Saturday, January 11, 2014

Two arguments for extended simples

A simple is something that lacks proper parts. An extended simple is a simple that occupies a region of space that is more than a point.

  1. If I am not simple, then I think with a proper part of me.
  2. I do not think with a proper part of me.
  3. So, I am a simple.
  4. I am extended.
  5. So, I am an extended simple.
  6. So, there is an extended simple.
The thought behind (1) is that if I am not simple, then my brain and/or my soul are going to be parts of me in the true ontology, and surely if the true ontology contains them, then I think with them. The thought behind (2) is that if A is a proper part of B, and I think with A, then A is a better candidate than B for being me. And (4) follows from the fact that I am 182 cm tall.

While I am inclined to accept (6), I find the argument for (2) weak. I would find it stronger if one could conclude from the fact that I think with A that A thinks, but I don't see that that follows.

Maybe a better argument:

  1. No particle occupies just one point.
  2. All particles occupy space.
  3. Some particles are simple.
  4. Something that occupies space but does not occupy just one point is extended.
  5. So, there is an extended simple.
The thought behind (7) is that in real life no particle has a wavefunction that is concentrated at one point.

Here, I am actually not sure of (10).

2 comments:

Heath White said...

[First: (3) Should be "I am a simple."]

The first argument seems to hinge on the claim that "thinking" is something done by a simple.

Compare: "If I am not a simple, then I swim with a proper part of me." Well, in one way yes and in one way no: I certainly use proper parts of me in swimming, but it is not like they could do the swimming in the absence of me, or the rest of me.

One might hold that "thinking" like "swimming" is something done by a non-simple but in such an organic way that no strictly proper part of me could do it.

Alexander R Pruss said...

I think swimming may be more holistic than thinking. If I were reduced to just a head-and-soul, I would continue to think. Moreover, as long as the sensory input through the neck was unchanged, my thinking wouldn't substantially change--I might not even notice the change.