A couple of days ago I blogged that van Inwagen is right that we should not expect an answer to the General Composition Question.
Now I am not so sure. Suppose van Inwagen is right about the Special Composition Question having the answer he thinks it has: Necessarily, the xs compose another thing if and only they have a life together.
The following is then plausibly true:
- Necessarily, y is a part of z if and only if y = z or there is a life L and xs such that (a) the xs live life L together, (b) z itself lives life L, and (c) y is among the xs.
But if so, then we have a non-mereological definition of parthood, and if substitute that into the definition of composition, we get a non-mereological account of when the xs compose y.
Maybe the problem with (1) is that it commits one to an ontology that quantifies over lives (which are presumably some kind of event), rather than just having some plural predicate like “are jointly lifewise active”.
But one can perhaps escape even that. Perhaps we can suppose a plural predicate S(xx,yy) which expresses the idea that the xx and yy same-co-live. One might want to paraphrase that as “the xx live the same life as the yy do”, but that would commit one to quantifying over lives. And then we can say:
- Necessarily, y is a part of z if and only if y = z or there are xx that have y among them such that S(xx,z).
I forgot that van Inwagen offers a very similar account, and says that it covertly uses mereological concepts. His version says that the activity of the xs constitutes the life of z, but he insists that the "of" will have mereology in it, because to account for the life of an organism one needs to talk of its parts.
ReplyDeleteI don't think that's clear. We could have an extended simple with distributional properties that lives. So all we need are distributional properties to account for life. In the case of a complex thing, these distributional properties may be grounded in the properties of parts, but nonetheless the distributional properties are not defined in terms of parts.
Furthermore, I suspect that if you think you need parts of the organism to account for what it means for an organism to be alive, you will need parts of a cell to account for what it means for cells to engage in a life-constituting activity, and van Inwagen does think cells compose a multicellural organism.