From time to time I wonder why it is that we focus on big evils in
discussing the problem of evil. After all, first consider this
argument:
As far as we can tell, Alice’s cancer is a gratuitous
evil.
So, probably, there is a gratuitous evil.
If there is a God, there is no gratuitious evil.
So, probably, there is no God.
And then this one:
As far as we can tell, Bob’s stubbed toe is a gratuitous
evil.
So, probably, there is a gratuitous evil.
If there is a God, there is no gratuitious evil.
So, probably, there is no God.
The same kind of backing can be given to (1) and (5). We’ve thought
long and hard about Alice’s cancer and its connections to the rest of
the world, and can’t find a theodicy. We’ve thought long and hard about
BOb’s stubbed toe and its connections to the rest of the world, and
can’t find a theodicy. And the rest of the two arguments seems to flow
the same way. But as far as I can tell (!), nobody’s become an atheist
because of arguments like (5)-(8) while many have become atheists
because of arguments like (1)-(4).
What’s going on?
Here is one answer, which at times I’ve felt some pull towards: we
shouldn’t take (1)-(4) as seriously as we do.
Here is another answer: we should take (5)-(8) more seriously than we
do.
But there may be a good conservative answer, one that maintains our
intuition that (1)-(4) should be taken seriously while (5)-(8)
shouldn’t. There is a difference in the two arguments, and it lies in
the difference between the inference from (1) to (2) and the inference
from (5) to (6). In the cancer case, a good that would justify God’s
permission of the evil would have to be a very large good. In the
stubbed toe case, a justifying good could be pretty small. But it is
much easier to overlook a small good than a very large good. Thus, (5)
confers much less probability on the existence of gratuitous evil than
(1) does.
When I first thought of this conservative answer, I had the image of
an elephant: it’s hard to overlook an elephant in the room, but a
smaller thing is easier to overlook.
Is that a good image? Are bigger goods easier to see?
Sometimes. A tiny increment in pleasure may be hard to see just as
it’s hard to tell the difference in color between two nearby shades of
green. If the stubbed toe led to Bob having a slightly greater
appreciation of his health the next day, he might not notice.
On the other hand, some really big goods are things we may take for
granted, and they need to be pointed out first by some wise person for
us to expressly notice them. For instance, the value of human dignity.
However, goods that we take for granted are likely irrelevant here—for
goods that we take for granted are unlikely to be goods that need Bob’s
cancer to exist.
Furthermore, it may not be all about smaller things being harder to
see. Consider Rover the dog. How likely is it that there is a cat bigger
than Rover? Well, it is more likely when Rover is small than when Rover
is big. Similarly, if an evil is smaller, then it is more likely that it
is connected to good big enough to justfy it than if the evil is
bigger.
So, I think, one can make a case that the inference from a cancer to
gratuitous evil is better than the inference from a stubbed toe to a
gratuitious evil. But is it much, much better? That I am not sure about.
Yet we take (1)-(4) very seriously and we take (5)-(8) not seriously at
all. Even if we are right to take (1)-(4) more seriously than (5)-(8),
perhaps we make too big a difference between them. Perhaps we shouldn’t
take (1)-(4) quite as seriously as we do, and perhaps we should take
(5)-(8) more seriously, and perhaps both!
