Catholics and the Orthodox insist that Mary is the Theotokos—the Godbearer. The child in her womb was God.
It follows that this child she bore in her womb was a person. For the child was God by virtue of the Incarnation, and the Incarnation consists precisely of the union of two natures in one person. Moreover, the Incarnation is a process of God becoming a human being. So that person in her womb was also a human being.
Thus, the human being Jesus, while in Mary’s womb, was a person. Now, Jesus is like us in all things but sin. So, while we are in our mothers’ wombs, we already are persons.
A theory of personhood or personal identity that requires human persons to have developed human mental functioning—like Warren’s theory of personhood or Locke’s theory of personal identity—conflicts with the Catholic and Orthodox teaching on Mary the Mother of God.
I have a question completely unrelated. If you don’t mind me asking, are you a Thomist?
ReplyDeleteWell, I accept the basic insight that the world is made of substances, which have substantial forms and accidents, and which have being. Like Thomas, I think the substantial forms are individual: your substantial form is numerically distinct from mine. My main differences from Thomas are:
ReplyDelete(1) While I think some substances are material, their materiality is not ontologically very important in my "system".
(2) I do not currently have passive potentialities, but only active potentialities, in my system.
(3) I accept a B-theory of time.
(4) I am a theistic incompatibilist.
By point 4, do you mean to suggest that Thomas was a compatibilist?
ReplyDeleteInteresting points! If I understand it, your argument runs like so:
ReplyDelete(P1) Mary's fetus was divine.
(P2) Divinity requires personhood.
(C1) So: Mary's fetus was a person. [from (P1), (P2)]
(P3) Mary's fetus lacked mental capacities.
(C2) So: Personhood doesn't require mental capacities. [from (C1), (P3)]
I like how compact, punchy this argument is.
But I wonder if a Christian objector could undercut your argument, like so.
The Christian objector stipulatively defines: (a) "early-state fetus" to mean "fetus before it develops mental capacities"; and (b) "late-stage fetus" to mean "fetus after it develops mental capacities".
The Christian objector starts with the following argument:
(Q1) A divine entity is essentially perfect.
(Q2) Perfection requires mental capacities.
(D1) So: A divine entity essentially has mental capacities. [from (Q1), (Q2)]
(Q3) An early-stage fetus lacks mental capacities.
(D2) So: A divine entity can't be an early-stage fetus. [from (D1), (Q3)]
The Christian objector then uses (D2) to target (P1). If "fetus" means "early-stage fetus", then (P1) is false, and so (C2) doesn't follow. If "fetus" means "late-stage fetus", then (P1) is true. But then (P3) is false, and so (C2) doesn't follow. In either case, (C2) doesn't follow.
The Christian objector thus tries to undercut your argument. Do you think that the objector is successful? I'd love to hear your thought, should you have the time.
Take care!
Michael:
ReplyDeleteI think St Thomas thought that God was able to determine us to freely choose a particular option. So, yes, I think Thomas's view is a theistic compatibilism. I wish he didn't think this.
Unknown:
ReplyDeleteThe incarnate Christ *always* has divine mental capacities, and it is these that are both necessary and sufficient for essential perfection. Human mental capacities are neither necessary nor sufficient for essential perfection.
Regarding the early/late stage division, the early stage fetus is still a human being. The question is whether this human being is a person. If not, then by my argument this human being isn't God incarnate. But it seems quite heterodox to say that there was a preexisting human being who then took on divinity.
Good point! I hadn't thought of it. The Christian objector asserts (Q3)---that an early-stage fetus lacks mental capacities. But as I understand you, (Q3) is false: Mary's early-stage fetus had divine mental capacities.
ReplyDeleteYet the tireless Christian objector might now poke at the following argument, which you seem to make:
(R1) Mary's early-stage fetus was a person.
(R2) In its human nature, Mary's early-stage fetus is like all other early-stage fetuses---save certain aspects related to sinfulness.
(E1) So: All other early-stage fetuses are persons. [from (R1), (R2)]
The objector might deny (R2): Mary's early-stage fetus had mental capacities, but no other early-stage fetus does. First, no other early-stage fetus has divine mental capacities, as none are divine. Second, no other early-stage fetus has human mental capacities, as none have the requisite neural architecture.
On your second point, the Christian objector tries to escape heterodoxy by denying that the early-stage fetus is a human organism. They instead assert either of two views.
First, the early-stage fetus is a non-human organism. It's later replaced by a human organism.
Second, the early-stage fetus is a developing human body---a kind of non-organism. It later becomes part of a human organism, when it unites with an immaterial person.
Hopefully, the Christian objector has escaped heterodoxy! But we can never be too sure.
I'm personally unsure about many of these personal identity issues. I tend to think that a human person is an immaterial simple---not a material entity, nor a mereological sum of immaterial and material entities.
1. On the first view, would Mary's early-stage fetus have only divine mental properties? But then we would have an incarnation as a human being without a human mind or will. But orthodoxy says that the incarnate Christ has two minds and two wills, a divine and a human one in each case.
ReplyDelete2. I think that the non-human organism move does escape Christological heterodoxy: Aquinas thinks something like this, and nobody thinks he's a Christological heretic. But I think it is implausible in light of modern embryology.
3. There is another move. Aquinas thinks that there was no early-stage fetus in Mary's womb. Instead, Mary's pregnancy is different from ordinary human pregnancies not just in the miraculousness of the conception but also because the conceived child was already fully formed. This lets Aquinas escape similar worries to the ones we've been discussing. I think Aquinas' move only works well if we have the idea that the early-stage fetus, in ordinary cases, is not a human organism, an idea that I think is implausible given modern embryology. For if the early-stage fetus is a human organism, then it seems problematic that Christ's human organism skipped over the first several months of existence.
4. By the way, if the target is a Warren-type view of personhood, one can do even better to press the argument at the time of birth. For on Warren-type views, infants are not persons. But the Christian tradition has always said things like: "Mary gave birth to our Lord and Savior."