causally inert make it an abstract object and, thus, an essence?
Igor
ReplyDeleteHow do essences exist is there is a real distinction between essence and existence?
It seems to me that essences are necessarily tied to beings. Beings are said to have essence and existence, except for God whose essence is existence.
If abstract objects are essences that exist independently of beings, then there is no real distinction between essence and existence.
Walter
ReplyDeleteEssences are tied to intellects. It's not that essences can exist apart from being, since they always exist at least in the Divine Intellect, which is Being.
What isn't true is that particular essences are tied to the existence they enform. For example, you can grasp the essence of an unicorn even if no unicorns actually exist.
Igor
ReplyDeleteOK. I understand that. But if, as you seem to say, a causally inert object is an abstract object, God cannot cause it, because it already exists (necessarily) in the Divine Intellect.
Walter
ReplyDeleteYes, I think I'd say that. They would be a feature (using lose terms) of God just like His power or His will (analogically speaking - of course, in Him all that are one and the same). That's why God cannot cause them, being a part of His essence, which is itself uncaused.
What God activelly does is impart existence to those individual essences, so that they exist distinctively from him.
What I'm trying to say is that, for example, for platonists, there's a 'third realm' of self-existing things which are independent of anything else (including God) and are causally inert. For the Scholastic Realist, those essences *by themselves* are also causally inert, but what "breathes fire" into them, and bring them into existence is God. And, of course, they cannot exist apart from Him.
Igor
ReplyDeleteBut that is why I think concurrentism is not rally different from occasionalism. The causal power of, say, a match, has nothing to do with the match itself, because the causal power, too, is an abstract object that God imparts existence to. IOW, the causal power of the match is actually from God, not from the match.
In order for the match to really play a part in causing a fire, it has to have some causal power of its own, but that entails some sort of conservationism.
And I don't know about Alex, but Feser denies conservationism altogether.
Walter
ReplyDeleteI don't know about that. Let's say concurrentism is true. If I make a hole on a paper in the shape of a star, put it on the flor and spray blue paint on it, the expected shape to form on the floor is that of a blue star (because the hole is star-shaped). That would mean there's a real connection between the two.
If occasionalism were true, there would be no connection whatsoever between the shape impressed on the floor and the hole on the paper, it's just the case that God causes the final shape to resemble that of the hole.
Think of, I don't know, a portable videogame. For it to work, it's battery needs to be charged, and if it runs out, the device won't operate. But of course, while the battery is up, you can speak of the device withouth making any refference to the battery, so that it really operates but, at the same time, is really dependent on the battery being charged for it to work.
Igor
ReplyDeleteBut your example entails conservationism. The real connection is between the causal powers of the paper and the shape. But without conservationism, the causal powers of the paper are God's, because He creates then and sustains them through every single instant.
That is even more obvious in your second example. Batteries cannot be charged without conservationism in place.
Walter
ReplyDeleteMere conservationism means that the only thing God does is to sustain things in being. They ultimately have causal power apart from Him (and that view has problems of its own).
Of course batteries cannot be charged by themselves, and that's where the analogy fails, since God would be like a "self charging" battery, or maybe a battery of endless charge. But the point of the analogy was that, once charged, the videogame can operate acording to the way it was set up to operate.
Take a natural substance, for example. What it does follows from its essence so that, if something were to happen that was contrary to the thing's essence, God would have to intervein and suspend its natural dispositions. But, operating normally, God provides the power necessary for it to realize its natural ends or goals (like the battery), so that theres a real connection between the two.
Igor
ReplyDelete"But the point of the analogy was that, once charged, the video game can operate according to the way it was set up to operate."
But that implies conservationism. On concurrentism it is, in the end, only God's causal power that is operating, so, the natural end of a substance is an illusion, because what a substance becomes is a result of God's intervention. If God leaves a substance on its own and doesn't constantly intervene, the only natural end for the substance is its annihilation.
Without conservationism, substances have no natural ends.
Now, I am afraid we will have to agree to disagree here, Igor. Thank you for the interesting discussion.
Walter
ReplyDeleteI guess we are, unfortunately. But thanks a lot for the discussion too!
