More on childbirth and the problem of evil

Say that a "God-disproving evil" is an evil that God, if he existed, would have no justification in permitting. Here is an argument:

1. (Premise) If there are God-disproving evils, then pain in childbirth is a God-disproving evil.
2. (Premise) If a pain is a God-disproving evil, then probably significant numbers of theists who suffer this pain thereby become atheists.
3. (Premise) Very few theists who give birth and suffer the pain of childbirth thereby become atheists.
4. Therefore, probably, the pain of childbirth is not a God-disproving evil. (2 and 3)
5. Therefore, probably, there are no God-disproving evils. (1 and 4)

I am not particularly impressed with this version of the argument, though I do think the argument is sound with the conditionals interpreted as material.

But if one wants more than soundness, I am not happy with (1). Maybe a better version would be: The sort of reasoning that makes one think that there are God-disproving evils makes one think that pain in childbirth is one. And then (2) and (3) serve to make one more suspicious of that sort of reasoning.

If one does like (1)-(5), we can add two fun steps:

6. (Premise) Probably, if there is no God, there are God-disproving evils.
7. Therefore, probably there is a God. (5 and 6)

Why accept (6)? Well, because if there is no God, and if a world somewhat like ours is actual (this is part of the background of the "Probably" in (6)), we would expect there to be nasty and pointless natural evils.

Natural childbirth and the problem of evil

A significant number of women believe there is a value in giving birth without medical intervention, and in particular without pain medication. Some of them change their minds once they are actually experiencing the pain, but some do not. What is interesting about this kind of a case is that people are accepting pain which they could permissibly avoid. This is a different sort of case from someone who withstands torture to protect her friends from a dictator, since the latter person—immensely admirable as her action is—is doing her moral duty. In the natural childbirth case, the woman accepts excruciating pain for the sake of a morally optional good, apparently of an aretaic sort.

Some may doubt whether there is in fact an aretaic good in this. I think a case can be made for it. There is a value in being fully perceptually in touch with the central processes of human life. Whether the value is great enough to make the acceptance of severe pain rational is a question to which I don't have an answer (in part because I have not experienced this pain), but it seems reasonable to leave that to the prudent judgment of the individual. In any case, it is widely accepted that what these women do is not unreasonable, and I think the following conditional is pretty solid:

1. If natural childbirth makes possible a very significant but morally optional aretaic good, it is rational to engage in natural childbirth despite severe physical pain.

Notice, too, that the aretaic good here is one that presumably is mainly experienced retrospectively. I would expect that while in labor, there is no leisure of mind for the experiencing of the aretaic good. What makes the acceptance of pains reasonable, assuming the antecedent in (1), is the way they fit into a whole story that involves the child's coming into the world and later retrospection.

One of the challenges, both intellectual and pastoral, with the problem of evil is our difficulty in imagining how it is that an afterlife can transform the meaning of suffering for an individual. The natural childbirth case provides a helpful analogy. The child's coming into the world and the retrospection, together with the intrinsic aretaic good (assuming for the sake of the argument that there is one—this is easily imaginable), make the suffering make sense. Now, in the childbirth case, the time scale between the suffering and the experience of the good may be shorter, but from the point of view of an infinite afterlife, the difference between twelve hours and seventy years is not so significant.

An apparent disanalogy is that in natural childbirth, the pain is voluntarily accepted by the sufferer, while many other sufferings are imposed on us whether we will or nill. There are, however, several ways of defusing this disanalogy (I am grateful to Trent Dougherty for the first two or three points below, though I may have modified them):

• We all will the greatest happiness for ourselves (or so Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas say). Insofar as we will this happiness to ourselves, we will the necessary means to it--and that may include suffering. So in some sense there is a voluntariness.
• God knows the structure of our desires better than we do, so he can choose for us more wisely even by our lights than we ourselves do.
• We are all small children. The greatest wisdom of the wisest humans is as the insight of a smart toddler. Or so we will see it from the viewpoint of eternity, if we are received into the joy of union with God.
• The kind of right we have to impose suffering on someone for the sake of a good to that person depends a lot on the relationship. For instance, for some children, the total suffering over thirteen years of compulsory schooling (even if not all legally compulsory, the parents may impose all of it) is quite horrendous (I am not talking about myself: I actually had quite a lot of fun at school myself, though I also suffered a lot, but not horrendously so). But parents have the right to impose this suffering for the sake of the good of knowledge. (Of course, if there are alternatives available, such as a different school or homeschooling, that do not involve so much suffering for the child, parents shuld opt for those.) X's parents, thus, are permitted to allow much suffering to X for the sake of X's good. X herself, as the childbirth example shows, is permitted to allow even more suffering to herself. And on this scale, God has the kinds of rights in respect to us that we ourselves have.