Fixing an earlier regress argument about intentions

In an earlier post, I generated a regress from:

1. If you are responsible for x, then x is an outcome of an intentional act with an intention that you are responsible for,

where both responsibility and outcomehood are partial. But I am now sceptical of 1. It is plausible when applied to things that aren’t actions, but there is little reason to think an action I am responsible for has to be the outcome of another action of mine.

Maybe what I should say is this:

2. Any action that I responsible for has an intention I am responsible for.

3. Anything that isn’t an action that I am responsible for is an outcome of an action I am responsible for.

This still seems to generate a regress or circle. By (3), if I am responsible for anything, I am responsible for some action, say A₁. This will have an intention I₁ that I am responsible for. Now either I₁ is itself an action A₂ or an outcome of some action A₂ that I am responsible for. In both cases, I am responsible for A₂. And then A₂ will have an intention I₂ that I am responsible for. And so on.

How can we arrest this? I think there are exactly two ways out:

4. Some action A_n is identical with its intention I_n.

5. Some action A_n has its own intention I_n as an outcome of itself.

Characterizing actions by the reasons against them

It is plausible that the reasons for which one chooses an action help determine the kind of action it is. Plausibly, an action is a murder if one performs it because it will kill an innocent.

But it is also interesting that the reasons against which one chooses an action also help determine the character of an action. This is true both in good and bad actions. Some actions are acts of courage in part because they are done contrary to reasons of one’s own safety. And some actions are acts of gross negligence in part because they are done contrary to reasons of the safety of another. If, on the other hand, the reasons of safety did not enter into deliberation at all, the act, in both cases, may well be a case of recklessness.