Tuesday, November 14, 2017

Freedom, responsibility and the open future

Assume the open futurist view on which freedom is incompatible with there being a positive fact about what I choose, and so there are no positive facts about future (non-derivatively) free actions.

Suppose for simplicity that time is discrete. (If it’s not, the argument will be more complicated, but I think not very different.) Suppose that at t2 I freely choose A. Let t1 be the preceding moment of time.

Then:

  1. At t2, it is already a fact that I choose A, and so I am no longer free with respect to A.

  2. At t1, I am still free with respect to choosing A, but I am not yet responsible with respect to A.

Thus:

  1. At no time am I both free and responsible with respect to A.

This seems counterintuitive to me.

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3 comments:

  1. Walter Van den AckerNovember 15, 2017 at 12:21 AM

    I don't really see what an open future has to do with being responsible or not.
    Let's suppose there is a positive fact about me choosing A at t2
    Then: At t2, it is fact that I choose A, so at t2 I am not free with respect to A and at t1, it is also already a fact that I will choose A at t2, so at t1 I am not free with respect to A.
    It seems to follow that on a non-open view of the future, at no time am I free with respect to A and at no time am I responsible with respect to A.

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  2. Heath WhiteNovember 15, 2017 at 7:27 AM

    Isn't this true on any view? You're not responsible for having done A until you've done it and are no longer free.

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  3. Walter Van den AckerNovember 16, 2017 at 8:11 AM

    Heath White
    "Isn't this true on any view? You're not responsible for having done A until you've done it and are no longer free."

    The problem I see with a non-open view of the future is I am not free at this moment to do ~A because it is already true now that I will choose A.

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