In paradigm instances of parental action, my reason for action is the objective fact that I am a parent, not because of the subjective fact that I think I'm a parent or identify with being a parent. There are times when it makes sense to act on the subjective fact. If I'm asked by someone (say, a counselor) whether I identify with being a parent, my answer needs to be based on the subjective fact that I so identify. But those are atypical cases.
I suspect this is generally true: cases when one acts on what one is are primary and cases when one acts on what one identifies as are secondary. It is, thus, problematic to define any feature that is significantly rationally relevant to ordinary action in terms of what one identifies with.
Two possible sources of confusion on this point:
ReplyDelete1. There are lots of cases where the objective fact depends on some prior act of ‘identifying as’. It is an objective fact that I am a fan of this football team, because I identify as a fan of this football team.
2. In the ‘space of causes’, the explanation for your acting as a parent is the subjective fact that you believe you are a parent, while in the ‘space of reasons’, the explanation is that you are a parent. (Your being a parent is what justifies the action while your believing that you are a parent is what brings the action about.)
Ad 1: I think that's not quite right. One can identify as a fan (both to others and to self) without being a fan. A necessary condition for being a fan of a team is having pro-attitudes towards the team's winning. But one can be self-deceived that one has such pro-attitudes, and can nonetheless identify as a fan. (Imagine that you live in a part of the country where it's expected that you are a fan of team X. You've worked hard to fit in, and you think you're now just like the locals, but "deep down" you just don't care.)
ReplyDeleteAd 2: Exactly.