If God is not simple, he has infinitely many really distinct features. Moreover infinitely many of these features will be involved in creation, e.g., because there are infinitely many reasons that favor the creation of this world, and for each reason God will plausibly have a distinct feature of being impressed by that reason. But causal finitism (the doctrine that infinitely many things can't come together causally) rules this out. So divine simplicity is true.
Assuming causal finitism, the thing that one might challenge is the claim that infinitely many of God's features are causally efficacious.
There is an even easier argument for divine simplicity based if actual infinites are impossible. For, surely, either (a) God is simple or (b) God has infinitely many really distinct features. If actual infinites are impossible, that rules out (b).
Assuming causal finitism, the thing that one might challenge is the claim that infinitely many of God's features are causally efficacious.
There is an even easier argument for divine simplicity based if actual infinites are impossible. For, surely, either (a) God is simple or (b) God has infinitely many really distinct features. If actual infinites are impossible, that rules out (b).
7 comments:
Dr Pruss
I am not sure if its true that if God is not simple, he has infinitely many really distinct features.
Suppose God has only three really distinct features?
Well, there is knowledge of all mathematics, knowledge of all physics, knowledge of all psychology, knowledge of future choices, etc. That's already four. And surely we can multiply indefinitely.
Now, maybe you can say: "There is just one feature here, omniscience. God's knowledge of psychology and God's knowledge of mathematics are not really distinct."
But once you allow for such seemingly different things as not really distinct, then you lose the motivation for having any distinctions between features, I think.
I personally think that knowledge of mathematics and knowledge of human psychology have to be distinct if human being have libertarian free will. Otherwise my choice between A and B would be based on mathematics. But I can imagine people treating omniscience as one feature, while treating omnipotence as a distinct feature and perhaps omnibenevolence as a third one.
It seem imaginable that somebody knows everything but is incapable of creating something, or that somebody is capable of creating everything he wants, but has a really evil character etc.
In short, lots of people talk about a tri-omni God and while there may be arguments against those three features being distinct, it is not at all obvious that they aren't.
Dr. Pruss,
Recently, I've been thinking of an alternative route how to go from causal finitism is true to the conclusion that God (as understood in Divine Simplicity) exists.
1. Either existential inertia theory (the theory that things can exist without a cause sustaining it in existence) or Divine Conservation theory (the theory that it's God, specifically as understood by Thomists, sustains everything in existence) is true.
2. The best account for existential inertia theory is the view that what explains the existence of a thing right now (at t=n), is its previous existence (at t=n-1) being carried over at t=n in the absence of anything that causes such things not to exist anymore.
3. If causal finitism is true, then the universe existed at t=0.
4. Causal finitism is true.
5. Therefore, the universe existed at t=0.
6. At t=0, there is no existence prior to it (at t=-1).
7. If existential inertia theory is true, then the universe cannot exist because there is no prior existence or prior cause (temporally speaking) that can cause it to exist at t=0.
7. Therefore, existential inertia theory is false.
8. Therefore, Divine Conservation theory is true.
9. Therefore, God exists.
I think (2) is not right. According to existential inertia, in the case of beings THAT HAD A PRIOR EXISTENCE, what explains current existence is the carrying over of previous existence. But the case of things that had no prior existence, existential inertia is irrelevant. Thus, if you were conceived at this moment, existential inertia is irrelevant.
Dr. Pruss,
Thank you for your comment.
Perhaps, I am thinking as to why is it the case that the premise by Dr. Craig "Whatever begins to exist has a cause" is true, especially if the being in question is something like the initial state of Big Bang where the universe existed already at t=0 while there is nothing temporally prior to it.
The common justification for the causal principle of Craig's version of Kalam is that nothing comes from nothing, but I don't think that the initial state of Big Bang is remotely like this, and the initial state does not violate the principle that nothing comes from nothing. It's because some atheists don't claim that the universe suddenly pop into existence, but it just had existence at t=0 which is the beginning of its existence.
It seems to me that if an atheist believes in an existential inertia, and there is no prior existence that explains the existence of universe at t=0, then this requires an explanation for its existence, similar to per se cause of Thomistic arguments.
It seems easy to see the error of atheists if they claim that the universe suddenly popped into existence without any cause because that involves a contradiction (like nothing comes from nothing, only something in act can actualize a potential, only something that exists can bring an effect, etc). But, for kalaam cosmological argument (and not Leibnizian), I'm just curious of your approach to show that the beginning of the universe requires a cause. In your article "Causal Finitism and Kalaam Argument", you provided a version of KCA such as:
(1) There is a cause.
(2) There is no circle of causes.
(3) There is no innite regress of causes.
(4) If (1) (3), there is an uncaused cause.
(5) So, there is an uncaused cause.
(6) If there is an uncaused cause, God exists.
(7) So, God exists.
http://alexanderpruss.com/papers/kalaam.pdf
Although the purpose of the article is to show that there is an uncaused cause without discussing why it has to be God, I would like to know your general approach for proving (6).
Also, I would just like to ask for confirmation for the following. This seems to be one argument I think of against causal finitism and/or infinite past.
Premise 1: An actual infinite is a collection of infinite things that exist all at once.
Premise 2:. An infinite history is a collection of an actual infinite past moments.
Conclusion 1: Therefore, an infinite history is a collection of infinite past moments that exist all at once.
Premise 3: All moments that exist all at once is just one moment (which is what we call as "now").
Conclusion 2:. Therefore, an infinite history is a collection of infinite past moments and just one moment.
Premise 4: An infinite collection of moments is contradictory to one moment.
Conclusion 3: Therefore, an infinite history is a contradiction and logically impossible.
One can edit this argument by saying that:
Premise 1: An actual infinite is a collection of infinite things that exist all at once.
Premise 2:. An infinite history is a collection of an actual infinite past moments.
Conclusion 1: Therefore, an infinite history is a collection of infinite past moments that exist all at once.
Premise 3: If an infinite past is possible, then it's possible for a being to experience an actual set of infinite moments of time.
Premise 4: All moments that exist all at once is just one moment (which is what we call as "now").
Conclusion 2:. Therefore, if an infinite past is possible, it's possible for a being to experience infinite moments of time and one moment of time.
Premise 4: An infinite collection of moments is contradictory to one moment is a logical impossibility.
Conclusion 3: Therefore, infinite past is impossible.
Looking forward to your reply. Although I am a bit more comfortable with Thomistic type of arguments, I am thinking how I can possibly use the Kalaam argument for apologetics based on my intuitions as I explained here.
Post a Comment