Consider this Simultaneity of Causation thesis:
- SC: If x causes y, then x and y have some simultaneous existence.
I didn’t say that x and y are simultaneous, because the most plausible versin of SC is one on which in some cases of causation we have incomplete temporal overlap: x exists over an interval of time that overlaps with the interval of time over which y exists, but x’s interval starts earlier than y’s and y’s ends later than x’s.
I don’t believe SC myself, but some Thomists are drawn to it, and it also seems pretty plausible given presentism, due to presentism’s difficulties with cross-time relations.
I used to think that SC is refuted by substantial change. Suppose a horse dies and is replaced by its carcass. Then when the horse is alive, there is no carcass, and when the carcass exists, the horse is gone. And yet there is an obvious causal relation between the horse and its carcass: the carcass non-coincidentally has approximately the same shape and color as the horse did!
I just realized that I was badly wrong. There is another logical option. It could be that in all cases of substantial change the earlier and later substances temporally overlap, and the substantial change is gradual. The horse gradually starts turning into a carcass. Maybe first the horse’s heart turns into a dead heart, the first part of the carcass, so that the horse now has a heart-shaped hole in its body filled by a small carcass, and then death spreads through the body, with horse stuff gradually turning into a larger and larger amount of carcass stuff, until we have no horse and all carcass. An Aristotelian could describe this in terms of the horse’s form withdrawing its informing influence from the horse’s body in a gradual way, while at the same time the carcass’s form gains influence over and more matter. (Probably a better story is one on which the carcass isn’t just one substance, but let’s simplify.) There are times when the horse hasn’t started dying, and there is no carcass, and there are times when the horse has died, and there is just a carcass. (While the horse is dying it is, of course, alive.)
This option is not ad hoc. Considerations of Special Relativity strongly favor the thesis that substances come into existence at something like a single point (otherwise, what are “initial points” within the substance will vary from reference from to reference frame in a problematic way), and it is plausible to think that by symmetry they cease to exist by contracting to something like a single point. Additionally, in almost all reference frames a topologically compact four-dimensional object comes into existence and out of existence at single points.
Furthermore, thinking that substantial change is gradual in this way avoids the asymmetry resultant from a view on which there is instant substantial change, continuous time, and no temporal overlap between input and output substance. For on such a view, there must either be a last moment of the input substance existing or a first moment of te output substance, but not both. And that’s asymmetric. On the other hand, if there is temporal overlap, we can coherently suppose that both there is a last moment of the input substance and a first moment of the output substance. Indeed, it was thinking about this asymmetry that made me realize that the overlap option was a real possibility.
I think the advocate of SC should insist that all cases of substantial change are gradual in this way, and hence there is always a temporal overlap between the perishing substance and the substance generated from it.
I think the main type of difficulty comes if fundamental particles are substances. When an electron and a positron collide to produce two photons, it doesn’t seem like there is any overlap time where any input substance temporally coincides with any output substance. However, I also think there is good reason to doubt that fundamental particles are substances (the true substance here might be the wavefunction of the universe, and that substance persists in the change), so this is not a decisive case of non-overlapping substantial change.
It still is a bit of a problem for SC that it seems imaginable to have a simple substance changing into another simple substance in a way that is causal. Perhaps one could posit a kind of “cross-fade” here? (Imagine one substance gradually losing energy to another, until all the energy is gone and the first substance perishes.) But in any case, it is not a big bullet to bite to just deny the possibility of instant change from one simple substance to another, once one has accepted that the actual world’s fundamental particles are not in fact substances.
I don’t think SC is home free. In the post where I made the incorrect argument about substantial change, I noted that a similar problem appears at the level of accidental change. When you change shape, your later shape is partly caused by the earlier one, but yet there is no temporal overlap period where you have both shapes.
But even apart from SC, the thesis of temporal overlap in substantial change is an interesting thesis, and worth exploring further.