Principles of Alternate Possibilities and God
- (Premise) If x chooses A, then x chooses A over some alternative B such that x deliberated over both A and B.
- (Premise) A perfectly rational being does not deliberate over options he knows with certainty to be impossible for him to choose.
- (Premise) If x is an omniscient being, then x knows with certainty exactly which options it is impossible for him to choose.
- (Premise) God is omniscient and perfectly rational.
- Therefore, God knows with certainty exactly which options it is impossible for him to choose. (3 and 4)
- Therefore, God does not deliberate over any options that it is impossible for him to choose. (2 and 5)
- Therefore, if God chooses A, then God chooses A over some alternative B such that it was possible for God to choose B. (1 and 6)
1 comment:
There is something funny about this that I have a hard time putting my finger on. Maybe this:
The argument treats (God's) deliberation as a process which has less information on the front end and more information once it's complete, i.e. the information about what one intends to do. Then God's omniscience is supposed to make this problematic, since God already knows what he's capable of.
But here is a different way to think of it. God's omniscience is a product of his "deliberation" or rather decision-making; he has decided how things will be and that's why he knows about them ahead of time.
On this view, we cannot understand divine deliberation in terms of an increase of information over the process, though that may be an okay approximation for some purposes.
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