Presentism and the intrinsicness of past tensed properties

Many presentists think that objects have past-tensed properties. Thus an object that is now straight but was bent has the property of having been bent. (Some such presentists use these properties to ground facts about the past.)

But assuming for simplicity that being bent is an intrinsic property, we can argue that having been bent is an intrinsic property as well. Here’s why. If being bent doesn’t describe an object in relation to the existence, non-existence or features of any other object (assuming being bent is intrinsic), neither does having been bent. Nor is having been bent “temporally impure”—it does not describe the object in terms of anything happening at other times, since nothing can happen at other times on presentism. It does not describe the object in relation its past or future temporal slices or past or future events involving the object, since on presentism there are no past or future objects, and there are no past or future events.

But if having been bent is an intrinsic property of an object, it seems that, by a plausible patchwork principle or by intuitions about the omnipotence of God, an object could come into existence just for one instant and yet have been bent at that instant. Which is absurd.