Requests and obligations

By requesting something from someone, we create a reason for them to fulfill the request. On an individualistic view of human beings, this is a rather awesome power—somehow I reach into your space of reasons and create a new one.

It is tempting to downplay the force of reasons created by a request. After all, it seems that a mere request can always be legitimately turned down.

But that’s not right. There are times when a request creates an obligation. For it may be that apart form the request one’s reasons for an action were nearly conclusive, and with the request they become conclusive.

And besides that, a successfully transmitted request always creates a moral obligation to consider the request. Sometimes, the request may be quickly rejectable on the basis of a background policy. But a quick rejection still requires a consideration.

Questions, of course, are a type of request: they are a request for an answer. Thus, they too always create a moral obligation.

A proof that ought implies can

Some actions are are things I can do immediately: for instance, I can immediately raise my hand. Others require that I do something to enable myself to do the action: for instance, to teach in person, I have to go to the classroom, or to feed my children, I need to obtain food. So, here is a very plausible axiom of deontic logic:

1. If I ought to do A, and A is not an action I can do immediately, then I ought to bring it about that I can immediately do A.

Now, say that I remotely can do an action provided that I can immediately do it, or I can immediately bring it about that I can immediately do it, or I can immediately bring it about that I can immediately bring it about that I can immediately do it, or ….

It follows from (1) and a bit of reasoning that:

2. If I ought to do A, then I remotely can do A, or I have an infinite regress of prerequisite obligations.

But:

3. It is false that I have an infinite regress of prerequisite obligations.

So:

4. If I ought to do A, then I remotely can do A.

Weak promises

Commanding is meant to create an obligating reason for another, while requesting is meant to create a non-obligating one. Promising is meant to create an obligating reason for self. There is a natural spot in illocutionary space, then, for a speech act meant to create a non-obligating reason for self, a speech act type that stands to promising as requesting does to commanding.

We would expect that when I have a normative power, I also have the corresponding weaker powers. If a legislature can bind under pain of ten years' imprisonment, they can bind under pain of a week's imprisonment. If I can create an obligating reason for myself, I can create a non-obligating reason for myself. That's another reason to think that we would have the "weak promise" speech act that creates non-obligating reasons.

I am not sure we have good phrases to express weak promises. We can approximate the force of a weak promise by weaselly promissory wordage like "I'll try to do this" or "I'll take your needs into account".