Suppose that Bob spent a month making a birthday cake for Alice that was only slightly better than what was available in the store, and Bob did not enjoy the process at all. One can fill out the case in such a way that what Bob did was permissible. Moreover, it is was more burdensome to him than buying the slightly less good cake would have been, and it was better for Alice, so it looks like the action was supererogatory. Nonetheless, we wouldn’t praise this action: We would say that the action was insufficiently prudent. So, it seems that not every supererogatory action is praiseworthy.
Perhaps the problem is with my understanding of supererogation. If we add the necessary condition for supererogation that the action is on balance better than the relevant alternative, then we can avoid saying that Bob’s action is supererogatory, because it is not better on balance than the alternative. But I would rather avoid adding that a supererogatory action is on balance better than the alternative. For then it becomes mysterious how it can be permissible to do the alternative.
I am inclined to just bite the bullet and deny the supererogation always deserves praise.
I am a bit confused by this post, probably because I have never delved deeply into the literature on supererogation. First, I don't see how you could define supererogation without appealing to the idea that the action is on balance better than the relevant alternative. How do you define it?
ReplyDeleteAdditionally, your comment seems to suggest that you think the only permissible action(s) is the one that has no alternatives that are, on balance, better. It seems, however, that almost all the actions anyone performs--even many we take to be praiseworthy--had even better alternatives. I always thought it was one of the virtues of non-consequentialist theories that they could easily allow for permissible actions for which there were better alternatives.
I think a supererogatory action is better in some respects but worse in others. For instance, if you save my life at the expense of yours, your supererogatory action is better with respect to my good and worse with respect to your good. And since your and my life are incommensurable, it seems we cannot say that it is on balance better for you to save my life rather than yours. But it is more praiseworthy.
ReplyDeleteMy preferred definition is very simple: An action is supererogatory iff there is a permissible alternative that is less convenient (a kind of technical term) to you. This definition only works if you think there are duties to self. (Otherwise there is this counterexample: Going to the kitchen the long way around is permissible but less convenient. I say that unless there is some good gained in going the long way around--exercise, scenic view, etc.--it is wrong to go the long way around.)
Another difficulty of the better-action requirement is this. A perfect being given the choice between two actions has to do the better one. But then it would follow that God cannot act supererogatorily, since a less good action would not be an available alternative to God, and hence there is never a less good alternative for God. On my view, however, God can choose between incommensurable actions, some of which are less "convenient" to God (e.g., the sacrifice of the Cross).
ReplyDeleteThanks for the quick response. Could you say more about what "convenient" means here (or point me to some literature or other post discussing it)?
ReplyDeletePeter: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2012/12/supererogation.html
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ReplyDeleteThanks Audrey. Somehow I completely missed the immediately preceding post that both explains the view in greater detail and links to a further explanation.
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