Two sources of discomfort with substitutionary views of atonement

On one family of theories of the atonement, the harsh treatment that justice called for in the light of our sins is imposed on Christ and thereby satisfies retributive justice. Pretty much everybody who thinks about this is at least a little bit uncomfortable with it—some uncomfortable to the point of moral outrage.

It’s useful, I think, to make explicit two primary sources of discomfort:

1. It seems unjust to Christ that he bear the pain that our sins deserve.

2. It seems unjust that we are left unpunished.

And it’s also useful to note that these two sources of discomfort are largely independent of one another.

I think that those who are uncomfortable to the point of moral outrage are likely to focus on (1). But it is not hard to resolve (1) given orthodox Christology and Trinitarianism. The burden imposed on Christ is imposed by the will of the Father. But the will of the Father in orthodox theology is numerically identical with the will of the Son. Thus, the burden is imposed on Christ by his own divine will, which he then obeys in his own human will. It is thus technically a burden coming from Christ’s own will, and a burden coming from one’s own will for the sake of others does not threaten injustice.

While (2) is also a source of discomfort, I think it is less commonly a discomfort that rises to the level of moral outrage. Maybe some people do feel outrage at the idea that a mass murderer could be left unpunished if she repentantly accepted Christ into her life and were baptised. But I think it tends to be a moral fault if one feels much outrage at leniency shown to a repentant malefactor.

I also think (2) is the much harder problem. Note, for instance, that the considerations of consent that dissolve (1) seem to do little to help with (2). Imagine that I was a filthy rich CEO of a corporation that was knowingly dumping effluent that caused the deaths of dozens of people and I was justly sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. It would clearly be a failure of justice if I were permitted to find someone else and pay her a hundred million dollars to go to prison in place—even though there would no doubt be a number of people who would be very eager, of their own free will, to do that for the price.

It would be nice if I could now go on to solve (2). But my main point was to separate out the two sources of discomfort and note their independence.

That said, I did just now have a thought about (2) while talking to a student. Suppose that you do me a very good turn. I say: “How can I ever repay you?” And you say: “Pass it on. Maybe one day you’ll have a chance to do this for someone else. That will be repayment enough.” If I one day pass on the blessing that I’ve received from you, justice has been done to you. The beneficiary of my passing on the blessing rightly substitutes for you. Maybe there is a mirror version of this on the side of punishment?

How not to defend penal substitution

Consider the standard problem for penal substitution views:

• How is it that an innocent person's suffering harsh treatment removes the guilt of this guilty?

This is just a quick remark. Here is how not to solve the problem: Don't invoke God's sovereignty or power to claim that God can transfer guilt and punishment at will. For if God can transfer guilt and punishment at will, then God could transfer the guilt and punishment to a tree. But wouldn't it be better that a tree should be harshly punished for eternity (say, constantly have its bark ripped off as it grows back) than that Christ suffer?

Penalty and reward substitution

Christ bore the suffering due for our sins, in our place. One might worry whether this makes any moral sense. Assume a retributive view of punishment, on which wrongdoing provides a reason, not based on the protection of society or the reformation of the wrongdoer, to treat the wrongdoer harshly.

Now, the best argument I know for a retributive view of punishment is the parallel with reward. Doing more than one's duty is a reason to be rewarded, in proportion to how far above one's duty one has gone. By parallel, doing less than one's duty is a reason to be punished, in proportion to how far short of one's duty one has fallen.

But in reward situations, we fully accept reward substitution. Sally has earned a large cash prize as a reward for her life's work in getting the Elbonians and Olbenians to forget their past differences and live in harmony. She directs the bestower of the prize to give it to the Orphans of Mixed Elbonian-Olbenian Descent Protection Fund. Some consideration of justice would have been satisfied by giving the prize to Sally. But when the substitution is made, the very same consideration of justice is still satisfied.

If retributive punishment is the flip side of retributive reward, and if we are untroubled by reward substitution, we should be equally untroubled by penalty substitution. Fred's receipt of harsh treatment that was due Sally could satisfy the reason of justice to treat Sally harshly, just as the Orphan Fund's receipt of the money due Sally could satisfy the reason of justice to reward Sally.

There are, of course, some consent conditions on reward substitution. For y's receipt of a good that was to be x's reward to be a valid substitution, x has to consent. Moreover, it may be that y has to either consent or be presumed to consent to receiving the good qua substitution for x. If Hitler got the Nobel Peace Prize and directed the money to my research fund, saying that my research work promotes his ideals, I would have very good reason to refuse. And if I were given the money despite my refusal, it is not clear that it would be a valid substitution. Further, maybe the persons who were the primary benificees of x's supererogatory action--the ones by benefiting whom x gained the reward--need to consent or be presumed to consent to the substitution.

It would be very interesting if penalty substitution required the same consent conditions. Thus, if Sally is due harsh treatment, and Fred offers to suffer it for her (so, Fred's consent is built into the story), this is only a valid substitution if Sally consents to it. This would have the theological consequence that Christ's sacrifice cannot be validly applied in justice to those who never consent to its application. Likewise, if the primary benificees need to consent in reward substitution cases, the primary individual against whom the wrong was done need to consent in penalty substitution cases. If so, this means that Christ's sacrifice requires the view that the primary individual against whom the wrong was done is always God. "Against you, you alone, have I sinned," says the Psalmist, emphasizing this.

Penal substitution

The penal substitution theory consists of two claims:

1. Christ's sufferings are a substitute for our justly deserved punishment.
2. Christ's sufferings are a punishment of Christ.

Here is something that to me is interesting. Claims (1) and (2) appear to be logically independent. It is possible to hold (2) without holding (1), though this would be a rather pointless theory. It is also possible to hold (1) without holding (2).

The gravest objection—the inappropriateness of Christ's being punished—to the penal substitution theory is an objection not to (1) but to (2). At the same time, the Biblical evidence for the penal substitution theory is largely evidence only for (1), not for (2). Consequently, it seems like one would do well to simply adopt (1), while rejecting (2). The resulting theory would be a theory of Christ's substitutionary sacrifice, but it would be penal only on our side, not on Christ's side. (This idea is inspired by a paper Adam Pelser gave at the SCP meeting in Niagara last year; Pelser was advocating a particular theory that entailed (1) without committing him to (2).)

I am not claiming that holding on to (1) while rejecting (2) solves all the problems of the atonement. The major difficulty of just how (1) manages to be true—just how Christ's sufferings manage to substitute for our punishment—remains.

I think (1) is plausible in some cases. Suppose I raped Captain Smith and tortured him to within inches of his life while I was working for a terrorist organization that captured Captain Smith. Later, Captain Smith jumped on a grenade to save my life, yelling that he forgave me what I did to him. Even if the death penalty were appropriate for my rape and torture of Captain Smith (I think rape and torture deserve the death penalty, though I also think we have a duty of mercy which prohibits us from employing the death penalty unless it is necessary for the protection of society), if I've accepted Captain Smith's forgiveness (and thus repented—it's not a real acceptance of forgiveness otherwise, I think), I think there would be something inappropriate about executing me for what I did to Captain Smith—there is a way in which his suffering death on my behalf substitutes for the punishment owing me. (This does not solve all of the problems with the atonement. One of the difficulties is with the way Christ's sufferings atones for sins we committed not just against God—there, I think we need to say something about how all sins are primarily against God. But it is enough to show that (1) is not in and of itself absurd.)