Plausibly, there is a strong correlation between good deeds and salvation. Both are the fruit of God's grace. If evidential decision theory is correct, then the fact that good deeds correlate with salvation makes it rational to do good deeds. Thus, if evidential decision theory is correct, then it makes rational sense to do good deeds for self-interested reasons, even if the good deeds in no way causally contribute to salvation.
What conclusions could be drawn from this? Well, this means that even if sola fide were true, and good deeds in no way contributed to salvation, nonetheless it would be self-interestedly rational to do good deeds for the sake of salvation. This in turn means that those Protestants whose motivation for embracing sola fide is that the doctrine makes it not make sense to do good deeds for the sake of salvation either need to reject either evidential decision theory or their motivation for sola fide. Or one might draw a more ecumenical conclusion. If we all accept evidential decision theory, then our stance on the metaphysical question of sola fide need not affect our practices and motivations: Lutherans, Calvinists, Catholics and Pelagians can all consistently do good deeds for the sake of salvation.
The above argument would be particularly interesting if it turned out that causal decision theory requires indeterminism. For the above argument might give my Calvinist friends reason to reject evidential decision theory, and hence to embrace causal decision theory, and hence to reject determinism. (A Calvinist does not need to be a determinist. She could embrace the position that W. Grant Matthews attributes to Aquinas in a fairly recent issue of Faith and Philosophy.)
15 comments:
Plausibly, there is a strong correlation between good deeds and salvation.
Yes -- good deeds are the result of salvation.
Thus, if evidential decision theory is correct, then it makes rational sense to do good deeds for self-interested reasons, even if the good deeds in no way causally contribute to salvation.
This doesn't follow -- specifically the "for self-interested reasons." "Good deeds" are the result of the love that God has poured into our hearts and therefore self-interest cannot be the source, since "love ... is not self-seeking."
Good deeds are the result of the changed human nature that comes from the rebirth; that is, good deeds are the result of love -- not rational self-interest.
Maybe the way to make this objection work is like this: good deeds done out of love correlate with salvation; but good deeds done out of self-interest do not correlate with salvation.
But what if one loves out of self-interest? Or is the relevant kind of love such that it can't come from self-interest? (That seems plausible.)
Maybe the way to make this objection work is like this: good deeds done out of love correlate with salvation; but good deeds done out of self-interest do not correlate with salvation.
I would agree. Either "gold, silver, and precious stones" or "wood, hay, and stubble."
But what if one loves out of self-interest?
That's an oxymoron; a built-in contradiction. If self-interest is the source, it isn't love (agape).
On the other hand, we are to love others as we love ourselves. This presupposes that it is possible to have a love for ourselves, and hence it is legitimate to pursue our own good, and not just the good of others.
The crucial thing, of course, is that Christian agape is only possible as a fruit of grace.
Dr Pruss
I think "fiducia" is a desperate dependence on God, in the realisation that our good deeds cannot contribute to our salvation.
It is essential that we leave any notion of "merit" out of our theology of salvation.
Is this compatible with what you are saying here? I'm not sure what you mean by "for the sake of salvation". If you mean - so that we might earn it, or stand a chance of earning it, even in part, then there's an incompatibility.
If you mean something else - say, that salvation involves moral transformation, and that we must somehow choose to involve ourselves in that - then there's room for agreement, and probably mutual edification.
"The crucial thing, of course, is that Christian agape is only possible as a fruit of grace."
This seems to be a crucial point of agreement.
My thoughts, FWIW, were much like wrf3's. There is a correlation between good deeds and salvation, but not good-deeds-out-of-self-interest and salvation. Indeed, depending on how we want to slice "good deeds" they may not be possible without salvation or at least divinely-granted charity.
Loving God out of self-interest is a bit like buying your wife flowers so you can be happier in your marriage. Maybe that will work...but it's a distinctly second-rate motivation, and if your wife finds out your motivations, it's not likely to work well. In the same way I think we are to love God for his sake, not for ours, and only then is it genuine love.
That doesn't militate against love for oneself. It's ok to love yourself for your own sake, since you are the object as well as the subject of that love.
If say that there is a correlation between good deeds done out of love and salvation, and we accept evidential decision theory, then we have to say that it is in one's interest to do good deeds out of love. It's self-interestedly rational to do good deeds out of love. But it is not possible to do this out of self-interested rationality (and this disagrees with what I said in the post).
