Has cultural relativism about norms of etiquette really been established?

Imagine a philosopher who argued that the norms of assertion are relative to culture on the grounds that in England we have the norm:

1. Only assert “It’s snowing” when it’s snowing

while in France we have the norm:

2. Only assert “Il neige” when it’s snowing.

This would be silly for multiple reasons. Foremost among these is that (1) and (2) are mere consequences of the norm of assertion:

3. Only assert what it is true.

(Of course, you may disagree that truth is the norm of assertion. You may prefer a knowledge or justified belief or belief or high credence norm. But an analogous point will apply.)

It is widely held that while the norm of assertion is essentially the same across cultures, norms of etiquette vary widely. But the main reason people give for believing that the norms of etiquette vary widely is akin to the terrible argument about norms of assertion I began the post with. People note such things as that in some countries when one meets acquaintances one bows, and in others one waves; or that in some one eats fish with two forks and in others with a fork and knife.

But just as the fact that in England one should follow (1) and in France (2) is compatible with the universality of norms of assertion, likewise the variation in greeting and eating rituals can be compatible with the universality of norms of etiquette. It could, for instance, be that the need to eat fish with two forks in Poland and with a fork and knife in the USA derives simply from a universal norm of etiquette:

4. Express respect for your fellow diners.

But just as one asserts the truth with different words in different languages, one expresses respect for one’s fellow diners with different gestures in different cultures.

Indeed, presumably nobody thinks that the fact that in France one says “Merci” and in England “Thank you” implies a cultural relativism in etiquette. In both cases one is thanking, but the words that symbolize thanks are different. But what goes for words here also applies to many gestures (there may turn out to be universal gestures, like pointing).

One object that among the norms of etiquette there are norms that specify which gestures signify, say, respect or thanks. But a specification of what signifies what is not the specification of a norm. That “Merci” signifies gratitude and that eating fish with two forks signifies respect are not norms, because norms tell us what to do, and these do not.

5. “Merci” signifies thanks

is grammatically not a norm but a statement of fact. We might try to make it sound more like a norm by saying:

6. Signify thanks with “merci”!

But that is bad advice when taken literally. For thanks are not to be signified always, but only when thanks are appropriate. A more correct norm would be:

7. When a service has been done for you, signify thanks with “merci”!

But this is just a consequence of the general norm of etiquette:

8. When a service has been done for you, signify thanks!

together with the fact (5).

So, we see that the mere variation in rituals should not be taken to imply that there is cultural relativity of norms of etiquette.

If there is to be a cultural relativity of norms of etiquette, it will have to be at a higher level. If in some cultures, etiquette requires one to show respect for all fellow diners and at others to show disrespect for some—say, those from an underprivileged group—then that would indeed be a genuine relativity of norms of etiquette.

But it’s not clear that me that in a culture where one is expected to show disrespect to fellow diners in some underprivileged group that expectation is actually a norm of etiquette. Not all social expectations, after all, are actually norms of etiquette, or even norms at all. A norm (of behavior) gives norm-based reasons. But an expectation that one show disrespect to members of an underprivileged group has no reason-giving force at all.

We can imagine a culture where there is no way to symbolize respect for members of an underprivileged group when dining. On the view I wish to defend, such a lack would not exempt one from the duty to show respect to all one’s fellow diners—it would just make it more difficult to do so, because it would require one to create new ways of showing respect (say, by adapting the forms of showing respect to members of privileged groups, much as in some European languages the polite forms of address are derived from forms in which one used to address nobility in less democratic times).

I am not sure if there is cultural variation in norms of etiquette. But if there is, that variation will not be proved by shallow differences between rituals, and may not even follow from deeper variation, such as a culture where it is not appropriate to thank one’s subordinates for work well done. For in the case of deeper variation, it could simply be that some in some cultures violation of certain norms of etiquette is nearly universal, and there are no accepted ways to show the relevant kind of respect.

In fact, it could even be the case that there is only one norm of etiquette, and it is culturally universal:

9. Signify respect to other persons you interact with in ways fitted to the situation.

If this is right, then social rules designed to show disrespect, no matter how widespread, are not norms of etiquette.

