Consider these two rules of doxastic practice:
- Modus Ponens (MP): If you believe that p and you believe that if p, then q, then infer q.
- Affirming the Consequent (AC): If you believe that q and you believe that if p, then q, then infer p.
- Necessarily, if it is true that p and it is true that if p, then q, then it is true that q.
- Possibly, it is true that q, it is true that if p, then q, but it is not true that p.
- MP is a more effective way of getting to truth than AC.
But (3) does not necessarily follow from (1) and (2). For instance, from (1) and (2), we get these claims:
- Necessarily, if all your beliefs are true, and you apply MP to generate a new belief, your beliefs will still be all true.
- Possibly, all your beliefs are true, and you apply AC to generate a new belief, and your resulting beliefs are not all true.
Imagine Sam. Most of Sam's beliefs are true. But in cases in which he believes that if p, then q, it is more often true that the converse conditional is true than that this conditional is true. It could very well be the case for Sam that following AC is a more effective way of getting to truth than following MP is.
Or imagine Dory. While most of her beliefs are true, and it is more often the case when she believes that if p, then q, that this conditional is true than that the converse conditional is true, nonetheless due to some cause she happens to tend to apply AC or MP almost only in cases where only the converse conditional is true. Again, for her following AC is a more effective way of getting to truth than following MP is.
Of course, I expect that for most if not all of us MP is a more effective way of getting to truth than AC. But there is no necessity in this. In particular, that MP is a more effective way of getting to truth than AC is not a thesis of logic (but of what? psychology? natural theology?). Nothing surprising about that, of course.
2 comments:
It might well be that what can be construed as affirming the consequent is also inductively a decent inductive inference. So, for instance, if P(Q|P) is high, and you observe Q, then P is (more) likely. Your theory P predicts Q and that is what we see. So, even if the deductive construction is a fallacy, there is another inductive construction that is a decent piece of reasoning. This is larger part of the smaller moral that what is a bad piece of deductive reasoning on one formal representation, might be good on another. It just cuts across deductive and inductive representations.
Right--bad deductive reasoning is often good inductive reasoning. Typically, p is evidence for p-and-q, p-or-q is evidence for p, etc.
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