Tropes of tropes

Suppose that x is F if and only if x has a trope of Fness as a part of it.

Here is a cute little problem. Suppose Jim is hurting and has a trope of pain, call it Pin. But Pin is an improper part of Pin. Thus, Pin has a trope of pain—namely itself—as a part of it, and hence Pin is hurting. Thus, wherever someone is hurting, there is something else hurting, too, namely their pain.

The standard move against “two many thinkers” moves is to say that one of them is thinking derivatively. But if we do that, then it looks like the fact that Jim is hurting is more likely to be derivative than the fact that Pin is hurting. For Jim hurts in virtue of having Pin as a part of it, while Pin hurts in virtue of having itself as a part of it, which seems a non-derivative way of hurting. But it seems wrong to say that Jim is hurting merely derivatively, so the real subject of the pain is Pin.

An easy solution is to say that x is F if and only if x has a trope of Fness as a proper part of it.

But this leads to an ugly regress. A trope is a trope, so it must have a trope of tropeness as a proper part of it. The trope of tropeness is also a trope, so it must then have another trope of tropeness as a proper part and so on. (This isn’t a problem if you allow improper parthood, as then you can arrest the regress: the trope of tropeness has itself as an improper part, and that’s it.)

One can, of course, solve the problem by saying that the trope theory only applies to substances: a substance x is F if and only if x has a trope of Fness as a proper part of it, while on the other hand, tropes can have attributes without these attributes being connected with the tropes having tropes. But that seems ad hoc.

As a believer in Aristotelian accidents and forms, which are both basically tropes, I need to face the problem, too. I have two ways out. First, maybe all tropes are causal powers. Then we can say that if “is F” predicates a power, then x is F if and only if x has a trope of Fness as a proper part. But for attribution of non-powers, we have a different story.

Second, maybe the relation between objects and their tropes is not parthood, but some other primitive relation. Some things stand in that relation to themselves (maybe, a trope of tropeness stands in that relation to itself) and others do not (Pin is not so related to itself). This multiplies primitive relations, but only if the relation of parthood is a primitive relation in the system.