Sunday, April 6, 2014

Knowing that you can't do otherwise

Suppose as is very plausible (except for dubious interpretations of "can do otherwise") that you know that

  1. Determinism implies that you cannot ever do otherwise than you in fact do.
Suppose you also know that
  1. You will in fact do A,
say by induction from what you've done in similar circumstances. Finally, suppose that you know that
  1. Determinism holds.
Then you know premises sufficient to conclude that you cannot do otherwise than A. So, plausibly, you are in a position to know that
  1. You cannot do otherwise than A.

This is interesting. For while determinism does not by itself guarantee the possibility of knowledge of how you are determined to act, it turns out that with a bit of induction and reflection, if you know determinism to be true, you are in a position to know what you are determined to do.

It is also plausible that:

  1. When you know you cannot do otherwise than A, then you are not freely choosing A.
For take Locke's locked room example. You're having great fun at the party, and don't want to leave, but unbeknownst to you, the door is locked so you can't leave. Then maybe Locke is right that you're freely staying at the party. But as soon as you find out that the door is locked, surely you're no longer freely choosing to stay at the party. The same is plausible in more sophisticated Frankfurt cases. Note that (5) can be accepted by a compatibilist.

But now we get the interesting conclusion that if you know determinism to be true, that knowledge could very well undercut some of our freedom. For it could boost knowledge of what we will in fact do to knowledge of what we will have to do.

Objection 1: Knowledge of what we will in fact do does take away freedom, so knowing that we will have to do it doesn't take away any freedom that wouldn't already have been taken away.

Response: I know I will eat lunch today, but that doesn't take away my freedom.

Objection 2: Claim (5) is no more plausible than the disjunction of the following two principles:

  1. When you have a belief with knowledge-level justification that you cannot do otherwise than A and you think you know that you cannot do otherwise than A, then you are not freely choosing to do A
  2. When you cannot do otherwise than A, then you are not freely choosing to do A.
For the work in (5) is either done by the justified belief or by the factiveness of knowledge—it surely isn't done by anti-Gettier conditions or even by a combination of the constituents of knowledge. Now (7) begs the question against those determinists who grant (1), while (6) is false. Here's a counterexample to (6). You have knowledge-level justification that you cannot resist some temptation, and you think you know this. But being a fallibilist about knowledge you decide to try anyway, since you can try to do even what you know is impossible. And you succeed, because you didn't in fact know. So, the reason to accept (5) is a disjunction of two claims, one of which has been shown false and the other is dialectically unacceptable, so (5) is dialectically unacceptable.

Response: Maybe. But maybe the right way to reason is this. Clearly (5) is true. Now, there are two initially plausible explanations for (5), namely (6) and (7). Since (6) is false, that leaves (7). So we have an inference to best explanation from (6) to (7). And so, even though previously I was only arguing for the interesting conclusion that knowledge of determinism could take away some freedom, we have arrived at an argument for incompatibilism. The argument starts with (5), concludes to (7) by inference to best explanation, then adds (1), and concludes that freedom is incompatible with determinism.

8 comments:

Brett Lunn said...

Why shouldn't (2) be thought of as open to other inductive factors that decrease the warrant for knowledge? For instance, there might be a certain probability that I purposely do not do something that it is obvious enough that I will do just for spontaneity's sake or some other reason (in fact, this is certainly true for certain people).

As to (5), I'm not so sure myself. Say I'm at Locke's Party and I'm deciding to stick around even though the doors are locked. Someone then comes around and tells me that the door are locked. I'm a bit incredulous so I go and check it out for myself. "What good fun," I exclaim, "it is like Poe's "The Masque [or Mask] of the Red Death! Nonetheless, this party is great fun so I am going to stick around." My interlocutor responds, "Well of course you are, because you are not freely choosing to do so." And yet it seems natural to me to respond with, "Of course I'm freely choosing to stick around, why does this change anything?"

That conversation seems natural enough to me. Why doesn't it seem like that for you?