So there are some actions that are in one's interest but that can't be done out of one's interest. That's related to Gauthier and Parfit stuff.
On the other hand, we are to love others as we love ourselves. This presupposes that it is possible to have a love for ourselves, and hence it is legitimate to pursue our own good, and not just the good of others.
The issue is not whether or not it is legitimate to pursue our own good (I think we agree that it is), but rather the reason for that pursuit. Is it out of self-interest or something else? I want to stress that "self-interest" cannot be a motivator for the truly Christian life. "He must increase but I must decrease". "Take up your cross and follow me." "I die daily..."
We love ourselves, not because it is in our self-interest to do so, but because we love God, and His interest in us entails what is best for us -- even if that ends up temporally in what the world thinks is wrong. As St. Paul so eloquently wrote, "We are fools for the sake of Christ... We are weak... [and are held] in disrepute. To the present hour we are hungry and thirsty, we are poorly clothed and beaten and homeless, and we grow weary from the work of our own hands. When reviled, we bless; when persecuted, we endure; when slandered, we speak kindly. We have become like the rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day."
Dr. Pruss,
You've misstated the Protestant position:
1. According to sola fide, sinners are *justified* by faith alone. That's not equivalent to saying that sinners are *saved* by faith alone. Salvation is inclusive of justification, but broader than salvation.
2. In Protestant theology (except for some antinomian fringe groups), good works are a necessary condition of salvation–for good works reflect the outworking of regeneration and sanctification, without which a sinner can't be saved.
At the same time, good works also reflect the outworking of God's grace (a cause/effect relation). And in Calvinism (to be more specific), good works are the inevitable outcome of (monergistic) regeneration.
So your syllogism is defective.
Steve:
Ad 1: Thank you for the precification. I was using "salvation" in a loose sense.
Ad 2: I am not sure how the fact that good works are a necessary outcome of regeneration does anything to affect my argument. My argument requires the thesis that good works are correlated with justification. If they are a necessary condition for regeneration, and regeneration is a necessary consequence of justification, then good works are correlated with justification.
Dr. Pruss,
You said: "Well, this means that even if sola fide were true, and good deeds in no way contributed to salvation, nonetheless it would be self-interestedly rational to do good deeds for the sake of salvation. This in turn means that those Protestants whose motivation for embracing sola fide is that the doctrine makes it not make sense to do good deeds for the sake of salvation either need to reject either evidential decision theory or their motivation for sola fide."
However, Protestants don't deny that there's a sense in which good works "contribute" to salvation. Rather, they deny that good works contribute to justification.
Consistent with sola fide, a Protestant can be motivated to do good works for a variety of reasons:
i) Out of gratitude to God.
ii) In the realization that good works are a necessary effect of regeneration and sanctification–without which no one will be saved. (That would be a self-interested motive, but not the only motive.)
iii) And even if they aren't consciously motivated to do good works, they can be subconsciously motivated to do good works, for regeneration and sanctification restore a disposition to do good works.
Alexander R Pruss said...
"If they are a necessary condition for regeneration..."
At best, that's a misleading way to state the interrelation. Regeneration is causally prior to good works.
Alexander R Pruss said...
"Thank you for the precification. I was using 'salvation' in a loose sense."
Okay, but "sola fide" is a technical term in historical theology. A term of art with a specialized meaning. To avoid a fallacy of equivocation, you need to define your idiosyncratic usage if you're going to employ nonstandard usage when you use theological nomenclature.
The argument works just fine if you substitute "justification" for "salvation", which is what I meant. Or one can just substitute: "getting into heaven."
Note that my target wasn't all Protestants. It was those Protestants who think it doesn't make sense to do good works out of self-interest in justification. I was pointing out that if we accept evidential decision theory, it makes sense to do good works on account of salvation / justification / getting into heaven. (The argument works in all three cases.)
In philosophese, X is a necessary condition for Y if and only if it is necessary that: if Y holds, X holds. In particular, if X is a necessary consequence of Y, then X is a necessary condition for Y. In ordinary English, "necessary condition" suggests a kind of priority, but I didn't mean to suggest that in my comment.
I should add that I don't accept evidential decision theory.
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