Sorry I’m a bit late to the party, but I have a hard time understanding Walter’s point on the battery analogy. It seems that there is a clear difference between the power of the battery and the power of the video game. The battery has no ability on its own to create images on a screen, this is the power of an electrified video game. So it seems that both the battery and the game’s power are operative and that neither are individually sufficient for the effect of images on a screen.
ReplyDeleteThe issue with God’s secondary causation is that it seems to be sufficient in itself for the effect. I.e. the battery can make the images on the screen itself. Now considered absolutely, in order to show that divine secondary causation is not occasionalism, we only need one instance where there is an effect that God cannot create in himself. And this seems to be adequately attested to by sin, denying God cannot be directly caused by God, but can be caused by a man being caused by God (Pruss makes a similar point in the “things God can’t cause” post).
So this leaves us with the question of how problematic this is for Thomism. I don’t think Thomas himself would deny any of the above points so I’m not sure how big a problem this is at all. So (6) “God can directly cause anything he can cause in cooperation with a creature” was never supposed to be an absolute statement but an empirical one. God can realize a physical state of affairs without directly without secondary causes. However, this does not cause problems for fire having different metaphysical explanatory properties. We can have two physically identical fires at T1 that nonetheless have different origins and hence difference metaphysical explanatory properties. I might well be wrong, but I can’t think of anywhere Thomas would have a problem with this account.
Matthew
ReplyDeleteMy point is simply that for there to be a clear difference between the power of the battery and the power of the video game, there has to be some sort of conservationism in play.
If God can directly cause anything, that means that God's creative power, while being simple, can account for many different things.
The question then is: what is the true difference between the power of the battery and the power of the video game, if neither power can exist even for an instant without god actively creating and sustaining it?
Matthew
ReplyDeleteAnd mine is that a real distinction does not entail separability, and that saying "God can directly cause anything" presuposes that God can cause anything in a non direct way.
Matthew:
ReplyDeleteI wouldn't say that on the Thomistic view, God's causation is sufficient for the effect. That buys into this picture of causation:
God → finite effect
Finite cause → finite effect.
But I think the Thomistic picture instead is: http://alexanderpruss.com/thomisticcausation.png
In other words, God does not cause the finite effect, but God causes the causal arrow between the finite cause and its finite effect.
By the way, there is a somewhat analogous problem for the atheist. A typical contemporary philosophical atheist thinks that it is logically possible for contingent things to come into existence for no cause at all (the universe did that, they are apt to think). Suppose now that A is an indeterministic cause that causes B half the time. Now the following seems logically possible: A doesn't cause B, but B still comes into existence uncaused.
ReplyDeleteSo, we have the puzzle: What distinguishes the case where where A causes B from the case where A doesn't cause B but B happens to come into existence uncaused?
Note, however, that the atheist can make an essentiality of origins move just as I do: deny that the *same* B can be caused by A in one world and be uncaused in another. And there is less cost to the atheist in making this move. (For there is some cost to the Thomist to hold that God cannot produce the *same* cow ex nihilo as the cow's parents can.)
Alex
ReplyDeleteBut that implies conservationism.
Actually, thinking about this more shows that there is a problem here for all theists who accept divine simplicity and the principle that truth supervenes on being, and not just for Thomists. For the principle that God can do whatever a creature can do seems very plausible for theists in general--it seems to be a part of omnipotence. But now take a case where a finite event A indeterministically causes B. Then the following seems logically possible: A occurs but by chance doesn't cause B; however, God miraculously causes B anyway. And we can ask: What differentiates this from the case where A occurs and causes B?
ReplyDeleteSuppose we say that what differentiates the two is the token causal relation C between A and B in the case where A causes B. Then either the correlation between A and C is indeterministic or the correlation between C and B is indeterministic. In both cases, the old question comes back.
It seems to me that the theist who accepts that truth supervenes on being just has to accept essentiality of origins and deny that God can cause whatever a creature can. As far as this argument goes, all that's needed is to hold that for any item B a creature can cause, God can cause something that is just like B.
