A method for blocking deflation of ontological debates

Consider Hirsch-type deflationary views on which many differences in ontology are simply verbal differences. A standard case is nihilism and universalism about composition: the nihilist says that multiple things can never compose a whole and the universalist says that every plurality must compose a whole. The deflationist sees the two views as notational variants. The universalist’s sentences describe the same facts as the nihilist’s. We can maybe even translate with little if any loss between the two idioms, replacing the nihilist’s quantifiers with quantifiers restricted to simples on the universalist’s side, and replacing the universalist’s quantifiers with plural quantification, or quantification over sets, or some other device acceptable to the nihilist.

Note, first, that in this particular case there is a bit of a problem. The universalist might allow for composed objects that have no simple parts—“gunk”. The claim that possibly there is gunk is one that cannot be translated into any statement in the nihilist’s language that has a hope of being true. The nihilist’s usual way of translating a universalist’s statement is to use plural quantification. So the statement that possibly there is gunk is going to get translated into something like the statement that possibly there is a plurality of things none of which is a simple. But that’s obviously false given nihilism, since the nihilist’s quantifiers can only quantify over simples, and so the statement basically says that there are simples none of which is a simple. Thus, we have a genuine, non-verbal disagreement.

So the only way we can take a nihilist-universalist disagreement to be merely verbal is if both theorists deny the possibility of gunk. I think they should deny the possibility of gunk.

Here is a second case, where disagreement on composition cannot be deflated. Consider a brutal composition view like Markosian’s. On this view, there will be possible worlds with the same simple objects standing in the same non-mereological relations but differing as to composition facts. For instance, in one world there might be three rocks that make up a whole and in the other world the very same three rocks do not make up a whole, even though they are arranged in exactly the same way. Any nihilist or universalist description of the two worlds will be unable to distinguish such worlds, but on a brutal composition view, there can be such pairs. Here we have a real disagreement, one that cannot be taken to be merely verbal. The brutal composition theorist has more possibilities than the nihilist and universalist. And the brutal composition theorist’s statement that the two worlds differ in composition facts but not in non-mereological facts either has no translation into either nihilist or universalist language or translates into something that is clearly false on the given theory.

The brutal compositionalist has an additional “degree of freedom”, as the scientist would say, on her theory than the nihilist or universalist does. The case here is similar to those dualists who believe in the possibility of zombies. While the disagreement between a dualist who thinks the mental supervenes on the physical and the pure physicalist could seem to be merely verbal to some (though I think it’s a mistake to see it that way), the disagreement between a dualist who thinks that the mental does not supervene on the physical and the pure physicalist is certainly not merely verbal.

In general, thus, the modal ramifications of theories can block deflationary moves. One theory may allow for a possibility that simply rules out the other theory (e.g., gunk ruling out nihilism), or one theory may posit contingent facts that do not supervene on reality as describable in the other theory (the brutal composition or zombie cases).

This leaves the possibility that there will be some ontological debates that are merely verbal. Perhaps the debate between the nihilist and the anti-gunk universalist is merely verbal. But that some pairs of ontological theories disagree merely verbally is not a very interesting deflationary thesis.

Moreover, I think that once we see that there are nearby debates that are clearly not merely verbal, the plausibility of the deflationary move in the cases that looks more verbal goes down. Once we realize that among the views under discussion there is a brutal composition view on which there is a possible world just like ours but where nihilism contingently holds and a possible world just like ours but where universalism contingently holds, it becomes pretty clear that holding nihilism to hold necessarily will also differ from holding universalism to hold necessarily. (That said, there may be particular variants on universalism that just are notational variants on nihilism. Say, ones where the quantifiers are stipulated in terms of plural quantification over simples.)

Compositional universalism and monotheism

Compositional universalism says that any collection of non-overlapping beings makes up a whole. (We might restrict this to material objects, but that would be an ad hoc restriction that would make the doctrine not be a true universalism.) Here, "non-overlapping" should, I think, be read not in the spatial sense, but in the mereological sense.

Here is an interesting problem for theists who embrace compositional universalism: It seems to follow that there are wholes of which God is a proper part. Thus, there would be a whole consisting of God and the Empire State Building as its parts. Call this whole x. We can get to a reductio in more than one way from this.

1. God and only God is infinite in the fullest sense. But anything that has a part that is infinite in the fullest sense is infinite in the fullest sense. Therefore, x is infinite in the fullest sense. But x is not God, since God is a proper part of x. This contradicts the claim that only God is infinite in the fullest sense.

2. God and only God has within him perfect goodness. But so does x. Which is absurd.

3. The whole is at least as great as its part. Thus, x is at least as great as God. Which is absurd.

4. Every being other than God is wholly created by God. Therefore, x is wholly created by God. But if y is wholly created by God, then every part of y is wholly created by God. Therefore, every part of x is wholly created by God. Therefore, God is wholly created by God, which is absurd.

Telekinesis and the unreality of artefacts

Telekinesis is not within our power. How can we formulate this fact? Well, it's a bit tricky. The natural way of formulating is to say that no human thought has a physical effect outside the body except through an extra-mental bodily movement (this formulation leaves open the possibility that the mind is a part of the body). However, we can, just by thinking about it, change the positions of needles on gauges on a neural scanner. And if Christians are right, it is possible to pray mentally for a physical effect, and have the physical effect occur by a divine intervention. Moreover, we want to insist that just as one person can't do telekinesis by herself, so too a dozen can't do it together.

One way to handle the neural scanner concern and to extend to the case of multiple agents is to say that whenever human thoughts have a physical effect in virtue of their content, they do so through causing at least one an extra-mental bodily movement. The case of miracles can be handled, perhaps, by adding a qualifier "except for miracles".

Now, suppose that tables, chairs and other artefacts exist. Then, I think, the existence of an artefact depends crucially on what people think: it depends on the intentions of the artificer and what other people plan to use it for. We could imagine a physical object just like a chair but which can survive the loss of all of its legs, because its purpose is quite different from the purposes of a chair. Whether that object exists or whether a chair exists in its place depends on what people made the object for, and/or what they plan to use it for. Likewise, whether one is making a palisade—a single object—or a series of upright pointed sticks tied together depends on one's intentions for the project. If, for instance, one is planning to untie all the sticks and use them as spears as soon as the enemy approaches, then what one has made is a bunch of spears tied together for ease of storage, and one has not made a palisade. Thus, the number of artefacts depends on the contents of our thoughts.

Facts about what artefacts exist depend crucially on the content of what people think. Since many artefacts, including the ones in the above examples, are physical objects outside of human bodies, it follows from the above, that if there really are artefacts, then the contents of thoughts can affect what kinds of and how many physical objects exist outside of human bodies. Moreover, this happens without any miracles, in the ordinary course of things. Hence, if there really are artefacts, there is something very much like telekinesis.

Of course, nobody really thinks there is some miraculous multiplication or aggregation, respectively, of objects when a bunch of spears tied together or a palisade, respective, is made. The reason for that is that we realize, perhaps inconsistently, that artefacts are not real things.

There is a way out of this argument, and this is to assume compositional universalism. But that faces at least one serious problem, as an earlier post has shown.