Alexander Pruss's Blog

This morning I realized the following Nomic Simplification thesis is very likely true: NS: Any physical theory can be replaced by a practi...

Some people are skeptical of distinctions between doing and refraining. It seems that anybody who accepts classical double effect reasoning ...

On a standard (but disputed ) interpretation of Scotus, x and y are inseparable (neither can consistently exist without the other) if and ...

Theists are sometimes accused of being anthropocentric in their worldview. Yet in a typical naturalistic worldview, rational animals are at...

Take Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist case . Here is a quick and simple argument for why it’s wrong to disconnect from the violinist...

Jeff Brower has a very original Aristotelian account of how three-dimensional substances endure and change accidentally, while being wholly...

Like the previous Ptolemaic model, Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the solar system required epicycles to predict the astronomical observa...

Platonist : Platonism is ideologically way more parsimonious than nominalism. For Platonism has one fundamental predicate applying to object...

Start with the Socratic intuition that the most beautiful thing on earth is a human being living well. Extrapolating: Persons living well ...

Here’s an argument against the claim that a human is sometimes (or always) a proper part of a larger whole such as a committee or an ecosyst...

Imagine that Alice lives in a classic growing block world, while Twin Alice lives in an eternalist world. Otherwise, the two worlds are exac...

Years ago, when I was thinking hard about lying, I conjectured that perhaps we simply have a moral duty not to assert falsehoods. This way, ...

This is yet another attempt to answer the question of the conditions under which in an atomic world with classical mereology we have unrestr...

Assume that human psychological states depend on brain states. On psychological continuity theories of personal identity, if a time t is s...

Schaffer says that pluralists think that parts are ontologically prior to their wholes. But this seems wrong, even as restricted to bottom-...