A Biblical argument for epistemicism

1. If God knows the exact number of hairs we have on our head, then there is a definite number of hairs we have on our head.

2. If there is a definite number of hairs we have on our head, vagueness is at most epistemic.

3. God knows the exact number of hairs we have on our head. (Luke 12:7)

4. So, vagueness is at most epistemic.

Premise 2 is based on observing that the number of hairs we have on our heads involves similar kinds of vagueness to more paradigmatic cases of vagueness. Think here about these questions:

• What’s the cut-off between hairs on the head and hairs on the upper neck?

• How much keratin needs to come out of a hair follicle before that keratin counts as a hair?

• How far must the molecules of a hair separate from the molecules of the skin before the hair counts as no longer attached?

One might worry that Premise 3 relies on biblical data too literalistically. Jesus is emphasizing the impressiveness of God’s knowledge. Suppose that instead of God knowing the exact number of hairs on my head, God knew the exact vagueness profile for the hairs on my head. That would be even more impressive. I see some force in this objection, but it implies that epistemicism holds at the level of vagueness profiles, and it seems (but perhaps isn’t?) ad hoc to go for epistemicism there rather than everywhere.

On reflection, I think premise 1 might be the most questionable premise. Perhaps God’s knowledge definitely matches the number of hairs: for every natural number n, it’s definitely true that: God believes I have n hairs if and only if I have n hairs, but there is no natural number n such that God definitely believes I have n hairs. In other words, the vagueness profile concerning God’s beliefs exactly matches the vagueness profile in reality. I am sceptical of this solution. It doesn’t feel like knowledge to me if it’s got this sort of vagueness to it.

Hair

For a while, I've thought that:

1. Hair is not alive.
2. Every part of me is alive.
3. So, hair is not a part of me.

This goes against the wisdom embodied in court precedent which has, I understand, held that cutting someone's hair without consent is battery rather than, say, theft.

Interestingly, in L'usage de la Raison, Mersenne talks of the human as a microcosm and mentions that humans, like the universe, have non-living parts, and gives hair as an example. So Mersenne denies (2). And on further reflection, I don't think I really had much reason to accept (2). Indeed, there seem to be other clear counterexamples to (2), such as the electrons in my heart (they are parts of my heart, and parthood seems transitive, at least in this case). Maybe one could argue that while the electrons are at least a part of a living part of me, hair isn't a part of a living part of me. But that would beg the question. For if my hair is a part of me, it's also a part of my head, and my head is surely a living part of me.

So I don't see much ground for denying that hair is a part of me. It's just one of my many nonliving parts.

Of course, speaking fundamentally, there is no such thing as hair (just as there are no hearts, chairs, stones, etc.). There is only I, who am hirsute.