Grounding grounding

Suppose Bill is a bachelor and Marcus is married. I claim that <Bill is a bachelor> stands in the same relation to <Bill is a never-married marriageable man> as <Marcus is a bachelor> stands to <Marcus is a never-married marriageable man>. But the propositions about Bill are true while those about Marcus are false. Since grounding is a relation that holds only between truths, the relevant relation that the two pairs of propositions have in common is not the grounding relation. It is something else. Call it ontological explanation, following Dan Johnson's dissertation. (Since, I think, explanation is factive, so that only truths can be explained, and they can only be explained by truths, ontological explanation isn't explanation strictly speaking.)

Abbreviate "<x is a bachelor>" as b_x and "<x is a never-married marriageable man>" as n_x. Then, necessarily, for every human being (at least) x, n_x ontologically explains b_x. Let B be Bill and M be Marcus. Then, n_B ontologically explains and grounds b_B, while n_M ontologically explains but does not ground b_M.

Moreover, we are in a position to offer a grounding for the proposition <n_B grounds b_B>. This grounding is given by the contingent truth n_B and the necessary truth <n_B ontologically explains b_B>. So at least in this case, the grounding truth is itself grounded in a truth about Bill together with a necessary truth of ontological explanation.

So at least sometimes we can find a grounding for grounding truths partly in terms of ontological explanation truths. This gives some evidence that ontological explanation facts are more primitive than grounding facts.

Is this pattern in general true? Is it the case that if p grounds q, then p together with <p ontologically explains q> grounds <p grounds q>? Not if ontological explanation is like Johnson thinks it is. For Johnson thinks that that if a ontologically explains b, then a is metaphysically necessary and sufficient for b. But p can ground q without being necessary for q: that I am sitting grounds that I am sitting or standing.

Perhaps we can modify Johnson's account by holding on to the sufficiency while dropping the necessity. Then we will have something like ontological explanation where a ontologically explains b only if a is metaphysically sufficient for b. In that case, the general pattern might hold. What grounds that <<I am sitting> grounds <I am sitting or standing>>? It is <I am sitting> and <<I am sitting> ontologically explains <I am sitting or standing>>. Of course, the falsehood <I am standing> also ontologically explains that I am sitting or standing.

If this is right, then we can get below the hood on grounding: the more primitive notion is ontological explanation (modified from Johnson's account as above). If Johnson is right to require necessity, we still can get below the hood on grounding in some cases.

Here is one reason all this might matter. Consider propositional desires other than beliefs. Let's say Marcus wishes he were a bachelor. It is important, both to Marcus and to the analysis of the situation, that <Marcus is a bachelor> is ontologically explained by <Marcus is a never-married marriageable man>. There is something about being never-married, or being marriageable, or being a man, or a combination of these that implicitly appeals to Marcus. (Likewise, ontological explanation seems potentially relevant to Double Effect.)

One could try to handle the stuff about ontological explanation by using counterfactual grounding. The relation between n_x and b_x is that n_x would ground (or would necessarily ground) b_x were n_x true. But it is implausible that such a counterfactual fact is prior to the grounding fact if x is Bill.

A puzzle about desire (and other propositional attitudes)

Sam and Francis each read a different newspaper article. Sam's article said that there was a newly produced element named "copernicium", and Sam came to have a desire that he expressed by saying to his agent: "I want you to buy me a pound of copernicium." Francis' article said that there was a newly produced element named "quinium", and Sam came to have a desire that he expressed by saying to his agent: "I want you to buy me a pound of quinium." Now, there is such a thing as copernicium, but the word "quinium" is pure made-up nonsense, and the article Francis read was an April Fools hoax.

What did Francis desire? It seems we can't say that he desired that his agent buy him a pound of quinium, since the italicized words fail to express a proposition, as the word "quinium" is nonsense. Maybe what Francis desires, thus, is that his agent buy him a pound of the element named "quinium". That's a perfect coherent, though unsatisfiable, desire. (But then again, practically speaking, a pound of copernicium is also not buyable—it seems that only a few atoms have been produced.) But if that's what Francis desires, then by parity it seems that what Sam desires is that his agent buy him a pound of the element named "copernicium", rather than a pound of copernicium. But that need not at all be what Francis desires—he may not care at all what the element is named.

Perhaps what we should say is that the appetitive state picks out the proposition that best matches the structure of the appetitive state. In the case of Sam, what best matches is that his agent buy him a pound of copernicium? In the case of Francis, what best matches is that his agent buy him a pound of what is called "quinium". Francis' propositional object is a less good match than Sam's, but it's in fact the best match available (let's suppose), and hence it is the desire-magnet.

In the above "what is called 'quinium'" is short for a longer and more complex description. I don't know exactly how to formulate it, but perhaps: "dthat element which is referred to as 'quinium' in this article".

Expressivism and non-doxastic propositional attitudes

One can fear that a certain medical procedure is wrong, one can hope that one's musical composition is beautiful, one can wish that a certain action be permissible, one can intend that one's children will make the right choices, one can be horrified that someone has committed a murder[note 1], one can promise that one will gain the contract in a morally licit way, one can rejoice that the expensive painting one has commissioned is good, etc. All of these are propositional attitudes. But the objects of propositional attitudes are propositions. Hence, that a medical procedure is wrong and that one's musical composition is beautiful (and and so on) are propositions, and expressivism is false.