Fighting the flu

Some people, perhaps more towards the beginning of our pandemic than now, have said that we wouldn’t have a shutdown for seasonal influenza, and COVID-19 is not much worse. Our best mortality data shows that this argument is unsound: COVID-19 is much worse. But still I wonder if there isn’t something to do the idea of turning the argument around to conclude that we should be doing more about the flu—and the common cold, while we’re at it—than we are.

The flu isn’t nearly as deadly as COVID-19, but it does kill many. It causes significant suffering to a much greater number than it kills, and it is very disruptive to the economy. The kinds of public health measures taken against COVID-19 have apparently been extremely effective against the flu, apparently leading to a seven-fold decrease in flu-like symptoms in Australia around April of this year as compared to last year. Of course, for economic reasons, it would not be prudent to shut down businesses and schools to prevent the flu, especially since economic impact is one of the reasons for fighting the flu. And, in my sample of one, I continue to delight in the fact that since spring break, I haven’t had any flu or cold—five months without coughing is completely new to me, and wonderful!

But some of the measures taken against COVID-19 carry little economic costs, and yet might significantly decrease flu transmission. Specifically: voluntary individual social distancing and masks. Prior to the pandemic, comfortable personal space in the U.S. was said to be at least 1.5 feet for good non-romantic friends, four feet for strangers and three for co-workers and casual acquaintances. We could modify our etiquette to increase all these distances to six in those circumstances where it is not seriously inconvenient to do so. And we could also make it a part of our social etiquette that we wear good quality masks (which we could presumably make in large numbers at relatively low cost if we put more resources into it in the long term) when we are with those who aren’t very close to us, again when this is not seriously inconvenient.

Of course, there would be many circumstances where distancing and masking would be seriously inconvenient, and our etiquette could take those into account, just as it already allows for exceptions to personal space requirements on public transit and on crowded streets. And in cases where facial expressions are important, or when communicating with members of the Deaf community, one would need to take off one’s mask or use a mask with a window.

And there might well be some bonuses:

• covering up a significant portion of the face could result in greater social equality for two reasons: (a) decreased lookism because of covering up of much of the face (one of my teens mentioned acne in this connection!) and (b) decreased barriers to social participation by those with serious social anxiety (for instance, I have noticed that I feel more comfortable in social interactions when covered up)
• potential for avoidance of being the victim of street crime, in that non-accidental violation of one’s personal space would provide an earlier warning of bad intentions (with lots of false positives, of course) and allow earlier evasive and protective action.

It would require research whether such partial measures would have sufficient effectiveness against the flu (and the common cold, which is still pretty unpleasant) to outweigh their inconvenience, at least when any bonuses are added.

Nonetheless, I am kind of thinking of unilaterally implementing some variant of these measures once the pandemic is over. The idea of being on an airplane or in a car with strangers and not wearing a mask—even if flu and common cold are all that one has to worry about—now seems rather weird or even repugnant to me. And I’ve wanted more personal space for a while—I can see myself continuing to step back from people not in my household when having conversations to ensure six feet of separation.

(And of course getting vaccinated for the flu goes without saying. I didn't even bother to write it because it's so obvious until my wife reminded me of how many people don't do it.)

An interesting preference structure

Sam invites me to a home-sewn costume party. While I'd love to come, I would much rather not spend the time to sew costume. Sam offers to do it for me. I know that it would take many hours for him to do it, and I would feel bad having him put this effort in when I could do it myself.

This generates a circular preference structure if we restrict to pairwise comparisons, assuming in each case that the third option is not available:

• Not coming to party beats sewing a costume.
• Sam's sewing a costume for me beats not coming to the party.
• My sewing a costume for me beats Sam's sewing a costume for me.

But if all three options are available, then I think I am stuck sewing a costume for me. For I just can't let Sam do the work for me simply because it's a lot of trouble for me, assuming I can do the work myself. Initially my choices were between sewing for myself and missing the party, and I preferred missing the party. But Sam's offering of a third option forced me to switch.

This kind of thing is a way for Sam to manipulate my behavior if I am a nice guy who doesn't want to put Sam to the trouble. In the case at hand, this means that Sam probably should not make me the offer to sew the costume, since by offering, he brings it about that I will go to the trouble myself. In cases where it is important that I go to the party, this manipulation may be perfectly fine—I've used it in an important case several years ago.