Alex: that seems right to me and is also, I think, what Aquinas is getting at. His main point is that God can impress on matter directly whatever form a creature can impress on matter, this as opposed to saying that whatever has been impressed into matter cannot be distinguished by its origin. However, I’m not quite as sure about the diagram. To me, it makes it appear that God is causing the arrow to exist itself, such that the relation might exist independently of the substances. I’ve generally taken God’s concurrent action to require God actualizing the being of a substance and the action of its power. This means God's arrow points at the substance's power, not the relation itself (see linked diagram below). So God both holds a human in existence and actualizes his power, say to will, such that an effect occurs (i.e. that which is willed).
ReplyDeleteWalter: This goes to your point about conservationism. The problem isn’t with any kind of conservationism but with mere conservationism. I’ve tried to capture this with the aforementioned chart. On all three forms, concurrentism, occasionalism, and mere conservationism, God conserves the finite substance in being. However, with mere conservation, God’s action is not required for the finite substance to act—so long as God holds a human in existence she can will x or y by herself. According to concurrentism, God must not only conserve the finite substance, He must concur with the acting of the power. E.g. He must act with the person’s will (or intellect, senses, etc.) or else the will does not act, no action occurs, and no effect happens.
https://universityofstandrews907-my.sharepoint.com/:b:/g/personal/mj62_st-andrews_ac_uk/EX5FNyVnIRdKiYqSsx3JwWABQii6GeQRuwYGvglhWLigzQ?e=wvXdPa
Matthew
ReplyDeleteYour diagram is very informative, congrats!
Alex
But what I'm not getting is this: isn't potentiality a kind of being? I mean, isn't establishing it as a kind of being the whole purpose of positing the act/potency distinction?
Because, If so, wouldn't your original striking of the match example be solved by saying that in one world the potentiality is actualized and, in the other, it is suspended, so that there's a real metaphysical distinction between the two?
Igor:
ReplyDeleteIn both worlds there is a potentiality for fire. And in exactly one of the worlds this potentiality is actualized. But what makes it be true that it is actualized? Suppose we say that the match is somehow different when the potentiality is actualized. Then the problem comes back when we ask about the connection between the match-with-actualized-potentiality and the fire. They seem to be distinct objects, linked in some causal way. That link requires divine cooperation. So, if God chooses not to cooperate, we will have the match-with-actualized-potentiality and no fire. And the problem comes back.
In fact, the standard Aristotelian story is that the *effect* is the actualization of the potentiality, rather than that the actualization is found in the cause. So the actualization of the potentiality is the fire. But if so, then the fire must be different in the world where it actualizes the potentiality of the match and in the world where God directly causes the match to be on fire. So we once again come back to the idea that God cannot cause the same fire the match can.
Matthew:
ReplyDeleteYour concurrentism diagram looks to me like a version of mere conservation. God is causing the power. And then the power is a finite cause of the finite effect. So God is causing a finite cause, apparently without cooperating in the cause's causing of the effect.
It seems to me that the central thesis of concurrentism is that *no* finite cause can produce an effect on its own. In particular, a finite power can't produce an effect on its own.
But perhaps I am unfair. You have a yellow glow around the causal arrow. If that means that God is also causing that arrow, then we have no disagreement about concurrentism: your diagram just has the extra conservation arrows that my diagram omits (God conserves the cause and the effect).
ReplyDeleteAlex:
ReplyDeleteThat was my intent with the yellow glow. There is probably a better way of showing concurrent causality but I couldn't think of it. I was worried if I used a both a yellow arrow and a black one it would look like there were two separate acts. In any case I'm glad to hear that it seems to be fair.
I'm new here and also somewhat new to thomistic philosophy but i have a question. What exactly is the advantage of Aristotelian concept of things having innate powers and tendencies? What is the problem with occasionalism? I feel like occasionalism is not problematic as long as humans have free will. What Im trying to say is that the only thing that it is important for it to achieve goodness in the Aristotelian sense are people mainly since they are the only beings with free will. Is it problematic if inanimate things lack innate powers?
ReplyDeleteSorry if that is a stupid question.
ReplyDeleteUnknown
ReplyDeleteIt is most certainly not a stupid question.
The problem I see is that if occasionalism is true, humans cannot have free will.
(Libertarian) free will requires a t least a portion of conservationism.
Why can’t occasionalism be true for all things that are not rational agents, but not a thing that applies to humans since they are the only rational beings?
