Plausibly:
- If the universe came into existence either for no cause at all or randomly, it is a priori more likely that it came into existence in a higher-entropy state rather than a lower-entropy one.
- If the universe came into existence fully-formed five minutes ago ("five minute hypothesis"), it came into existence in a higher-entropy state than if it came into existence 13.8 billion years ago ("scientific orthodoxy").
- So, if the universe came into existence either for no cause at all or randomly, the five minute hypothesis would be a priori more likely than scientific orthodoxy.
- But there is no a posteriori evidence for scientific orthodoxy over the five minute hypothesis.
- So, if we think the universe came into existence either for no cause at all or randomly, it is not rationally consistent for us to believe scientific orthodoxy over the five minute hypothesis.
Of course, I think we should believe scientific orthodoxy over the five minute hypothesis, so we should reject the no-cause and randomness hypotheses in (1).
An amusing rhetorical way to present the argument is that if the universe came into existence for no cause at all or randomly, we shouldn't prefer scientific orthodoxy to certain young earth views.
8 comments:
This is a really cool argument. I don't think people realize just how pernicious an abandonment of the causal presumption would be to their entire scientific worldview (unless they opt for an open embracing of the Taxi-Cab Fallacy, I suppose).
The five minute hypothesis, like brain-in-a-vat, would be consistent with almost any present evidence. So we cannot reject it on the basis of evidence (premise 4). But for just this reason, it is completely useless; if true, it would tell us almost nothing about the present that we don’t already know. We don’t so much reject it as ignore it. Scientific orthodoxy, by contrast, makes strong statements about the present state of the universe. And these statements mostly seem to be true. So we run with it (without necessarily believing it) for as long as it seems to work. Then we change it...
Hi Dr. Pruss
I have been formulating 5 arguments in support of a causal over an acausal universe in turn for supporting P1 of a Kalam Cosmological Argument. Your argument here is intriguing and would add a 6th argument in support of a causal universe.
However I'm not sure how in P1
If the universe came into existence either for no cause at all or randomly, it is a priori more likely that it came into existence in a higher-entropy state rather than a lower-entropy one.
you derive that, 'it is a priori more likely that it came into existnce in a higher-entropy state rather than a lower-entropy state'
Could you elaborate when you have the time?
Thanks
Matt
A standard explanation of why entropy is increasing is that, roughly, there are a lot more high-entropy states than low-entropy ones, so it is much more likely that one will transition from low to high entropy rather than the other way around.
Thanks, I appreciate you taking to the time to provide feedback.
Hello Dr. Pruss,
I apologize if this is the wrong place to leave this comment, I didn't know quite where to put it. I am a 22 year old Christian philosophy student at Seattle Pacific University and I am just starting to study the contingency argument (in a few different formulations) right now. I wanted to ask what could be said against an objector who says, "Why assume nothingness as the norm and existence needing the explanation?" What can I say in response to this? If this has been dealt with in your (or somebody else's)published work, please direct me toward whatever I should be reading.
Thank you for your time,
Chris
The PSR-based arguments don't depend on any nothingness-as-norm principle. They say, simply, that when there is something contingent, that needs an explanation. If there were, per impossibile, nothing, that too would need an explanation.
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