Here's a theory: a material thing is something that has or is a causal power that is not a mental causal power. Variant: that is not a rational causal power.
I think it would be very hard to reach a wide consensus on that definition. Anybody who was a physicalist but not an epiphenomenalist would likely disagree with that definition.
I would think it would be possible for an immaterial being to have effects by virtue of that being’s beauty, and that the causal power in such cases would neither be a mental causal power nor a rational causal power. At the very least, the causal power in question would not be linked to a specific intention had by the immaterial being.
Yeah, it might turn out that, (A) necessarily every beauty had by immaterial beings is a mental beauty. That doesn’t sound like a logical necessity to me, but I could be wrong. Does it follow from (A) that (B) necessarily every causal power exercised by virtue of a mental beauty is a mental causal power. ?
I think it would be very hard to reach a wide consensus on that definition. Anybody who was a physicalist but not an epiphenomenalist would likely disagree with that definition.
ReplyDeleteSure, but I'm not looking here for a consensus, but the truth. :-) It's notoriously hard to come up with an account of matter.
ReplyDeleteI would think it would be possible for an immaterial being to have effects by virtue of that being’s beauty, and that the causal power in such cases would neither be a mental causal power nor a rational causal power. At the very least, the causal power in question would not be linked to a specific intention had by the immaterial being.
ReplyDeleteMaybe it could only be a mental beauty?
ReplyDeleteYeah, it might turn out that,
ReplyDelete(A) necessarily every beauty had by immaterial beings is a mental beauty.
That doesn’t sound like a logical necessity to me, but I could be wrong.
Does it follow from (A) that
(B) necessarily every causal power exercised by virtue of a mental beauty is a mental causal power.
?
Maybe.