ReplyDeleteDavid
ReplyDeleteThat could be the case, but it contradicts the radical thomistic view, supported by, among others, Edward Feser, that nothing can remain in existence, not even for an instant if it isn't created and actively sustained by God.
Walter
ReplyDeleteOf course everything might need a sustaining cause, including humans, and a non-occasionalistic view of free choice would not deny that. All i’m saying is that it seems that the only beings possessing secondary, innate powers could be people (even though they need to be conserved at every moment by God) while all other things being inanimate more or less would need an occasionalistic explanation.
Walter
ReplyDeleteI don't think that follows even if occasionalism were true. God causing something to exist does not mean he causes it to act in a deterministic manner, so that there's no conflict with free will.
The real problem, which Feser pointed out in the quotation I put forward a few comments back, is that if occasionalism were true, nothing would be real, including yourself. But you cannot deny your own existence without being inconsistent. Therefore, occasionalism is false.
But again, the occasionalist view presuposes the possibility of non-occasionalist views, so that there's no inconsistency in positing the veracity of such views.
Miguel
ReplyDeleteI don’t understand why something needs causal efficacy to exist. I’m not denying that to be true. I just don’t understand. Also it seems that in the Feser passage above he says that proposing an occasionalistic view would undermine the original basis for getting to God in the first place. But why can’t we have a model where humans are the only beings with causal efficacy (free will) and even if nothing else exists you can still make any of the same arguments based on change towards God?
David
ReplyDeleteI think that occasionalism has that consequence because what a thing does reflects what it is, or follows from its essence. Now, if only God does anything, then there's no such things as essences, or even such things as things.
Since there's no causal connection in the world, occasionalism would do away with act/potency distinction, which was fundamental to get to God in the first place (at least from Feser's proofs).
As to your second point, I don't see any conceptual problem with that, though I could be wrong. However, that seems a little ad hoc, I mean, how wouldn't it commit the Taxi Cab fallacy of stopping where you want to stop in your explanations? If you say that you exist and has derivative causal power, why not everything else?
Igor
ReplyDeleteFor some reason I called you Miguel sorry. I don’t exactly know how to get around your first point, mainly because I’m having trouble understanding how something can have secondary causal power in itself detached from the source. I think I need a good analogy for that. As to my second point I don’t think it’s an arbitrary distinction since humans (it seems) are the only beings with free will.
I wasn’t clear in my response to your second point. The human intellect and will is more understandable to me as something with its own causal power since it’s more coherent as an incorporeal entity than essences being IN physical objects. That’s probably just my flawed way of thinking about it though.
ReplyDeleteDavid
ReplyDeleteIt's okay, I imagined you were talking to me since there was no Miguel here at the combox :D
And relax, I'm no expert either, just a mate trying to figure things out as you are.
So, on concurrentism, it's not that anything has causal power in themselves, they always depend on the source (namely, God). But here's the deal: although God has to cooperate (that's the key word) for things to have their effects, as Alex pointed out a few comments back, it's like God causes the arrow A -> B, not that he causes B when there's an A.
In that sense, there's a real connection between the cause A and the effect by, by virtue of it's essence. That's not the case on occasionalism, however, since it's only God who causes anything (and the connection between A and B is arbitrary).
In respect to the intellect and will, I'd say the same thing I said in my last comment, namely: God giving something causal power does not mean it will operate in a deterministic manner, only that it will operate. The human intellect and will have ends or goals in the most radical way, so that our thoughts are about things. That means that it needs causal power in order to be directed towards an specific end.
Miguel
ReplyDeleteI can see how God is creating the arrow for immanent causative forces ( specifically humans) in that he “holds back” and allows for humans to have free will and to be there own cause ( not for existence but for function). I think maybe that is why humans have an incorporeal aspect, namely intellect, that can take on different forms through determinate thinking (something non-human animals can’t do). Yes, things have essences, but maybe they only exist in the intellect. I wouldn’t necessarily say though that a things essence is what lays the foundation for its function. Why can’t it be rather that its essence is what it is and at the same time God directly causes every causal chain in a non-arbitrary way (for a reason we don’t understand)? When we conceptualize something’s essence we are conceptualizing its behavior but not necessarily its causal source. Thoughts?
Sorry! I said Miguel again!
ReplyDelete