An ontological argument from the essentiality of origins

1. (Premise) If a perfect being can't desire a state of affairs A, then A is not a good state of affairs.
2. (Premise) A perfect being can't desire any state of affairs incompatible with the existence of a perfect being.
3. (Premise) Necessarily, if a perfect being exists and if Jean Vanier (or Barack Obama or some other person you admire) exists, then Jean Vanier (etc.) is created by the perfect being.
4. (Premise) If x is not created by a perfect being, then x cannot be created by a perfect being. (Essentiality of origins)
5. (Premise) The state of affairs of Jean Vanier (etc.) existing is good.
6. So, a perfect being can desire Jean Vanier (etc.) to exist. (1 and 5)
7. So, Jean Vanier's (etc.) existence is compatible with the existence of a perfect being. (2 and 6)
8. So, possibly a perfect being exists and creates Jean Vanier (etc.). (3 and 7)
9. So, a perfect being created Jean Vanier (etc.). (4 and 8)
10. So, a perfect being exists. (9)

[Note added later: This was, of course, written before the revelations about Jean Vanier's abusiveness. I would certainly have chosen a different example if I were writing this post now.]