Some actions are are things I can do immediately: for instance, I can immediately raise my hand. Others require that I do something to enable myself to do the action: for instance, to teach in person, I have to go to the classroom, or to feed my children, I need to obtain food. So, here is a very plausible axiom of deontic logic:
- If I ought to do A, and A is not an action I can do immediately, then I ought to bring it about that I can immediately do A.
Now, say that I remotely can do an action provided that I can immediately do it, or I can immediately bring it about that I can immediately do it, or I can immediately bring it about that I can immediately bring it about that I can immediately do it, or ….
It follows from (1) and a bit of reasoning that:
- If I ought to do A, then I remotely can do A, or I have an infinite regress of prerequisite obligations.
But:
- It is false that I have an infinite regress of prerequisite obligations.
So:
- If I ought to do A, then I remotely can do A.