Assume the open futurist view on which freedom is incompatible with there being a positive fact about what I choose, and so there are no positive facts about future (non-derivatively) free actions.
Suppose for simplicity that time is discrete. (If it’s not, the argument will be more complicated, but I think not very different.) Suppose that at t2 I freely choose A. Let t1 be the preceding moment of time.
Then:
At t2, it is already a fact that I choose A, and so I am no longer free with respect to A.
At t1, I am still free with respect to choosing A, but I am not yet responsible with respect to A.
Thus:
- At no time am I both free and responsible with respect to A.
This seems counterintuitive to me.
3 comments:
I don't really see what an open future has to do with being responsible or not.
Let's suppose there is a positive fact about me choosing A at t2
Then: At t2, it is fact that I choose A, so at t2 I am not free with respect to A and at t1, it is also already a fact that I will choose A at t2, so at t1 I am not free with respect to A.
It seems to follow that on a non-open view of the future, at no time am I free with respect to A and at no time am I responsible with respect to A.
Isn't this true on any view? You're not responsible for having done A until you've done it and are no longer free.
Heath White
"Isn't this true on any view? You're not responsible for having done A until you've done it and are no longer free."
The problem I see with a non-open view of the future is I am not free at this moment to do ~A because it is already true now that I will choose A.
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