Brett Lunn said...

Here is an argument against (5):

(1) If Peter knows that Jesus is God and what that entails, then Peter knows that if Jesus says A then he knows he cannot do otherwise than A.
(2) Jesus says that Peter will deny Him three times.
(3) Whether or not Peter knows that Jesus is God and what that entails, Peter is still morally responsible for denying Jesus three times.
(4) If someone is not freely choosing A, then that person is not morally responsible for A.
(5) Peter knows that Jesus is God and what that entails.
(6) Therefore, Peter knows that if Jesus says A then he knows he cannot do otherwise than A. [(1) and (5)]
(7) Therefore, Peter knows that he cannot do otherwise than deny Jesus three times. [(2) and (6)]
(8) Therefore, Peter is morally responsible for denying Jesus three times. [(3)]
(9) Therefore, Peter is freely choosing to deny Jesus three times. [(4) and (8)]
(10) Therefore, Peter both knows that he cannot do otherwise than deny Jesus three times and yet he is freely choosing to deny Jesus three times. [(7) and (9)]
(11) Therefore, a person can both know they cannot do otherwise than A and still freely choose A. [(10)]

I suppose I will see which premises you disagree with and then maybe see if you are right or if I can give a defense for them at that point. I think the big hangup will be (3), so this is sort of an argument to see if you have conflicting intuitions with regards to (5).

Drew said...

(1) in that argument against (5) is a scope fallacy. It is not possible that (Jesus knows Peter will deny and Peter does not deny)

This does not entail, nor is it equivalent to: If Jesus knows that Peter will deny, then it is not possible that Peter will not deny.

Alexander R Pruss said...

Brett:

Sure, one's knowledge of (2) might defeated. But it won't always be defeated.

You can certainly *want* to stay at the party. But you're not freely choosing to do so, any more than you're freely choosing right now not to be turned by a magician into a frog. Of course, you want to not be turned into a frog, but since there is no possibility of your being turned into a frog, you're not making any choice.

Alexander R Pruss said...

There is a howler in Objection 2. The argument given doesn't (directly) support the claim

(not-6): You can have justified belief that you can't do A and yet freely choose not to do A.

Rather, it supports the claim

(*): You can have justified belief that you can't do A and yet freely do A.

Moreover, my direct argument against compatibilism in my response to Objection 2 also has no force if the argument against (6) fails.

I do think there is now a direct objection to (5) in the spirit of Objection 2. Suppose that I am told that if I don't trisect an angle, my rich uncle, whose inheritor I am, will be killed. I know I can't trisect an angle. But I could at least try, just in case I'm mistaken (I can't be mistaken if I know, but I can be mistaken that I know). I consider trying, am fully capable of trying, but I choose not to try. Surely I am now freely not trisecting an angle.

I am not so sure, though. I am freely not *trying* to trisect an angle. But that's not the same as freely not trisecting. This is all very confusing to me.

Brett Lunn said...

Drew,

Right, but if can do otherwise is taken to mean given different circumstances (Jesus says A in one case and not in another), then how exactly is the phrase now being used differently compared to how some compatibilists want to construe it?


Alex,

On the first point, I'm willing to grant that.

As to the second point, I wonder if it can be turned on its head given that we can try to do what we know is impossible. I would have to think about it more though. It seems to me that this might turn into your last comment about trisecting an angle, but it might be stronger since there is not a wanting and doing but simply a wanting (someone else is the doer).

Drew said...

Brett, I am not using "can do otherwise" to mean different circumstances. Can and will are two totally different claims.

"Alex will eat lunch today" is a de facto claim.

"Alex can eat lunch today" is a modal claim.

To say that you will not do otherwise is not to say that you cannot do otherwise, even given the same circumstances.

Sam Harper said...

I wonder what you would make of the following scenario.

Suppose Jim has libertarian freedom. And suppose God knows that Jim is about to have a Dr. Pepper. Can God tell him? Or, if God tells him, can Jim choose to do otherwise?